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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In what may be an oversimplification, we introduce our 
opinion on this appeal by setting forth that the central 
controversy is a dispute over whether African American students 
in the Lower Merion School District (“LMSD”) public schools 
in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of 
appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and 
segregation in violation of federal law.  The plaintiffs 
unsuccessfully brought this action pursuant to the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et 
seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 
  10 
§§ 12101, 12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the 
“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 
state law, claiming that African American students in the LMSD 
suffered from such discrimination.
1
  They now appeal from 
portions of the District Court’s orders on federal issues entered 
                                               
1
 During the course of the District Court proceedings, plaintiffs, 
based on a then recent examination by a psychologist, asserted 
that five or six of the student plaintiffs had been identified 
incorrectly as being learning disabled.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 
2013, at 12, 14, 19, 36.  Therefore, at oral argument before us 
the parties focused on the Title VI and § 1983 claims, as the 
District Court had held that the IDEA, ADA and RA were 
inapplicable to the claims of the plaintiffs who by then 
contended that they wrongly had been identified.  The plaintiffs’ 
arguments were further limited because the IDEA, ADA, and 
RA claims of all individual plaintiffs except those of one family, 
the Blunts, were dismissed as a result of their failure to exhaust 
IDEA administrative remedies.   Recently, however, in a related 
case, S.H. v. Lower Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248 (3d 
Cir. 2013), involving litigants who also are parties to this action, 
we held that students incorrectly identified as learning disabled 
may not bring claims under the IDEA, though they still may 
have claims under the RA and the ADA.  Id. at 257, 260-61.   
But, as far as we can ascertain, Amber Blunt, a student plaintiff, 
and her parents continue to press their original claims under the 
IDEA.  Consequently, we address a statute of limitations issue 
relating to their IDEA claims even though Amber now claims 
that she is not learning disabled. 
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at various times during the course of the litigation.  We, 
however, are not concerned with the substance of the state law 
claims on this appeal as the District Court did not exercise 
jurisdiction over those claims.   
This case encompasses a myriad of legal issues, including 
standing to bring suit, application of a statute of limitations, res 
judicata (claim preclusion), application of disability laws, 
appropriateness of education provided to students, anti-
discrimination laws, and sections of the Code of Federal 
Regulations implementing the applicable laws.  The case on 
appeal also includes a cross-appeal by the LMSD, but we will 
dismiss the cross-appeal without deciding it on the merits as it is 
moot.  The District Court found that the plaintiffs did not 
present sufficient evidence to survive LMSD’s motion for 
summary judgment on the discrimination charges and the Court 
dismissed plaintiffs’ other claims for other reasons.  Thus, the 
Court did not find that there had been any violations of federal 
law.     
Plaintiffs, now appellants, appeal from the District 
Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order 
granting a final summary judgment to defendant  LMSD and 
against all the plaintiffs in the case remaining at the time that the 
Court granted summary judgment, the Court already having 
dismissed several of the parties and claims from the case by 
previous orders.
2
  Appellants also appeal from rulings in two 
                                               
2
 Throughout the opinion we sometimes refer to the plaintiffs 
and appellants collectively even though two different groups of 
plaintiffs filed separate appeals which have been consolidated 
  12 
intermediate orders that became final at the time of the entry of 
the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, 
namely: the dismissal of all claims of plaintiffs, now appellants, 
Amber Blunt, a now former student at LMSD, and Crystal and 
Michael Blunt, her parents, in the District Court’s memorandum 
and order of February 15, 2008, the “February 15, 2008 Order”; 
the dismissal of all plaintiffs’ claims against the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education (“PDE”) in the District Court’s order 
and memorandum of August 19, 2009, the “August 19, 2009 
Order”; and the dismissal of plaintiff Concerned Black Parents 
of Mainline Inc. (“CBP”) as a party in the District Court’s 
August 19, 2009 Order for lack of standing.  Appellants’ No. 
11-4201 br. at 1. 
Plaintiffs, with the exception of the CBP and the 
mainline branch of the NAACP (the “NAACP”), are present and 
past African American students of the Lower Merion Township 
public schools, who were placed in remedial classes after being 
identified as learning “disabled” under the IDEA and/or those 
students’ parents.  The plaintiffs repeatedly used the term 
“disabled” to describe the student plaintiffs throughout the 
pleadings, a term consistent with the IDEA, a statute under 
which they were making claims, as the IDEA safeguards the 
                                                                                                         
along with the cross-appeal of the LMSD.  Though LMSD is a 
cross-appellant we do not include it when we refer to appellants. 
 We usually refer to the parties who brought this action as 
plaintiffs when describing proceedings in the District Court and 
as appellants when describing proceedings in this Court. 
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rights of disabled students.  Nevertheless, at this stage in the 
litigation some appellants argue that the LMSD incorrectly 
identified them as learning disabled,
3
 thereby causing them 
injury.
4
  Appellants claim that their placement in remedial 
                                               
3
 Even though by the time that the District Court considered the 
motion for summary judgment most of the student plaintiffs 
remaining in the case asserted that they had been misidentified 
as learning disabled, the pleadings continued to identify the 
students as learning disabled.  In rendering its opinion on the 
summary judgment motion, notwithstanding the pleadings, the 
Court assumed with two exceptions that the student plaintiffs 
were not disabled.  We also note that Appellants’ No. 11-4201 
br. at 1 n.2 recites that the correct name of Concerned Black 
Parents of Mainline Inc. is simply Concerned Black Parents, Inc. 
4
 The Code of Federal Regulations sets forth that:  
Child with a disability means a child evaluated in 
accordance with §§ 300.304 through 300.311 as having 
mental retardation, a hearing impairment (including 
deafness), a speech or language impairment, a visual 
impairment (including blindness), a serious emotional 
disturbance (referred to in this part as ‘emotional 
disturbance’), an orthopedic impairment, autism, 
traumatic brain injury, an other [sic] health impairment, a 
specific learning disability, deaf-blindness, or multiple 
disabilities, and who, by reason thereof, needs special 
education and related services.  
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1). 
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classes had a negative impact on their opportunity for 
educational advancement, but by the time of the proceedings on 
the motion for summary judgment they were seeking relief in 
the District Court only pursuant to Title VI and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  Appellants’ case is largely based on their 
contention that the disproportionate placement of African 
American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory 
purpose and was the result of racial bias.
5
     
Ultimately, the summary judgment question turns on 
whether there is enough record evidence to establish that LMSD 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs, whether 
through its own actions or by failing to correct a third party’s 
                                                                                                         
 
5
 Initially, the individually named students sought to bring their 
claims on their own behalf and on behalf of the students 
similarly situated as a class action; however, the District Court 
ruled that class certification was inappropriate due to the highly 
individualized aspects of each student’s claims.  (No. 2:07-cv-
3100, Doc. No. 124).  At oral argument, one appellants’ 
attorney acknowledged that the District Court had been correct 
in not certifying the case as a class action (Tr. Oral Arg. June 
11, 2013, at 6:18-21, 14:4-7 (“You can’t remedy it as a class 
action . . . because of the individual issues.”)), and thus 
appellants no longer seek to proceed in this case on a class 
action basis. 
 
  15 
intentional discrimination.  Looking at the whole record, which 
includes statistical evidence showing that minorities are 
overrepresented in low achievement classes, we conclude that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s 
intent.  There is no evidence showing that the District intended 
to discriminate against plaintiffs, nor that LMSD had knowledge 
of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, 
including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices 
against African American students as a form of intentional 
discrimination.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment. 
 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This suit has had many plaintiffs and defendants, though 
some have come and gone, and includes many related issues and 
claims.
6
  We now are dealing with what is left of this litigation 
                                               
6
 The District Court’s docket sheets lists numerous cases with 
separate numbers as being related to this action.  It is 
particularly significant that in a related case, S.H. v. Lower 
Merion School District, No. 2:10-cv-06070, in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania involving two of the same litigants that 
are parties in this case, Carol Durrell and her daughter, 
identified in that case as “S.H.” and in this case as “Saleema 
Hall,” that we have decided an appeal in a precedential opinion. 
 See S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Saleema Hall is identified as a litigant in the most recent 
version of the complaint in this case in the caption as is her 
sister, Chantae Hall and her mother, Carol Durrell.   
  16 
by entertaining the present appeals which have been 
consolidated with the cross-appeal in this Court under No. 11-
4200.
7
   
The plaintiffs filed the original complaint on July 30, 
2007.  At that time the plaintiffs were current or former students 
in the LMSD, four parents, and the two organizations that we 
have identified.
8
  The original defendants were the LMSD and 
                                                                                                         
We note that S.H. changed her theory of recovery in the 
other action from her theory in this case, although she filed it 
under the same statutes based on the same set of facts on which 
she previously had relied in this case.  Her theory in the other 
action was that she is not and never has been learning disabled 
and was placed improperly in special education classes.  Id. at 
255-56.  Other student plaintiffs in this case have asserted the 
same theory of liability (incorrect identification as learning 
disabled), but inasmuch as Saleema Hall and Carroll Durell have 
not withdrawn as plaintiffs in this litigation (they were named in 
the third amended complaint) it appears that they press their 
claims in the two cases on both theories though they are 
inconsistent.   
7
 DLA Piper, LLP and the Public Interest Law Center of 
Philadelphia represent separate groups of appellants and have 
filed separate briefs on their behalf.  For the sake of clarity we 
will distinguish between their briefs on the basis of the appeal 
numbers. 
8
 The original plaintiffs were Amber Blunt, on behalf of herself 
and all others similarly situated; Crystal Blunt and Michael 
Blunt, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly 
  17 
two of its officials in their official capacity.
9
  No. 2:07-cv-3100, 
Doc. No. 1.
10
   
The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on 
September 26, 2007, adding three plaintiffs (two current or 
former students in the LMSD and one parent)
11
 and several 
                                                                                                         
situated; Linda Johnson, on her own behalf, on behalf of her 
daughter, Lydia Johnson, and all others similarly situated; Carol 
Durrell, on her own behalf, on behalf of her minor daughter, 
Saleema Hall, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; 
Christine Dudley, on her own behalf, and on behalf of her minor 
son, Walter Whiteman, and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated; Eric Allston on his own behalf and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; Concerned Black Parents, Inc.; and the 
Mainline Branch of the NAACP.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 
1.  
9
 The officials were Jamie Savedoff, Superintendent, and 
Michael Kelly, Director of Pupil Services.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, 
Doc. No. 1. 
 
10
 Though the parties sometimes have used the term “the 
District” to refer to the LMSD, because this usage may be 
confusing inasmuch as we regularly refer to the District Court, 
we have used the term “LMSD.” 
11
 Chantae Hall, the daughter of Carroll Durrell and sister of 
Saleema Hall, both of whom were parties in the original 
complaint, was added as were June Coleman, on her own behalf 
  18 
defendants, including the Lower Merion School Board, its 
President, Vice President, and various members of the Board 
(together, the “School Board”), the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education (the “PDE”), and two of its officials.  No. 2:07-cv-
3100, Doc. No. 10.  Inasmuch as the LMSD and the School 
Board have the same interest in this case and are represented by 
the same attorneys, we sometimes refer to them together as the 
LMSD.  The plaintiffs named the PDE as a defendant because 
they believed that it failed to meet the supervisory, monitoring 
and compliance procedural obligations that federal law imposed 
on it.  The FAC concerned, inter alia, as appellants indicate in 
one of their briefs, “a decision of the Pennsylvania Special 
Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel (the ‘Appeals 
Panel’) pursuant to the IDEA.”  Appellants’ No. 11-4201 br. at 
8-9;
12
 see also J.A. vol. 2, at 91-151.  As stated above, the 
                                                                                                         
and on behalf of her minor son, Richard “Ricky” Coleman, and 
on behalf of all others similarly situated.   
12
  The brief further explains that Crystal and Michael Blunt are 
the parents of Amber Blunt, a 2005 graduate of Lower Merion 
High School who “was identified as a student with a Specific 
Learning Disability.”  Appellants’ No. 11-4201 br. at 8-9.  The 
Blunts sought payment by LMSD for the tuition for a six-week 
remedial program that West Chester University required Amber 
to take as a condition of her admission.  Id.  The Blunts argued 
that the LMSD “should pay for this program to compensate for 
the fact that it failed to develop and implement transition 
services for Amber as required by the IDEA.”  Id.  The Blunts 
also were dissatisfied that Amber was not admitted into her first 
choice college, Temple University, although two of the three 
  19 
original complaint alleged that the defendants violated the 
IDEA, 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (regarding the monitoring 
requirements imposed on states receiving federal funds for 
education of students with disabilities), the ADA, § 504 of the 
RA, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, all premised on the theory 
that plaintiffs had learning disabilities for which LMSD had not 
made adequate provisions.  The FAC invoked the same legal 
theories/statutes as the original complaint.  J.A. vol. 2, at 91-
151. 
On October 8, 2007, LMSD and the School Board filed a 
motion to dismiss the FAC, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed 
to exhaust their administrative remedies, the CBP and NAACP 
did not have standing, and the FAC failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.  They also contended that the 
IDEA action was untimely.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 11. 
On November 19, 2007, the PDE filed a motion to 
dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
13
  No. 
2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 21-22; J.A. vol. 2, at 284.  PDE argued 
that the Blunt plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the IDEA’s statute 
of limitations and that the other individual student plaintiffs had 
not exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA.  Id. 
 The PDE further argued that its sovereign immunity barred the 
                                                                                                         
colleges to which she applied did admit her.   
13
 Gerald Zohorchak and John Tommasini, who were named in 
their official capacities as officers of PDE, joined in this motion 
but they no longer are parties to this suit, and appellants do not 
challenge their dismissal. 
  20 
state law claims asserted against it, and that plaintiffs had failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against it.  
Id.   
On February 15, 2008, the District Court entered an order 
dismissing various plaintiffs and claims from the FAC.  The 
Court methodically eliminated each federal law claim that the 
Blunt plaintiffs made against each defendant.  In particularly 
significant holdings that we address at length below, the Court 
held that a 90-day statute of limitations in the IDEA barred the 
Blunts’ claims under the IDEA, RA, and ADA and that a 
separate two-year statute of limitations barred their other claims. 
 Consequently, the order dismissed the Blunts’ federal claims in 
their entirety, although their state law claims remained.  See No. 
2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 9; see also J.A. vol. I, at 42.42-42.45.  
The Court also determined that the individual plaintiffs, other 
than the Blunts, had not sought an administrative remedy for 
their IDEA claims, and therefore it dismissed the IDEA claims 
of the remaining individual plaintiffs against the LMSD 
defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  J.A. vol. 1, at 
42.16.  However, the Court found that the individual plaintiffs 
did not need to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to 
their claims against the PDE because Pennsylvania regulations 
provide for administrative resolution of disputes between 
students, their parents, and their representatives and school 
districts, but do not provide for administrative resolution of 
similar disputes with the Commonwealth.  Id. at 42.17.   
The District Court also dismissed plaintiffs’ ADA and 
RA claims (other than the Blunts’ claims) against the LMSD and 
the School Board for failure to exhaust their administrative 
  21 
remedies, reasoning that the claims were based on the same 
allegations as plaintiffs’ IDEA claims and that, if the plaintiffs 
were entitled to relief, it would have been available through the 
IDEA administrative dispute process.  Id. at 42.18-42.19.  The 
Court noted that “[t]he parties agree[d]” regarding the 
exhaustion requirement for those claims.  Id.  The Court found, 
however, that the IDEA exhaustion requirement did not bar 
plaintiffs’ claims under Title VI because, unlike the IDEA, Title 
VI does not “focus on ‘the rights of children with disabilities.’”  
Id. at 42.19.  The Court also did not find that the plaintiffs 
needed to exhaust their § 1983 claims administratively. 
In addition, as we indicated above, the District Court 
concluded that the NAACP and CBP lacked standing as 
plaintiffs.
14
  Id. at 42.33.  The Court also found that the counts 
against individual defendants in their official capacity (as 
representatives of the other defendants, LMSD, the School 
Board and PDE) were duplicative, and therefore it dismissed the 
FAC against those individuals to  “simplify[  ] the litigation in a 
way that does not cause any prejudice to plaintiffs.”15  Id. at 
42.35-42.36. 
                                               
14
 Although the NAACP attempted in the next version of the 
complaint to allege facts to support its standing, as we already 
have indicated it does not appeal from the holding that it does 
not have standing.  On the other hand, CBP has appealed from 
the order dismissing it from the case because of its lack of 
standing. 
15
 The appellants have not appealed from this ruling and we 
therefore will not discuss it further. 
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The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) 
on July 8, 2008, adding   two plaintiffs, one parent and one 
student.
16
  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 49.  The SAC, in accord 
with the District Court’s February 15, 2008 Order, removed as 
defendants the School Board members previously so-named in 
their official capacities.  But the SAC continued to name the 
School Board in its caption though it did not make allegations 
against the School Board in its body.  The SAC, however, 
included the PDE and two of its officials as defendants.  The 
SAC continued to name the Blunts as plaintiffs, despite the 
circumstance that the Court had dismissed all of their federal 
claims in its February 15, 2008 Order.
17
  The SAC also added 
several paragraphs discussing the CBP’s alleged increase of 
expenditures that it attributed to “the inferior quality of LMSD’s 
dual system of education.”  Moreover, the SAC named several 
persons who the CBP claimed were members of that 
organization in a clear attempt to demonstrate that the CBP had 
standing.  SAC at 34-36.  In addition, the SAC added six 
paragraphs regarding plaintiff NAACP’s expenditure of 
                                               
16
 The added plaintiffs were Lynda Muse, on behalf of herself 
and her minor son, Quiana Griffin, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated.   No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 49. 
17
 In contending that the District Court had jurisdiction, 
plaintiffs argued that “[t]he Blunt Plaintiffs have fully exhausted 
their administrative remedies under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 
1415; the other individual Plaintiffs are excused from doing so 
because such efforts would be futile.”  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. 
Nos. 9, 55; J.A. vol. 2, at 95.   
  23 




The plaintiffs filed a third and final amended complaint 
(“TAC”) on August 5, 2008.  No. 2:07-cv-3100,  Doc. No. 55; 
J.A. vol. 9, 3847-97.  The plaintiffs remained the same in the 
TAC as previously except that one parent was no longer a 
plaintiff.
19
  The TAC, however, no longer named two officials 
of the School Board as defendants, and it did not name the 
officials of the PDE that the plaintiffs previously had named as 
defendants.  The TAC continued to list the School Board as a 
named defendant in the caption, and the PDE and LMSD 
remained named defendants in both the caption and the body of 
the TAC.
20
  Despite the District Court’s dismissal of all of the 
                                               
18
 Inasmuch as the NAACP is no longer a party in this litigation, 
these paragraphs are now immaterial. 
 
19
 Linda Johnson, the parent of Lydia Johnson, was dropped as a 
plaintiff in the TAC.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 55; J.A. vol. 
9, 3847-97.  Nevertheless, she was listed as an appellant in the 
notice of appeal.   
20
 Specifically, in the introduction to the TAC: 
3.  Plaintiffs assert that LMSD routinely misuses so-
called below grade level programs and modified classes 
to remove African American students from the general 
education curriculum, in some instances to avoid 
evaluating a student’s eligibility for services under the 
  24 
Blunts’ federal claims in the complaint in its February 15, 2008 
Order, the TAC included them again in Count VI against the 
LMSD and the School Board pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Public School Code, 22 Pa. Code §14.102 et. seq.
21
  Plaintiffs 
                                                                                                         
IDEA.  Plaintiffs further assert that LMSD intentionally 
segregates these African American students in classes 
that are taught below grade level while depriving them of 
grade-level subject matter and materials that are provided 
to their Caucasian peers at all educational levels. 
4.  Plaintiffs also assert that the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education (PDE) failed to enforce the 
IDEA’s mandate that it ensure that children with 
disabilities receive an appropriate education in the least 
restrictive environment and that African American 
children in the LMSD are not inappropriately over-
identified or disproportionately placed in special 
education classes.  By their claims against PDE, 
Plaintiffs seek to remedy wide-spread violations of the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . the IDEA, the [ADA], 
[Section 504 of the RA], [Title VI] and Section 1983 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 18971 [sic]. 
TAC at 2-3; J.A. vol. 9, at 3848-49. 
21
 Several pages of the alleged factual basis for the Blunts’ 
claims, appearing in the “Parties” section of the SAC, were 
deleted in the TAC, and the identification of Amber and her 
parents as “African American” was added to that section.  No. 
2:07-cv-3100 Doc. Nos. 36, 55.   
  25 
sought widespread injunctive relief and “compensatory damages 
each on their own behalf to offset the deprivations of an 
appropriate education to which they are entitled.”  TAC at 3, 
para. 6; J.A. vol. 9, at 3849.   
The LMSD and the School Board filed an answer to the 
TAC and a separate motion for judgment on the pleadings on 
August 15, 2008.  The PDE filed an answer to the TAC on 
August 19, 2008.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 58. 
On August 15, 2008, the LMSD and the School Board 
filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings addressed to 
the Blunts’ remaining state law claims, which the Blunts 
formally opposed on August 29, 2008.  J.A. vol. 3, at 561-72, 
575-89.  The District Court issued a Memorandum and Order on 
November 18, 2008, (the “November 18, 2008 Order”), in 
which it noted that the motion incorrectly had been styled as a 
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, when it was really 
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The 
Court granted the motion,
22
 finding that it did not have 
supplemental jurisdiction over the Blunts’ state law claims and 
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 The District Court noted that there was little overlap of the 
operative facts of Amber Blunt’s claims with the claims of the 
other plaintiffs, as the claims involved different time periods, 
different treatment, and possibly different schools.  J.A. vol. 3, 
at 602.  In this regard, the Court noted that “each of the student-
plaintiffs presents an entirely different factual predicate for his 
or her claims.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that it 
could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Blunts’ 
remaining claims, which were based on state law.  Id. at 603. 
  26 
that there was not a common nucleus of operative fact between 
her claims and those of the other students.
23
  J.A. vol. 3, at 597. 
  
On December 22, 2008, the remaining plaintiffs moved 
for class certification.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 64.  After 
the parties briefed the issues, the District Court held a hearing 
on the motion on July 21, 2009.  Id., Doc. No. 122.
24
  By an 
order of August 19, 2009, (the “August 19, 2009 Order”), the 
Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 
(Appellants’ No. 11-4200 br. at 39),25 again dismissed the 
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 The Blunts have not appealed from the District Court’s ruling 
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their state law 
claims.  
24
 The District Court scheduled oral argument on the class 
certification issue for June 26, 2009, but we are uncertain 
whether the Court held an argument on that day in addition to 
the July 21, 2009 argument, or whether argument took place on 
the second date because the original argument had been 
postponed.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 118. 
25
 In doing so, the District Court explained that, among other 
rationales for this denial, it had determined that the factual 
circumstances of potential class members were too disparate to make 
final injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a 
whole.  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.60.  The Court noted that the disparate 
factual circumstances of individual students also likely would 
overwhelm the litigation: 
Analysis of whether an African American student with a 
  27 
claims brought by the CBP and the NAACP for lack of standing, 
and found that a prior court-entered settlement agreement 
reached in Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. 
Pa. 2005), barred all claims against the PDE, which it therefore 
dismissed from the case.  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.46-42.69.   
In concluding that CBP lacked standing, the District 
Court found that it did not have a personal stake in the outcome 
of the litigation, and did not suffer an injury giving it standing.  
Rather, “[i]ts injuries [we]re more akin to an abstract, 
ideological interest in the litigation as opposed to the necessary 
‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the controversy necessary to 
confer standing.”  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.52.  In addition, the Court 
reasoned that CBP did not have standing to bring suit on behalf 
of its members because, according to CBP’s bylaws, it did not 
have any members.  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.53-54; August 19, 2009 
Order at 9 (“The corporation’s bylaws specifically state ‘the 
Corporation shall have no members.’  In light of this express 
statement in a formal document governing the conduct of the 
                                                                                                         
disability was deprived of an appropriate education will be 
highly individualized and dependent upon that particular 
student’s needs, capabilities, and the IEP in place for that 
child.  These individual determinations, which must be made 
to determine whether a particular student falls within the class 
definition and whether such student has a cause of action, 
weigh against certifying this class. 
J.A. vol. 1, at 42.61. 
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corporation, we find that it does not have standing to bring suit 
on behalf of its members because it has none.”).  J.A. vol. 1, at 
42.54. 
The District Court also dismissed the claims against the 
PDE because the settlement agreement that the parties had 
reached in Gaskin barred this action against the PDE.  The 
Court noted that Gaskin was similar to this action, as 12 
students with disabilities and 11 disability advocacy groups 
brought that case against the PDE, among others, pursuant to the 
IDEA, § 504 of the RA, and Title II of the ADA.  The Gaskin 
plaintiffs made similar (although not identical) allegations as 
those in this case, alleging that the defendants failed to provide 
disabled students the opportunity to participate in regular 
education classrooms, provided insufficient supplementary aids 
and services, and generally failed to provide them with a free 
appropriate public education (“FAPE”).  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.63, 
42.67.  Though the Court acknowledged that the Gaskin 
complaint had not alleged racial discrimination as “the basis for 
the improper treatment of those with learning disabilities,” the 
Court nonetheless held that the causes of action in Gaskin and 
here arose from the same “common nucleus of operative facts.”  
The Court therefore concluded that the release included in the 
Gaskin settlement agreement, which by its terms was effective 
for five years from September 19, 2005, to September 19, 2010, 
barred the claims in this case because the plaintiffs brought this 
action and individual plaintiffs in this action were evaluated and 
identified as learning disabled during this period.  J.A. vol. 1, at 
42.67, 42.68; Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 19:9-22.  
Significantly, the class of plaintiffs in the Gaskin litigation was 
very broad and included “all present and future school age 
  29 
students with disabilities in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.”26 
On April 5, 2011, the District Court denied a motion by 
LMSD to amend its answer to the plaintiffs’ TAC to include an 
additional defense based on releases that certain plaintiffs 
signed after the LMSD filed its answer in this case because the 
Court believed that the LMSD unreasonably had delayed 
making the motion.  J.A. vol. 1, at 46-47.  LMSD has filed a 
cross-appeal from the order but, as will be seen, this appeal is 
moot and thus we do not address it. 
The LMSD filed a motion for summary judgment on July 
15, 2011, (No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 159), and it is that 
motion that has led to the order at the heart of this appeal.  The 
                                               
26
  We queried the attorneys for appellees at oral argument as to 
whether the Gaskin settlement should apply given that the 
plaintiffs in Gaskin brought their claims under the IDEA, ADA 
and RA, and the appellants other than the Blunts were 
advancing only § 1983 and Title VI claims.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 
13, 2013, at 27.  However, as noted above, we recently 
indicated in a related case, S.H. v. Lower Merion School 
District, 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013), that litigants who 
incorrectly were identified as disabled might be able to bring 
suit under the ADA and RA, but cannot bring suit under the 
IDEA, as that statute extends only to disabled individuals, not to 
individuals who incorrectly were identified as disabled.  Id. at 
257-58.  But regardless of what claims could have been brought 
against the PDE, as we explain below the Gaskin settlement bars 
the claims in this case. 
  30 
parties filed numerous documents in support of and in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment.  On October 4, 
2011, the District Court held a hearing on the motion, at which 
time the Court afforded all parties the opportunity to present 
their arguments.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 174, 183. 
On October 20, 2011, the District Court made three 
docket entries, two of which were orders and a third which is 
the memorandum explaining the basis for those orders 
(collectively, the “October 20, 2011 Memorandum and 
Judgment Order”).  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 180-82.  In the 
October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, the Court 
denied plaintiffs’ motion to partially exclude and/or limit the 
report and testimony of Daniel J. Reschly, Ph.D., a witness for 
the LMSD, as moot.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 181.  The 
Court’s principal order granted summary judgment to the LMSD 
against all remaining plaintiffs in the action.  J.A. vol. 1, at 1-39; 
also available at No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 182.  The Court 
held that the plaintiffs had failed to put forth any evidence from 
which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the LMSD 
intentionally segregated the students on the basis of race into 
inferior educational programs in violation of Title VI.  J.A. vol. 
1, at 30-32.  The Court also held that plaintiffs had failed to 
establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case for violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as they had not 
established that the LMSD had engaged in purposeful 
discrimination and had not been deliberately indifferent to 
plaintiffs’ rights.  J.A. vol. 1, at 33-34.   
The District Court noted in particular that plaintiffs were 
required to “raise at least some reasonable inference that they 
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were placed into classes and offered services by the [LMSD] 
due to intentional discrimination based on their race and not 
simply due to errors in evaluation.”  The Court concluded that 
plaintiffs had failed to support this inference with sufficient 
evidence, and had not put forth more than a scintilla of evidence 
that the LMSD had acted with a racially discriminatory purpose 
in identifying them as disabled and placing them in special 
education courses (regardless of whether this identification was 
correct or not).  They also failed to identify an official policy or 
custom that was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights.  
J.A. vol. 1, at 32-36;
27
 also available at No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. 
No. 180. 
On November 18, 2011, the Blunt plaintiffs and the CBP 
filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s October 20, 
2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order.  J.A. vol. 1, at 40-42.  
In an attempt to preserve their right to appeal from all of the 
Court’s dispositive orders, their November 18, 2011 notice of 
appeal stated that “[w]ithout limiting their right to appeal any 
particular order rendered during District Court proceedings, 
Plaintiffs listed herein specifically appeal the following orders.” 
 The notice of appeal then went on to challenge the February 15, 
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 The District Court correctly observed that the LMSD’s 
awareness (as evidenced by the formation of a committee to 
address the concerns of African American parents) of an 
achievement gap, between Caucasian and African American 
students, and its failure to eliminate that gap were not evidence 
of intentional discrimination or deliberate indifference toward 
African American students.  J.A. vol. 1, at 36. 
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2008 Order dismissing the Blunts’ claims under the IDEA and 
the District Court’s orders of February 15, 2008, and August 19, 
2009, as they pertained to CBP and its lack of standing.  J.A. 
vol. 1, at 40-42; see also No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 186. 
Also on November 18, 2011, plaintiffs Linda Johnson, 
Lydia Johnson, Durrell/Hall, Dudley/Whiteman, Allston, 
Coleman, and Muse/Griffin filed an appeal generally from the 
District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment 
Order.  Their notice of appeal specifically cited the District 
Court’s order of August 19, 2009, in which the Court dismissed 
the claims against defendant PDE, an order of October 20, 2011, 
entering the summary judgment in favor of LMSD, and an order 
of October 20, 2011, denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to 
preclude expert testimony.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 187. 
On December 1, 2011, LMSD filed a cross-appeal from 
the portion of the District Court’s February 15, 2008 Order 
which denied LMSD’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VI 
claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
28
 and, as 
we have indicated, the District Court’s April 5, 2011 denial of 
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 As explained above, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
IDEA, RA and ADA claims against LMSD, other than those of 
the Blunts, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but 
had found that Title VI relief was not available through the 
administrative process set up for resolving IDEA disputes, and 
thus it did not dismiss the Title VI claims for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.  Of course, the Court similarly did not 
dismiss the § 1983 claims because there were no administrative 
remedies available under that section. 
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its motion to amend its answer to the TAC.  J.A. vol. 1, at 43-
45; 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 123-24. 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ 
federal law claims pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A),
29
  28 
U.S.C. § 1331,  and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).  In addition, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the Court had supplemental jurisdiction 
over their state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.   We, 
however, do not determine whether the District Court had 
jurisdiction over the state law claims because no party contends 
that the Court erred in not exercising jurisdiction over those 
claims.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is well established that we employ a plenary standard 
in reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, 
applying the same standard as the district court.  Kelly v. 
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
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 “The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction 
of actions brought under this section without regard to the 
amount in controversy.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). 
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Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009));  Albright 
v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Montone v. 
City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citing Beazer E., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection 
Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
Inasmuch as our review is plenary, “[w]e may affirm the District 
Court on any grounds supported by the record,” even if the court 
did not rely on those grounds.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 
805 (3d Cir. 2000).
30
   
In considering an order entered on a motion for summary 
judgment, “we view the underlying facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.”  Babbitt, 63 F.3d at 236.  As we also 
have explained, “[a] factual dispute is material if it bears on an 
essential element of the plaintiff’s claim, and is genuine if a 
reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party.”  
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citing Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (in turn quoting Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, 
Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002))). 
However, where a non-moving party fails sufficiently to 
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 We note that sometimes in our opinions we refer to the 
standard of review on an appeal from an order for summary 
judgment as “plenary” and sometimes as “de novo.”  We discern 
no difference between the plenary and de novo standards of 
review.  See 19-206 Pratt, Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 
206.04 (2013). 
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establish the existence of an essential element of its case on 
which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there is not a genuine 
dispute with respect to a material fact and thus the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Lauren W. v. 
Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2007).  Further, mere 
allegations are insufficient, and “[o]nly evidence sufficient to 
convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of 
[the] prima facie case merits consideration beyond the Rule 56 
stage.”  Id. (quoting and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
We review a district court’s determinations concerning 
the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Martin v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“Where a party makes known the substance of the 
evidence it desires to introduce, we review the District Court’s 
decision to exclude the evidence for an abuse of discretion.”) 
(citing Narin v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 334 (3d 
Cir. 2000)).  There is an abuse of discretion if the district court’s 
decision “‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  
Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 
In re Merritt Logan, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., Inc, 901 F.2d 349, 
359 (3d Cir. 1990)) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 
136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)).  “An abuse of discretion can also 
occur ‘when no reasonable person would adopt the district 
court’s view.’  We will not interfere with the district court’s 
exercise of discretion ‘unless there is a definite and firm 
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of 
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the 
  36 




It is also well established that we review de novo a 
district court’s determination of a party’s standing to bring suit, 
as a court makes a determination of whether a party has standing 
on a legal basis, at least where, as here, the determination does 
not depend on the court’s resolution of a factual dispute.  See 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N. J., 730 
F.3d 208, 218 (3d Cir. 2013); Common Cause of Pa. v. 
Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009).
32
 
Judgments of a court applying the IDEA’s statute of 
limitations but not resolving disputes of fact are subject to 
plenary review as conclusions of law, but “whether [plaintiffs] 
proved an exception to the [IDEA] statute of limitations, and 
whether the [School] District fulfilled its FAPE obligations . . . 
are subject to clear error review as questions of fact.  Such 
[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be 
considered prima facie correct, and if [we] do[ ] not adhere to 
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 On the other hand, “[t]o the extent an evidentiary issue turns on the 
interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence, rather than the mere 
application of the rule, our review is plenary.” Forrest, 424 F.3d at 
349 (emphasis added) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 
F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
32
 Citing Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 
188 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Public Interest Research Grp. of 
N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
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those findings, we must explain why.”  D.K. v. Abington Sch. 
Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting P.P. ex. rel. 
Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d 
Cir. 2009); S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 
F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
When a district court reviews an administrative law 
judge’s decision, a court of appeals exercises plenary review 
over the court’s legal conclusions, and reviews its findings of 
fact with a “modified de novo” standard of review (giving the 
administrative factual findings “due weight” and considering 
them to be prima facie correct) for clear error.  Lauren W., 480 
F.3d at 266.  However, we do not make such an analysis here, as 
the issue before us with respect to the Blunts, the only 
appellants who exhausted their administrative remedies, is 
whether the District Court correctly dismissed their case on the 
grounds that they brought it beyond the period allowed by the 
statute of limitations.  The resolution of that issue would not be 
aided by administrative expertise. 
 
V.  ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Though the District Court made many rulings, the 
appellants have appealed only from some of them.  Accordingly, 
we are able to summarize the issues on this appeal as follows:  
1. Did the District Court correctly dismiss the action 
against the PDE on the basis of res judicata (claim preclusion)? 
  38 
2.  Did the District Court correctly conclude that CBP did 
not have standing as a plaintiff in this action? 
3.  Does the IDEA’s 90-day statute of limitations, in 
which a party adversely affected by an administrative 
determination of an IDEA claim may bring a state or federal 
suit, enacted on December 3, 2004, and effective July 1, 2005, 
apply to bar the Blunts’ federal action, given that they first 
began the administrative judicial process on April 8, 2005, when 
the IDEA’s statute of limitations for bringing a claim in state or 
federal court after receiving an adverse administrative 
determination was two years, and they received their final 
adverse administrative disposition on August 31, 2005, almost 
two months after the new 90-day statute of limitations came into 
effect, and almost nine months after Congress enacted it?
33
 
4.  Did the District Court abuse its discretion in how it 
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 We note that although the statute of limitations issue was not 
discussed at oral argument, the Blunts’ brief raises a challenge 
to the District Court’s ruling on the issue as a prime point of 
argument.  Appellants’ br. No. 11-4201 at 31-37.  Presumably, 
however, in the case of student appellants who no longer are 
claiming to be disabled, but rather are claiming to have been 
misidentified as disabled, a statute of limitations issue would be 
inapplicable.  However, as far as we can tell from the record, at 
least one or two of the student plaintiffs do not challenge their 
identification as disabled, and counsel for the Blunts has not 
withdrawn the argument regarding the statute of limitations 
which thus has been preserved on appeal.  Therefore, we 
address the statute of limitations issue.  
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treated certain evidence that plaintiffs offered by not giving it 
greater weight and not considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs when the Court considered and 
granted the motion for summary judgment made by the LMSD 
and, on the other hand, in how it treated certain evidence that 
LMSD offered for consideration on that motion? 
5.  Did plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination in violation of Title VI and § 1983 such that 




VI.  SUMMARY OF THE LAW 
 A.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
Congress enacted the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., 
with the goal of “improving educational results for children with 
disabilities.”  20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).  The congressional 
findings and purposes section of the IDEA is quite broad and 
sets forth in great detail Congress’ intention in adopting the 
IDEA.  
Each public school district in a state that accepts federal 
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 LMSD argues that the District Court improperly denied its 
motion to amend its answer.  We, however, do not reach that 
issue because our determination that the Court properly granted 
summary judgment in its favor and our affirmance of the other 
orders on appeal are dispositive of the issue. 
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funds under IDEA
35
 has a continuing obligation, called the 
“child find” requirement, to identify and evaluate all students 
reasonably believed to have a disability, and each state receiving 
funds must establish procedures to effectuate this requirement.  
Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2012).  As 
we pointed out in Ridley, Pennsylvania has set forth child find 
procedures in 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.121 through 14.125.  Id.   
States receiving federal funding for assistance in the 
education of children with disabilities under the IDEA are 
responsible for providing a FAPE to any students who are 
identified as learning disabled until they reach 21 years of age.  
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d)); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-
300.2;
36
 Jonathan H. v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 
527, 528 (3d Cir. 2009); Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 272.  As we 
explained in Ridley:  
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  “The IDEA was enacted pursuant to the congressional 
spending power.  [Thus, a] state is not generally bound by the 
IDEA unless it receives federal funding under the statute.”  
A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal citations omitted). 
36
  “The purposes of this part are-- (a) To ensure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further 
education, employment, and independent living; . . .”  34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.1(a).  Further, “[t]his part applies to each State that 
receives payments under Part B of the Act, as defined in § 
300.4.”  34 C.F.R. § 300.2(a). 
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A FAPE consists of educational instruction specially 
designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped 
child, supported by such services as are necessary to 
permit the child to benefit from the instruction.  
Although a state is not required to maximize the potential 
of every handicapped child, it must supply an education 
that provides significant learning and meaningful benefit 
to the child.  [T]he provision of merely more than a 
trivial educational benefit is insufficient. 
680 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050 
(1982); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d 
Cir. 1999); L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d 
Cir. 2006)). 
In providing a FAPE to a disabled student, school 
districts must work with the student’s parents to create an 
individualized education plan (“IEP”), containing certain 
elements that the Code of Federal Regulations specifies must be 
made available to each disabled student.  We have explained the 
balance between reasonable goals for the IEP and a parent’s 
fondest hopes for the parent’s child as follows: 
Under the IDEA, school districts must work with parents 
to design an IEP, which is a program of individualized 
instruction for each special education student. ‘Each IEP 
must include an assessment of the child’s current 
educational performance, must articulate measurable 
educational goals, and must specify the nature of the 
special services that the school will provide.’  Although 
the IEP must provide the student with a ‘basic floor of 
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opportunity,’ it does not have to provide ‘the optimal 
level of services,’ or incorporate every program 
requested by the child’s parents. . . . [T]he IDEA 
guarantees to a disabled child ‘an education that is 
appropriate, not one that provides everything that might 
be thought desirable by loving parents’ . . . . ‘[A]t a 
minimum, the IEP must be reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive meaningful educational 
benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential,’ 
and ‘individual abilities.’ 
Ridley, 680 F.3d at 276 (internal citations omitted).   
Congress amended the IDEA through the Individuals 
with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004 to require that an 
IEP include “a statement of the special education and related 
services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-
reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the 
child.”  Ridley, 680 F.3d at 276 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
and citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)).  Because neither 
the text of the IDEA nor the regulations promulgated under it 
provided guidance regarding the peer-review research provision, 
we looked to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations 
for guidance, and determined (1) that although schools should 
strive to base a student’s IEP on peer-reviewed research to the 
maximum extent possible, the student’s IEP team must be 
allowed to be flexible in devising an appropriate program for 
any particular student in light of the available research; and (2) 
courts must accord significant deference to the choices made by 
school officials as to what constitutes an appropriate program 
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for each student.
37
  Ridley, 680 F.3d at 277 (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 46,665 (2006); D.S., 602 F.3d at 556-57;  Ridgewood, 172 
F.3d at 247). 
B.  Redress and the Statute of Limitations 
under the IDEA 
  “If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their 
child with a FAPE, they may request an administrative 
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 We explained that “[g]iven that the IDEA does not require an 
IEP to provide the ‘optimal level of services,’ we likewise hold 
that the IDEA does not require a school district to choose the 
program supported by the optimal level of peer-reviewed 
research.  Rather, the peer-review specially designed instruction 
in an IEP must be ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s 
intellectual potential.’”  Ridley, 680 F.3d at 277 (citing 
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 2009)).  While we recognized that “there may be 
cases in which the specially designed instruction proposed by a 
school district is so at odds with current research that it 
constitutes a denial of a FAPE,” and that “if it is practicable for 
a school district to implement a program based upon peer-
reviewed research, and the school fails to do so, that will weigh 
heavily against a finding that the school provided a FAPE,” 
nonetheless we declined to set a bright-line rule as to what 
constitutes an adequately peer-reviewed special education 
program, and emphasized that the appropriateness of an IEP 
must be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
the available research.  Id. at 279. 
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‘impartial due process hearing,’” as may a school district if it 
wants to change an existing IEP or seeks an evaluation without 
the parents’ consent.  Ridley, 680 F.3d at 269-70 (citing 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f); Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53, 126 S.Ct. at 532).   
The burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing 
under the IDEA lies with the party seeking relief.  See Schaffer, 
546 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. at 537.  Similarly, the party judicially 
challenging an administrative decision bears the burden of 
persuasion with respect to the finding for each claim challenged. 
 Ridley, 680 F.3d at 270. 
On December 3, 2004, Congress revised the IDEA with 
the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004, 
which included a two-year statute of limitations governing the 
time during which an aggrieved party may file a request for an 
administrative due process hearing under the IDEA.  P.L. 108-
446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(c).  The two-
year period runs from the date that the parent knew or should 
have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for the 
complaint.  The same two-year statute of limitations for bringing 
administrative claims also applies to other legal claims premised 
on the IDEA, such as claims under § 504 of the RA, or claims 
“invoking Child Find and FAPE duties.”  D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 
(quoting P.P. ex. rel. Michael P., 585 F.3d at 734).  In the same 
legislation, Congress shortened the statute of limitations to 90 
days for a party dissatisfied with the result of the administrative 
proceedings to bring a federal or state judicial action to 
challenge that result.  Though Congress mandated that these 
new statutes of limitations were to be retroactive, it delayed 
their effective dates until July 1, 2005.  
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In 2010, we determined that the seven-month “grace 
period” between the enactment of the two-year statute of 
limitations and its effective date provided litigants with 
reasonable notice and opportunity to bring claims, so that it was 
not unfair to impose the new statute of limitations and thus the 
period that the limitations period allowed was not impermissibly 
short.  Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 415-16 
(3d Cir. 2010).
38
  We further explained that “all persons are 
charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must 
take note of the procedure adopted by them, [and] a legislature 
need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford 
the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with 
its terms and to comply.”  Id. at 416 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, we noted that the Supreme 
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 In so doing, we cited a Supreme Court decision reciting that 
[t]his court has often decided that statutes of limitation 
affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a 
reasonable time is given for the commencement of an 
action before the bar takes effect. 
It is difficult to see why, if the legislature may prescribe 
a limitation where none existed before, it may not change 
one which has already been established.  The parties to a 
contract have no more a vested interest in a particular 
limitation which has been fixed than they have in an 
unrestricted right to sue. 
Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63, 22 S.Ct. 573, 575 (1902) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Court 
has upheld retroactive adjustments to a limitations period 
only when the legislature has provided a grace period 
during which the potential plaintiff could reasonably be 
expected to learn of the change in the law and then 
initiate his action.  In the context of a retrospective 
statute of limitations, a reasonable grace period provides 
an adequate guarantee of fairness.  Having suffered the 
triggering event of an injury, a potential plaintiff is likely 
to possess a heightened alertness to the possibly 
changing requirements of the law bearing on his claim. 
Id. at 417 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 549, 102 
S.Ct. 781, 802 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
An IDEA claimant’s right to redress does not end with 
the administrative review process, for any aggrieved party who 
received an adverse administrative determination regarding his 
or her complaints with respect to IDEA compliance may bring 
an action in a “[s]tate court of competent jurisdiction or in a 
district court of the United States, without regard to the amount 
in controversy,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), within 90 days of 
the final administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B).
39
  
Prior to the amendment of the IDEA shortening the limitations 
period, the time for bringing suit in a state or federal court after 
receiving an adverse administrative determination had been two 
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 But an action may be brought in a state with “an explicit time 
limitation for bringing such an action . . . in such time as the 
State law allows.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B).   
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years.  The amendment adopting the 90-day statute of 
limitations passed by Congress on December 3, 2004, became 
effective July 1, 2005, seven months after its enactment.  This 
90-day statute of limitations period begins running on “the date 
of the decision of the [administrative] hearing officer.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); see also Jonathan H., 562 F.3d at 530 
(“Section 1415(i)(2)(B) limits a party’s right to ‘bring an action’ 
to within 90 days after the final administrative decision.”). 
As with ADA claims, a party seeking redress under the 
IDEA must exhaust administrative remedies before filing an 
action seeking redress in a state or federal court.   See Komninos 
by Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 
778 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1011-12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468-69 (1984)); see also I.M. ex rel. 
C.C. v. Northampton Pub. Schs., 869 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D. Mass. 
2012) (“Plaintiffs’ conceded failure to exhaust their 
administrative remedies with regard to the ADA-grounded claim 
and/or appeal such a decision within 90 days is fatal to its 
present viability.”). 
We have explained that the policy of requiring 
exhaustion of  administrative remedies is strong but it has some 
very limited exceptions, namely: 
 where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate 
(see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327, 108 S.Ct. 592, 
606 (1988)); 
 where the issue presented is a purely legal 
question; 
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 where the administrative agency cannot grant 
relief (for example, due to lack of authority); and 
 an emergency situation, such as where exhaustion 
of administrative remedies would cause ‘severe or 
irreparable harm’ to the litigant. 
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778-79.
40
   
Nonetheless, we have cautioned that “[t]he advantages of 
awaiting completions of the administrative hearings are 
particularly weighty in Disabilities Education Act cases.  That 
process offers an opportunity for state and local agencies to 
exercise discretion and expertise in fields in which they have 
substantial experience. . . . [Therefore], courts should be wary 
of foregoing the benefits to be derived from a thorough 
development of the issues in the administrative proceeding.”  Id. 
at 779-80.  We have explained that “the IDEA provides a 
comprehensive remedial scheme” and “includes a judicial 
remedy for violations of any right ‘relating to the identification, 
evaluation, or educational placement of [a] child, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.’” 
 A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)).
41
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 Citing, inter alia, Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. at 606. 
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 In A.W. we further noted that “[b]y preserving rights and 
remedies ‘under the Constitution,’ section 1415(l) does permit 
plaintiffs to resort to section 1983 for constitutional violations, 
notwithstanding the similarity of such claims to those stated 
directly under IDEA.  But section 1415(l) does not permit 
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C.  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000d.  Title VI further provides, in relevant part, that the 
guidelines and criteria established by Title VI “dealing with 
conditions of segregation by race, whether de jure or de facto, in 
the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall 
be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States . . . 
whatever the origin or cause of such segregation.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000d-6(a). 
                                                                                                         
plaintiffs to sue under section 1983 for an IDEA violation, 
which is statutory in nature.  Nothing in section 1415(l) 
overrules the Court’s decision in Smith [v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 
992, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984)], to the extent it held that Congress 
intended IDEA to provide the sole remedies for violations of 
that same statute. . . . Indeed . . . the Court has continued to 
refer to the IDEA as an example of a statutory enforcement 
scheme that precludes a § 1983 remedy.”  A.W., 486 F.3d at 
798-803 (emphasis added).  Thus, we note that for the five or 
six student plaintiffs who have changed their theory of liability 
and now argue that the LMSD incorrectly identified them as 
disabled, this part of the analysis presumably would not apply, 
as they no longer make claims under the IDEA.  However, as we 
previously have noted, appellants did challenge the District 
Court’s determination on this issue in the briefs in No. 11-4201. 
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The application of Title VI to recipients of federal 
assistance through the Department of Education, as explained in 
the Code of Federal Regulations is especially germane to this 
case: 
(a) General.  No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program 
to which this part applies. 
(b) Specific discriminatory actions prohibited. 
(1) A recipient under any program to which this part 
applies may not, directly or through contractual or 
other arrangements, on ground of race, color, or 
national origin:  
(i) Deny an individual any service, financial aid, 
or other benefit provided under the program;  
(ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other 
benefit to an individual which is different, or is 
provided in a different manner, from that 
provided to others under the program;  
(iii) Subject an individual to segregation or 
separate treatment in any matter related to his 
receipt of any service, financial aid, or other 
benefit under the program;  
 (iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the 
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enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed 
by others receiving any service, financial aid, or 
other benefit under the program;  
(v) Treat an individual differently from others in 
determining whether he satisfies any admission, 
enrollment, quota, eligibility, membership or 
other requirement or condition which individuals 
must meet in order to be provided any service, 
financial aid, or other benefit provided under the 
program; 
. . . 
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(a), (b)(1)(i)-(b)(1)(v). 
 Private individuals who bring suits under Title VI may 
not recover compensatory relief unless they show that the 
defendant engaged in intentional discrimination.  Guardians 
Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597, 607, 
103 S.Ct. 3221, 3230, 3235 (1983); see also Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1517-18 
(2001) (reaffirming that private individuals cannot recover 
compensatory damages under Title VI except in cases of 
intentional discrimination).   Recently, we held that plaintiffs 
bringing claims under the ADA and RA may establish 
intentional discrimination with a showing of deliberate 
indifference.  S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 
263 (3d Cir. 2013).  Given the parallels between Title VI and 
the statutes at issue in S.H., our rationale for adopting deliberate 
indifference as a form of intentional discrimination in S.H. 
applies with equal force in the Title VI context.  We explained 
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that the deliberate indifference standard was “better suited to the 
remedial goals of the RA and the ADA,” id. at 264, which is 
also true for Title VI given that the remedies available for 
violations of Title VI are coextensive with those available under 
the ADA and the RA, Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185, 
122 S.Ct. 2097, 2100 (2002).   
 Other courts of appeals to have considered the issue 
agree that deliberate indifference may, in certain circumstances, 
establish intentional discrimination for the purposes of a Title 
VI claim.  See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 
F.3d 655, 664-65 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that deliberate 
indifference to teacher or peer harassment of individual may 
create liability if a plaintiff establishes “(1) substantial control, 
(2) severe and discriminatory harassment, (3) actual knowledge, 
and (4) deliberate indifference”); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
I-38 of Garvin Cnty., Ok., 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that “deliberate indifference to known instances of 
student-on-student racial harassment is a viable theory in a Title 
VI intentional discrimination suit”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union 
High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that school district may violate Title VI if there is a racially 
hostile environment, the district had notice of the problem, and 
it failed to respond adequately).  The Supreme Court, addressing 
claims under Title IX, explained that in order to establish 
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the school 
district had knowledge of the alleged misconduct and the power 
to correct it but nonetheless failed to do so.  See Davis v. 
Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645-49, 119 S.Ct. 
1661, 1672-74; S.H., 729 F.3d at 265.  Constructive knowledge 
is not sufficient; “only actual knowledge is a predicate to 
  53 
liability.”  Zeno, 702 F.3d at 666. 
 D.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . .  
To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a 
defendant’s discriminatory action was purposeful: 
To bring a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a 
denial of equal protection, plaintiffs must prove the 
existence of purposeful discrimination. They must 
demonstrate that they ‘receiv[ed] different treatment 
from that received by other individuals similarly 
situated.’ 
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(internal citations omitted).  We further explained in Brown v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 293 (3d Cir. 2009):   
Our analysis yields the following conclusion: in 
order to establish municipal liability for selective 
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enforcement of a facially viewpoint- and content-
neutral regulation, a plaintiff whose evidence 
consists solely of the incidents of enforcement 
themselves must establish a pattern of 
enforcement activity evincing a governmental 
policy or custom of intentional discrimination on 
the basis of viewpoint or content. 
We also have explained that “[a]n essential element of a 
claim of selective treatment under the Equal Protection Clause is 
that the comparable parties were ‘similarly situated.’  Persons 
are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when 
they are alike ‘in all relevant aspects.’”  Startzell v. City of 
Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v. City of 
Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
E.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
Relevant Regulations of the Department of 
Education 
Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., states, in 
relevant part:  
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
in the United States, . . . shall, solely by reason of 
her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Thus, § 504 of the RA requires school 
districts receiving federal funding to provide a FAPE to each 
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qualified handicapped person within the recipient’s jurisdiction. 
 See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 274; see also Ridley, 680 F.3d at 
280 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995), 
abrogated on other grounds by A.W., 486 F.3d 791); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.33(a)-(b).
42
   We have explained that this means “a school 
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 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 provides: 
(a) General. A recipient that operates a public elementary or 
secondary education program or activity shall provide a free 
appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped 
person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction, regardless of the 
nature or severity of the person’s handicap. 
(b) Appropriate education. 
(1) For the purpose of this subpart, the provision of an 
appropriate education is the provision of regular or special 
education and related aids and services that (i) are 
designed to meet individual educational needs of 
handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of 
nonhandicapped persons are met and (ii) are based upon 
adherence to procedures that satisfy the requirements of 
§§ 104.34, 104.35, and 104.36.  
(2) Implementation of an Individualized Education 
Program developed in accordance with the Education of 
the Handicapped Act is one means of meeting the 
standard established in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.  
(3) A recipient may place a handicapped person or refer 
such a person for aid, benefits, or services other than 
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district must reasonably accommodate the needs of the 
handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in 
educational activities and meaningful access to educational 
benefits. . . . However, § 504 does not mandate ‘substantial’ 
changes to the school’s programs, and courts ‘should be mindful 
of the need to strike a balance between the rights of the student 
and [his or her] parents and the legitimate financial and 
administrative concerns of the [s]chool [d]istrict.’”  Ridley, 680 
F.3d at 280-81 (internal citation omitted); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d 
at 247; Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405, 
99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366 (1979).  On the other hand, mere 
administrative or fiscal convenience does not constitute a 
sufficient justification for providing separate or different 
services to a handicapped child.  Ridley, 680 F.3d at 281 (citing 
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
To establish that there has been a violation of § 504 of 
the RA, a plaintiff must prove that:  (1) the student was 
disabled;
43
 (2) (s)he was “otherwise qualified” to participate in 
                                                                                                         
those that it operates or provides as its means of carrying 
out the requirements of this subpart. If so, the recipient 
remains responsible for ensuring that the requirements of 
this subpart are met with respect to any handicapped 
person so placed or referred. 
43
 Again, as noted, a recent psychological evaluation of the 
students in question, performed by plaintiffs’ psychologist at 
their behest, has concluded that five or six of the students at 
issue are not learning disabled, and thus a § 504 analysis 
presumably is not relevant to those students’ claims. 
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school activities; (3) the school district received federal financial 
assistance; and (4) the student was excluded from participation 
in or denied the benefits of the educational program receiving 
the funds, or was subject to discrimination under the program.  
See id. at 280. 
F.  Americans with Disabilities Act 
In a provision similar to the safeguards we have 
outlined above, Title II of the ADA provides, in relevant 
part: 
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 
or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity. 
42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
The Code of Federal Regulations has effectuated 
the ADA by mandating that there be equal opportunity in 
benefits and services for disabled individuals.  It 
provides, in relevant part,  
(b)(1) A public entity, in providing any aid, 
benefit, or service, may not, directly or through 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on 
the basis of disability— 
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. . . 
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a 
disability an opportunity to participate in 
or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service 
that is not equal to that afforded others; 
(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a 
disability with an aid, benefit, or service 
that is not as effective in affording equal 
opportunity to obtain the same result, to 
gain the same benefit, or to reach the same 
level of achievement as that provided to 
others; 
. . . 
(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual 
with a disability in the enjoyment of any 
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity 
enjoyed by others receiving the aid, 
benefit, or service. 
. . .  
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii), (iii), (vii). 
We have explained that “the substantive standards for 
determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
are the same.”  Ridley, 680 F.3d at 282-83 (citing McDonald v. 
Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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 G.  Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial               
           Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence 
Inasmuch as we have recognized that individuals who 
violate the law based on discriminatory motives sometimes do 
not leave a trail of direct evidence, but instead “cover their 
tracks” by providing alternate explanations for their actions, we 
have found that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie factual 
foundation of discrimination by drawing reasonable inferences 
from certain objective facts that are generally not in dispute.  
See Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 
162-63 (3d Cir. 2001).
44
 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, a Title VII employment discrimination case mentioned 
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 In Barnes, a case involving a museum with a primarily 
African American board of directors, the plaintiffs’ evidence 
consisted mainly of affidavits from attorneys expressing their 
viewpoint that zoning enforcement had been unequal with 
respect to the museum.  In this regard, the plaintiffs claimed that 
there had been unequal treatment of the museum as compared to 
its neighbors in the enforcement of parking regulations.  
Moreover, it was claimed that one resident of the municipality 
in which the museum was located used “code words” at a public 
meeting in a manner that the plaintiffs believed had racial 
undertones.  Nevertheless, we concluded that the evidence 
provided “a totally inadequate foundation on which to predicate 
an inference that racial animus motivated the appellants,” 242 
F.3d at 164, except perhaps as to the one individual who had 
used the “code words.” 
  60 
several times during oral argument in this case,
45
 the Supreme 
Court rejected defendants’ arguments that statistics never can 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  Rather, the Court 
held that statistics, when bolstered by other evidence, may, 
depending on the circumstances, establish a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination.  431 U.S. 324, 338-40, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 
1856-57 (1977).  However, the Court cautioned that the 
“usefulness [of statistics] depends on all of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances.”  Id. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1856-57.   
Importantly, the Supreme Court has explained that 
neither the “courts or defendants [are] obliged to assume that 
plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable,” and has cited, for 
example, the weaknesses inherent in small or incomplete data 
sets and/or inadequate statistical techniques.  Watson v. Fort 
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 Many of the cases that discuss statistical evidence as it relates 
to establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination do so in 
the context of employment litigation under Title VII.  Though 
we are not suggesting that a Title VI prima facie case 
necessarily requires a plaintiff to meet the same burden of proof 
that a plaintiff must meet in a Title VII case, as we have no need 
to address that possibility, the general discussion of the 
usefulness of statistics as prima facie evidence in Title VII cases 
is instructive.  Indeed, we have recognized that “[a]lthough the 
Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue, the courts of 
appeals have generally agreed that the parties’ respective 
burdens in a Title VI disparate impact case should follow those 
developed in Title VII cases.”  Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 
393 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2790 
(1988); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20, 97 S.Ct. at 
1857 n.20 (“Considerations such as small sample size may, of 
course, detract from the value of such evidence.”).   
The Supreme Court also has rejected the use of particular 
standard deviations or “any alternative mathematical standard” 
in establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, 
and has stressed that the significance or substantiality of 
numerical disparities must be judged on a case-by-case basis.  
“[S]uch a case-by-case approach properly reflects our 
recognition that statistics ‘come in infinite variety and . . . their 
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.’”  Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3, 108 S.Ct. at 
2789 n.3 (internal citations omitted).  Moreover, the Court has 
noted that its “formulations, which have never been framed in 
terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently 
stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently 
substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.”  Id. at 
995, 108 S.Ct. at 2789.   
H.  Class Actions and Res Judicata (Claim 
Preclusion) Defenses 
1. Claim Preclusion 
We have explained that 
[c]laim preclusion, formerly referred to as res judicata, 
gives dispositive effect to a prior judgment if a particular 
issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in 
the earlier proceeding.  Claim preclusion requires: (1) a 
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final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) 
the same parties or their privities [sic]; and (3) a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.  
Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. - 
Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citing United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 
(3d Cir. 1984)). 
In analyzing whether these three elements have been met, 
we “[do] not apply this conceptual test mechanically, but focus 
on the central purpose of the doctrine, to require a plaintiff to 
present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a 
single suit.  In so doing, we avoid piecemeal litigation and 
conserve judicial resources.”  Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 
609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Churchill v. Star 
Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)) (in turn quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984). 
We further have explained that “[w]e take a ‘broad view’ 
of what constitutes the same cause of action” and that “res 
judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of 
the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.”  
Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261 (emphasis in original) (citing 
Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194) (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983-
84).  In analyzing essential similarity, we consider several 
factors: “(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for 
relief are the same . . .; (2) whether the theory of recovery is the 
same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at 
trial are the same . . .; and (4) whether the material facts alleged 
are the same.  It is not dispositive that a plaintiff asserts a 
different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two 
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actions.”  Id. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982)); 
see also Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“This analysis does not depend on the specific legal 
theory invoked, but rather [on] the essential similarity of the 
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, res judicata bars a claim litigated between the same 
parties or their privies in earlier litigation where the claim arises 
from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated on the merits in 
the earlier litigation.  “Moreover, ‘res judicata bars not only 
claims that were brought in the previous action, but also claims 
that could have been brought.’”  Id.  (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d at 171).  Further, 
“[t]he fact that several new and discrete discriminatory events 
are alleged does not compel a different result.  A claim 
extinguished by res judicata ‘includes all rights of the plaintiff 
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part 
of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of 
which the action arose.’”  Id. at 174 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)). 
2. Application of Res Judicata (Claim 
Preclusion) in Class Actions 
We have explained that “[i]t is now settled that a 
judgment pursuant to a class settlement can bar later claims 
based on the allegations underlying the claims in the settled 
class action.  This is true even though the precluded claim was 
not presented, and could not have been presented, in the class 
action itself.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice 
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Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001).  While “it may seem 
anomalous at first glance . . . that courts without jurisdiction to 
hear certain claims have the power to release those claims as 
part of a judgment . . . we have endorsed the rule because it 
serves the important policy interest of judicial economy by 
permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that 
prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class 
action.”  Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Grimes v. Vitalink Comm’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1563 (3d 
Cir.1994)). 
 It is highly significant that adding parties to the class in a 
subsequent class action does not necessarily preclude parties 
from satisfying the second prong of the res judicata test, that the 
parties are the same or privies of the parties in the first action.  
See, e.g., Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261 (“The fact that there are 
additional parties in Sheridan II does not affect our 
conclusion.”)  (citing Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 119 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (“The essence of the cause of action asserted against 
the defendants in the state proceeding is not altered by the 
addition of more parties.”)). 
I.  Standing 
Article III, § 1 of the Constitution confers judicial power 
on the federal courts, but limits their jurisdiction to cases and 
controversies “which are appropriately resolved through the 
judicial process.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 112 S.Ct. 1717, 1722 (1990) 
(“[T]he core component of standing is an essential and 
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
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Article III.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  It is well 
established that plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that 
they have standing in the action that they have brought.  See 
Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citing Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 
322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
The Supreme Court has explained that “the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements”: 
(1) the invasion of a concrete and particularized legally 
protected interest and resulting injury in fact that is actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, 
meaning that the injury must be fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 
2136, 2147 (1992) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
740-41 n.16, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368-69 n.16 (1972)).  See Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 218. 
An injury is “concrete” if it is real, or distinct and 
palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and is sufficiently 
particularized if “‘it affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.’”  New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. President of 
the United States, 653 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing City 
of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665 
(1983)) (citing and quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1, 112 
S.Ct. at 2136 n.1).  A harm is “actual or imminent” rather than 
“conjectural or hypothetical” where it is presently or actually 
occurring, or is sufficiently imminent.  The determination of 
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what is  imminent is somewhat elastic, but it is fair to say that 
plaintiffs relying on claims of imminent harm must demonstrate 
that they face a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury from 
the conduct of which they complain.  Id. (citing Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 
2301, 2308 (1979)). 
In the context of a motion to dismiss, we have held that 
the “[i]njury-in-fact element is not Mount Everest.  The contours 
of the injury-in-fact requirement, while not precisely defined, 
are very generous, requiring only that claimant allege [ ] some 
specific, identifiable trifle of injury.”  Danvers Motor Co., 432 
F.3d at 294 (quoting Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1151 
(3d Cir. 1982)).    
The Supreme Court explained the difference in the 
burden placed on the plaintiff to satisfy the standing requirement 
at the motion to dismiss stage as compared to the motion for 
summary judgment stage, as follows: 
At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of 
injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may 
suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that 
general allegations embrace those specific facts that are 
necessary to support the claim.’  In response to a 
summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no 
longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set 
forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the 
summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.  And 
at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be 
‘supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.’ 
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Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2137 (internal citations 
omitted).  
The Court further has noted that: 
‘Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal 
judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential 
principles that bear on the question of standing.’  One of 
these is the requirement that the plaintiff ‘establish that 
the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the 
adverse effect upon him) falls within the “zone of 
interests” sought to be protected by the statut[e] [or 
constitutional guarantee] whose violation forms the legal 
basis for his complaint.’  The ‘zone-of-interests’ 
formulation first appeared in cases brought under § 10 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, but 
we have subsequently made clear that the same test 
similarly governs claims under the Constitution in 
general.  Indeed, we have indicated that it is more strictly 
applied when a plaintiff is proceeding under a 
‘constitutional . . . provision’ . . . 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 468-69, 112 S.Ct. 789, 
807-08 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
An organization or association may have standing to 
bring a claim where (1) the organization itself has suffered 
injury to the rights and/or immunities it enjoys; or (2) where it is 
asserting claims on behalf of its members and those individual 
members have standing to bring those claims themselves.  See 
Common Cause of Pa., 558 F.3d at 261.  Where an organization 
asserts its standing to sue on its own behalf, “a mere ‘interest in 
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a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no 
matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the 
problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 
‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved.’”  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. at 739, 92 S.Ct. at 1368; see also Pennsylvania Prison Soc. 
v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Where an organization is asserting that it has standing on 
behalf of its members, it is claiming that it has “representational 
standing.”  There are three requirements for this type of 
standing: 
 (1) the organization’s members must have standing to 
sue on their own; (2) the interests the organization seeks 
to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual 
participation by its members. 
Pennsylvania Prison Soc., 508 F.3d at 163 n.10 (citing Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Adver. Com’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 
2434, 2441 (1977)); see also Public Interest Research Grp. of 
N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
Regarding the first prong, we have explained that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that generalized grievances 
shared by the public at large do not provide individual plaintiffs 
with standing,” and further that “the right to have the 
government act in accordance with the law [is] insufficient, by 
itself, to support standing.”  Id. at 120.  Rather, the plaintiff 
organization must “make specific allegations establishing that at 
least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm.” 
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 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498, 129 S.Ct. 
1142, 1151 (2009). 
We also have rejected the “formalistic argument” that an 
organization necessarily lacks standing “because [its] charter 
prohibits [it] from having members,” but rather in some cases 
have relied upon “indicia of membership” in analyzing an 
organization’s standing.  See Public Interest Research Grp., 123 
F.3d at 119 (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. at 2436-
37).
46
  But we also have held that a plaintiff by making 
expenditures to advance litigation does not suffer sufficient 
damage to support standing.  Fair Hous. Council of Suburban 
Phila. v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 
1998).
47
   
Finally, “‘the jurisdictional issue of standing can be 
                                               
46
 In Hunt, the Supreme Court held that “it would exalt form 
over substance to differentiate” between the Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission, which represented the interests 
of all apple growers and suppliers, whose membership in the 
State of Washington was mandatory and who paid dues and 
directly benefitted economically from the Commission’s 
activities, and a traditional trade organization. 
47
 Other courts of appeals “have, however, adopted different 
views of whether the injury necessary to establish standing 
flows automatically from the expenses associated with 
litigation.”  But we have aligned “ourselves with those courts 
holding that litigation expenses alone do not constitute damage 
sufficient to support standing.”  Fair Hous., 141 F.3d at 78-79. 
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raised at any time,’” by either a party or by the court.  See 
Center For Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 
707 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Viltrakis, 108 F.3d 
1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1997)) (citing Summers, 555 U.S. 488, 129 
S.Ct. 1142); see also Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Although Appellees do not address standing, 
we are required to raise issues of standing sua sponte if such 
issues exist.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is hardly 
surprising that we have this obligation inasmuch as “federal 
appellate courts have a bedrock obligation to examine both their 
own subject matter jurisdiction and that of the district courts 
[,and] . . . standing is ‘perhaps the most important’ of 
jurisdictional doctrines.”  Public Interest Research Grp., 123 
F.3d at 117 (citing FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 
230-31, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607 (1990); Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 
349, 355 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 
VII.  ANALYSIS 
Now that we have set forth the procedural history, facts, 
and applicable law in this case we directly address the issues 
raised in this appeal.  We first will discuss whether the District 
Court correctly determined that the Gaskin settlement and final 
adjudication barred the claims against the PDE.  Then we will 
discuss whether CBP has standing as a litigant in this case.  Our 
third focus will be on the issue of whether the IDEA’s 90-day 
statute of limitations bars the Blunt plaintiffs’ claims.  Finally, 
we will discuss whether any of the plaintiffs still in the action 
when the LMSD moved for summary judgment established a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VI and/or 
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presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the LMSD 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so that the District 
Court erroneously entered its October 20, 2011 Memorandum 
and Judgment Order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
LMSD.
48
  As part of this last issue, we will review for abuse of 
discretion the District Court’s determinations in using the 
evidence submitted on the motion for summary judgment.  
A.  The Effect of the Gaskin Settlement on the 
Claims Against the PDE 
We conclude that the District Court correctly held that 
the Gaskin settlement barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the 
PDE.  Although the Gaskin plaintiffs were basing their claims 
against the PDE on its alleged supervisory failure and did not 
assert that it engaged in racial discrimination, the Gaskin class 
consisted of “all school-age students with disabilities in 
Pennsylvania who have been denied a free appropriate education 
in regular classrooms with individualized supportive services, 
individualized instruction, and accommodations they need to 
succeed in the regular education classroom.”  J.A. vol. 1, at 
42.64.  The allegations against PDE in this case are strikingly 
similar to those made against it in Gaskin.  As the District Court 
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 Although we do not reach this issue with respect to the Blunts 
(as the brief in No. 11-4201 filed on their behalf did not and 
could not challenge the summary judgment), it is difficult to see 
how we would have come to a different result if we had done so. 
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summarized: 
As in Gaskin, the plaintiffs here claim that the PDE 
violated the IDEA by failing to identify children with 
disabilities and provide needed special education and 
related services and by failing to provide the plaintiffs 
and members of the putative class a free, appropriate 
public education.  As in Gaskin, plaintiffs here bring a 
claim against the PDE under § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.   
J.A. vol. 1, at 42.67. 
We conclude that the claims plaintiffs asserted against 
the PDE in this case overlap with the claims made in Gaskin.  
Though plaintiffs here advance theories of racial motivation not 
raised in Gaskin, the claims here arise from a “common nucleus 
of operative facts” when compared to the claims in Gaskin:  
namely LMSD’s failure to provide a FAPE to students by 
mishandling identification and/or testing of students for learning 
disabilities which resulted in incorrect placements.  Thus, the 
release entered into in Gaskin bars the claims here against the 
PDE because the Gaskin release covered claims arising between 
2005 and 2010 and included all present and future students with 
disabilities within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Indeed, 
appellants acknowledge that most, though not all, of the plaintiff 
students in this case were evaluated individually and their IEPs 
formulated before the Gaskin settlement.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 
2013, at 19:9-22. 
As explained above, we apply res judicata and claim 
preclusion as a consequence of settlement agreements because 
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by doing so we encourage settlements and “serve[ ] the 
important policy interest of judicial economy by permitting 
parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that ‘prevent 
relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action.’”  
Prudential, 261 F.3d at 366.  We see no reason to depart from 
that policy in this case.   
In considering the res judicata issue we recognize that, 
although the Gaskin release was broad,
49
 there is no suggestion 
in the record that the attorneys who represented the parties in 
Gaskin did not negotiate the settlement at arms’ length.  
Moreover, the district court in Gaskin reviewed and accepted the 
settlement; and the settlement led the parties to forego additional 
litigation in which they could have advanced their positions with 
the hope of obtaining what they perceived would be a more 
favorable outcome than the settlement agreement provided them. 
 We agree with the PDE that the claims against it in this case, 
like those in Gaskin, deal with its alleged failure to monitor 
special education programs carried out by school districts in 
Pennsylvania, including the procedures regarding testing of 
students for special education services and other aspects of the 
provision of special education services to students entitled to 
them, and that the settlement covered the period from 2005-
2010.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 26:12-25.   
We recognize that appellants argue that the District Court 
here erred in its interpretation of the parties’ intent in entering 
into the Gaskin settlement agreement.   Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 
2013, at 21-23.  There can be no doubt that, as other courts have 
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 See Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 28.1. 
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held, “[t]he best evidence of  . . . intent is, of course, the 
settlement agreement itself.”  Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis 
added); see also Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equip. Corp., 
936 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[A] settlement agreement is 
an enforceable contract to which a court must give legal effect 
according to the parties’ intent as expressed in the document.”); 
Miller v. Ginsberg, 874 A.2d 93, 99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005);
50
 
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1283 (5th Cir. 
1989) (where parties express their intent in language in 
settlement agreement and were represented by skilled attorneys, 
court should not look beyond that language to understand 
agreement).  Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit explained in Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest 
Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011), a 
settlement agreement may release all claims arising out of the 
transaction with which the release was concerned even if they 
are not yet known; and broad releases are valid at least when 
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  “Settlement agreements are regarded as contracts and must be 
considered pursuant to general rules of contract interpretation.  
The fundamental rule in construing a contract is to ascertain and 
give effect to the intention of the parties.  Thus, we will adopt 
an interpretation which, under all circumstances, ascribes the 
most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of the parties, 
bearing in mind the objects manifestly to be accomplished.  
Additionally, if the language appearing in the written agreement 
is clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be discerned 
solely from the plain meaning of the words used.”  Miller, 874 
A.2d at 99 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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negotiated between sophisticated parties.  Overall, we are 
satisfied from the terms of the Gaskin settlement that it included 
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 We have not overlooked appellants’ argument that the Gaskin 
settlement could not bar claims that arose after its effective date. 
 Rather, we reject that argument because the settlement included 
claims of “future” students and therefore necessarily it included 
the claims that arose after its effective date. 
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B.  Whether CBP Has Standing in this Suit
52
 
                                               
52
 As a matter of convenience this subsection largely is written 
as though for the Court, but in fact this section in its entirety 
represents only the views of Judge Greenberg, as Chief Judge 
McKee and Judge Ambro agree with aspects of the section but, 
as they explain in their separate opinions, not its conclusion that 
CBP does not have standing.  Although Judge Ambro, in his 
concurring opinion, concludes that “CBP has standing to sue on 
its own behalf,” he also observes that “CBP has not explained 
how, were it permitted to continue as a plaintiff in the case, it 
could prevail where the individual Plaintiffs have failed.”  Chief 
Judge McKee writes that “CBP’s likelihood of success on the 
merits has no bearing on its standing.”  Judge Ambro, however, 
did not make his observation to support Judge Greenberg’s 
conclusion that CBP does not have standing.  Rather, Judge 
Ambro’s point is that, even if CBP has standing, it could not 
save its case as it could not survive LMSD’s motion for 
summary judgment.  Judge Greenberg agrees that, even if CBP 
had standing, it would lose on the merits.  See infra note 62. 
 We note that Chief Judge McKee sets forth that CBP was 
dismissed at an “early stage” of the litigation and did not have 
the opportunity to engage in discovery.  But as we explain 
below, the District Court considered the standing issue twice, 
once in proceedings leading to the February 15, 2008 Order 
dismissing CBP for lack of standing, and again in proceedings 
leading to the August 19, 2009 Order again dismissing CBP for 
lack of standing, and in entering the second order the Court 
considered testimony.  See infra note 57.  Indeed, there was a 
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The District Court dismissed CBP as a plaintiff on its 
own behalf in its February 15, 2008 Order because the Court 
concluded that CBP had failed to “allege any injury whatsoever” 
to itself beyond advancing evidence that at best insufficiently 
could support an inference that “the defendants’ conduct may 
have caused [CBP] . . . to ‘suffer a setback to the 
organization[’s] abstract social interests.’”  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.33. 
 The Court also determined in its February 15, 2008 Order that 
CBP had not met the three-part test that Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission indicated needed to be met 
for an organization to sue on behalf of its members.  The CBP 
failed in this respect because it did not “provid[e] the court with 
the identity of any member or alleged in the Amended 
Complaint that any of [its] members has suffered an injury[, and 
                                                                                                         
great deal of discovery in this case after the Court originally 
dismissed CBP as a party on February 15, 2008, and both this 
opinion and Chief Judge McKee’s opinion refer to this 
discovery. 
 Judge Ambro and Judge Greenberg see no reason why 
CBP’s participation in the discovery process would have made 
any difference in the outcome of this litigation by somehow 
having enabled it to survive the motion for summary judgment if 
it had been directed against it.  In this regard, they point out that 
both groups of plaintiffs had the goal of establishing that LMSD 
had been violating anti-discrimination and anti-segregation laws 
and regulations and so would have had the same objective in the 
discovery process. 
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that w]ithout that information, the court ha[d] no basis to 
conclude that the organization[] ha[s] standing to bring claims 
on behalf of [its] members.”  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.33-42.34.  
Though CBP’s lack of standing may make no difference with 
respect to its claims against the PDE inasmuch as the Gaskin 
settlement may have foreclosed those claims, its claim to have 
standing raises an issue that must be addressed, for it continues 
to assert claims against the LMSD.
53
    
CBP has not demonstrated that it suffered an injury to 
itself  conferring standing, and, even if its claim is true that it 
has members notwithstanding its bylaws, CBP does not have 
standing to sue on their behalf.  CBP has a stated purpose to 
promote “equity and excellence in the response of school 
districts to the needs of diverse student populations; to address 
issues related to education for populations identified as minority 
and/or African American; and to identify, monitor, and inform 
parents about educational issues impacting disadvantaged 
students, their families and the community at large.”  J.A. vol. 1, 
at 42.50.   
In its complaint, CBP identified itself as having been 
“operating as an organization in the LMSD for about 13 years,” 
and as “a non-profit Pennsylvania corporation whose purpose is, 
inter alia, to promote equity and excellence in the response of 
school districts to the needs of diverse student populations; to 
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 “May have” is used because CBP was not a member of the 
plaintiff class in Gaskin though it might be so regarded to the 
extent that it asserts it has representational standing.  This point 
need not be explored further. 
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address issues related to education for populations identified as 
minority and/or African American; and to identify, monitor, and 
inform parents about educational issues impacting 
disadvantaged students, their families and the community at 
large.”  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 1, pp. 23-24; J.A. vol. 2, at 
509.  CBP claimed to bring the action “on its behalf and on 
behalf of its members.”  Id.  at 25.  CBP identified its members 
generally as follows: “[t]he members of the organization are 
residents of the Lower Merion School District and current and 
former parents or students of the District.”  Id. at 510.  The 
District Court noted that, notwithstanding these allegations, 
CBP supplied documents that stated that it had no members.  
See August 19, 2009 Order at 5, No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 
123 (“The organization’s bylaws specifically state ‘[t]he 
Corporation shall have no members.’”).   Nevertheless, CBP’s 
prohibition in its bylaws against having members does not 
necessarily mean that it could not have standing as a plaintiff on 
behalf of its members.  If such a determination were predicated 
solely on the basis of the bylaws, it would advance the strictly 
formalistic approach that we have rejected in other cases.  See 
Public Interest Research Grp., 123 F.3d at 119.  Nonetheless, 
the bylaws do provide context to the overall analysis, 
particularly in considering whether CBP has attempted to create 
standing for itself by changing its structure and membership and 
by its expenditure of resources in response to the District 
Court’s observations concerning its standing. 
In the TAC, the last revised complaint in this case, CBP 
did not change its statement of purpose quoted above.  It, 
however, did identify 11 of its members by name, five of whom 
are individually named plaintiffs in this case, and it also 
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identified itself as “support[ing]” several more class members 
and individually named plaintiffs in this case at school-related 
meetings and court proceedings.   TAC, No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. 
No. 55, pp. 25-26.  CBP also went to great pains to explain the 
rise in its expenditures “over the five years” in relation to this 
case because, as discussed above, the expenditure of funds by an 
organization on behalf of a cause, though not determinative, is 
one factor that may be considered in resolving a standing issue.  
The CBP’s alleged expenditures on behalf of the interests 
embodied in this case included: 
 Use of its resources to ‘host educational 
consultants and experts’ with the purpose of 
providing information to the Plaintiffs, class 
members, community and LMSD; 
 A ‘sharp’ rise in expenditures over the last five 
years due to its efforts to ‘protect its members 
from the adverse impact’ of ‘the inferior quality 
of LMSD’s dual system of education’; 
 Expenditure of resources as a result of its 
attending meetings related to IEPs, Section 504 
and ‘disciplinary meetings, court hearings and 
parent-teacher conferences with and/or on behalf 
of’ various plaintiffs, CBP members and class 
members; 
 Its efforts in facilitating a ‘Conciliation 
Agreement between LMSD and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission in which the 
District promised, inter alia, to eradicate the 
disproportionate suspension of African American 
students as compared to White students’; 
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 Production of a 45-minute video ‘highlighting the 
issue of racial inequality’; 
 Making the public aware of ‘racial graffiti and 
symbols’ which ‘were promulgated at both LMSD 
high school and middle school buildings’;54 
 Publication of a community newsletter and ‘News 
Notes . . . to disseminate the compilations of data 
on’ alleged racial disparities in application of 
disciplinary measures, segregation by race and 
‘under achievement of African American students 
in the [Lower Merion] District’; 
 The ‘organization’ of educational, career, 
standardized test, financial aid, and college 
preparatory seminars. 
TAC at 25-26; J.A. vol. 9, at 3871-72.   
Even if all of these expenditures were legitimate, CBP 
has not established organizational standing.  An organization 
may establish a “concrete and demonstrable injury” sufficient to 
confer standing if a defendant’s actions “perceptibly impair” the 
organization’s ability to provide services.  Havens Realty Corp.  
 
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124  
(1982).
 55
  In Havens, the Supreme Court determined that a 
                                               
54
 It is not clear what these symbols were, who promulgated 
them, or why the LMSD should be held responsible for them.  
No. 2:07-cv-3100 Doc. No. 55, p. 26. 
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nonprofit organization formed to promote equal housing through 
counseling and referral services had standing to bring an action 
charging that operators of rental housing units had “steered” 
potential tenants to certain properties based on race.  HOME 
alleged that its mission had been frustrated because it had to 
devote significant resources to identify and counteract the 
defendants’ racial steering.  The Supreme Court held that these 
allegations, if proven, would constitute an injury in fact, and 
thus HOME had standing to sue on its own behalf because the 
defendants’ practices had impaired its ability to provide 
services.  Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124.  However, organizations 
may not satisfy the injury in fact requirement by making 
expenditures solely for the purpose of litigation, Fair Hous., 141 
F.3d at 75, nor by simply choosing to spend money fixing a 
problem that otherwise would not affect the organization at all.  
La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake 
Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010).  “It must instead 
show that it would have suffered some other injury if it had not 
diverted resources to counteracting the problem.”  Id.   
CBP has failed to show how LMSD’s actions have 
                                                                                                         
55
 We all agree that Havens supplies the correct standard for 
determining whether an organization has alleged an injury in 
fact sufficient to confer standing.  We disagree, however, about 
whether CBP’s allegations are sufficient to meet that standard.  
This disagreement is irrelevant to the resolution of this appeal, 
however, inasmuch as Judge Ambro and Judge Greenberg point 
out that CBP has not explained how it could win on the merits.  
Thus, even assuming CBP does have organizational standing, 
our ultimate holding would be the same.    
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“perceptibly impaired” its mission.56  CBP’s very purpose 
relates to actions directly involving LMSD, and its expenditures 
were devoted to protecting students’ interests in their 
interactions with LMSD.  In Havens, HOME’s purpose was to 
promote equality in the Richmond area overall and its interests 
thus went far beyond monitoring the specific actions at issue in 
the Havens case.  By contrast, the CBP is targeted only at 
LMSD, so its very purpose was to expend resources to educate 
the public regarding the LMSD’s behavior.  J.A. vol. 2, at 510 
(defining CBP’s membership as residents of LMSD and LMSD 
parents and students).  Because it is targeted at LMSD, all of 
CBP’s resources would necessarily have been spent on LMSD-
related projects.  CBP has failed to show why this particular 
litigation has frustrated its mission, or caused a “concrete and 
demonstrable” injury to its activities.  It appears that the alleged 
additional expenditures were consistent with CBP’s typical 
activities, and it is thus unclear the effect, if any, that this 
litigation had on their expenditures.  See Fair Hous., 141 F.3d at 
77-78 (refusing to confer standing at summary judgment where 
plaintiff failed to present evidence that it altered its operations 
or diverted resources based on litigation); Havens, 455 U.S. at 
379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124 (explaining that mere “abstract social 
interests” do not confer standing (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 
739, 92 S.Ct. at 1368)).  CBP simply has not established that the 
LMSD’s actions have frustrated its efforts to fulfill its mission.  
                                               
56
 We emphasize that much of what we write with respect to 
standing reflects the views only of Judge Greenberg.   
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Thus, it has not established standing to sue on its own behalf.
57
 
CBP also has not established that it has standing to sue 
on behalf of its members, if it has any.  Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission is a useful starting point in 
the consideration of this issue because the Supreme Court 
discussed indicia of membership as a means of establishing that 
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 As we state above, see supra note 52, the District Court 
considered the standing issue twice, once in proceedings leading 
to the February 15, 2008 Order dismissing CBP for lack of 
standing, and again in proceedings leading to the August 19, 
2009 Order again dismissing CBP for lack of standing.  This 
latter consideration included testimony.  The dissent parses this 
testimony in detail, and Judge Greenberg likewise considers it in 
his analysis.  However, a plaintiff may not simply make 
repeated amendments to a complaint to “fix” the standing issue. 
 In this regard, the court’s reasoning in La Asociacion de 
Trabajadores is instructive: “[A plaintiff] may not effectively 
amend its [c]omplaint by raising a new theory of standing in its 
response to a motion for summary judgment.  ‘Simply put, 
summary judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh 
out inadequate pleadings.’”  624 F.3d at 1089 (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 
435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006)).  This is not to say that a 
plaintiff never can cure a pleading with respect to a standing 
issue in response to a motion for summary judgment challenging 
its standing.  Rather, the court of appeals’ comments are 
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. 
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an organization has members.  432 U.S. at 344, 97 S.Ct. at 
2442.   
In Hunt, the Supreme Court determined that a 
commission created by the State of  Washington to represent 
and promote the advertising interests of that State’s apple 
growers, whose collective efforts constituted “a multimillion 
dollar enterprise which plays a significant role in Washington’s 
economy,” had standing to challenge a North Carolina statute 
prohibiting the display of apple grading codes on boxes of 
apples shipped to North Carolina.  Id. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 2438.  
The Washington State apple grading system had been in place 
for over 60 years, and the stamp reflecting the apple grading was 
a selling point for Washington State apples because of the good 
reputation of that State’s apple growing regulations.  But due to 
the structure of the industry, it would have been difficult to pack 
some apples in unstamped boxes and ensure that they were sent 
to North Carolina, while ensuring that stamped boxes were 
separated and not shipped to North Carolina.  Id.  at 337, 97 
S.Ct. at 2438-39.  The Supreme Court found that in the 
circumstances of that case
58
 the Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission had standing to bring the action 
challenging the North Carolina statute.  Id. at 344-45, 97 S.Ct. at 
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 “Under the circumstances presented here, it would exalt form 
over substance to differentiate between the Washington 
Commission [as a government-mandated organization] and a 
traditional trade association representing individual growers and 
dealers who collectively form its constituency.”  Hunt, 432 U.S. 
at 345, 97 S.Ct. at 2442 (emphasis added). 
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2442.  The Court explained that “while the apple growers and 
dealers are not ‘members’ of the Commission in the traditional 
trade association sense,” because their membership was not 
voluntary, but rather was required by statute, “they possess[ed] 
all of the indicia of membership in an organization.”  Id. at 344, 
97 S.Ct. at 2442.   
In making this determination, the Court noted that only 
Washington State apple growers and dealers could elect the 
members of the Commission, and that the growers and dealers 
alone financed its activities, including litigation costs, through 
mandatory assessments levied on them.  Id. at 344-45, 97 S.Ct. 
at 2442.  The Court found that “[i]n a very real sense, therefore, 
the Commission represents the State’s growers and dealers and 
provides the means by which they express their collective views 
and protect their collective interests.”  Id. at 345, 97 S.Ct. at 
2442.  The Court reasoned that the statutorily-mandated 
participation of apple growers and dealers through assessments 
did not bar the Commission from having standing, analogizing 
that 
[m]embership in a union, or its equivalent, is often 
required.  Likewise, membership in a bar association, 
which may also be an agency of the State, is often a 
prerequisite to the practice of law.  Yet in neither 
instance would it be reasonable to suggest that such an 
organization lacked standing to assert the claims of its 
constituents. 
Id., 97 S.Ct. at 2442.   
Further, the Court noted that the Commission had a 
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strong direct interest in the litigation, because its existence 
depended on the economic health of the Washington State 
apple-growing industry.  Moreover, assessments based on the 
volume of apples grown and packaged provided the 
Commission’s funding and the North Carolina regulation was 
expected to have a great economic impact on the Washington 
State apple industry.  Id., 97 S.Ct. at 2442. 
Though appellants rely heavily on Hunt, Judge 
Greenberg believes that it clearly is distinguishable.  CBP is not 
funded through mandatory assessments of African American 
students or their parents residing in the LMSD.  Further, CBP’s 
funding is not tied directly to a clear economic interest which 
will be affected by the outcome of this litigation.   The analogy 
of a traditional trade organization discussed in Hunt is simply 
not relevant to the CBP’s position in this case.  Moreover, in an 
entirely different setting, the Court based its decision in Hunt on 
the circumstances of that case, including an analysis of how the 
Commission functioned as an organization.
59
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 In support of his contention that CBP has standing, Chief 
Judge McKee indicates that if CBP “can establish both the 
discriminatory practices and resultant harm alleged, any 
injunctive or declaratory relief would surely inure to the benefit 
of African American students and parents in the school district.  
These students and parents are no more required have to be a 
party to this suit in order to benefit from the requested relief 
than the constituents in Hunt were required to be parties to 
benefit receive the benefits there.”  The problem with this 
statement is that, though it indicates that non-parties may benefit 
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Although appellants amended their complaint after the 
District Court’s dismissal of the CBP to name several alleged 
individual CBP members as plaintiffs, CBP’s organizational 
documents state that it does not have members.  Moreover, even 
though appellants also added statements to the complaint 
asserting that the CBP was making expenditures related to this 
suit after the District Court noted the lack of economic impact of 
the litigation on CBP, this amendment does not supply the basis 
for standing.  It is clear that a nonprofit entity cannot create 
standing in a lawsuit in which it has no direct economic interest 
by having its representatives attend meetings regarding the issue 
that the entity intends to raise in the suit, or by making 
expenditures to “educate” the public on what it regards as the 
factual or legal basis for its agenda.  As the court said in Center 
for Law and Education v. United States Department of 
Education, 315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2004): 
Without concrete and demonstrable injury to the 
groups’ activities, however, evidence of a drain 
on the organizations’ resources does not amount 
to an injury-in-fact for standing purposes. . . . 
[A]n organization’s expenses in the pursuit of its 
agenda are self-effectuating and [claiming them as 
injury-in-fact] would allow any advocacy group 
to manufacture standing by choosing to expend 
                                                                                                         
from any declaratory or injunctive relief that CBP obtains, a 
standing inquiry addresses the different matter of whether a 
party can seek that relief.  Judge Greenberg believes that CBP 
cannot do so.   
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resources to advocate against policy decisions 
made by the federal government.    
Otherwise, the implication would be that any individual or 
organization wishing to be involved in a lawsuit could create a 
corporation for the purpose of conferring standing, or could 
adopt bylaws so that the corporation expressed an interest in the 
subject matter of the case, and then spend its way into having 
standing.   
Fair Housing discussed the artificial creation of standing, 
and cited and quoted with approval a case that noted that “[a]n 
organization cannot, of course, manufacture the injury necessary 
to maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very 
suit. Were the rule otherwise, any litigant could create injury in 
fact by bringing a case, and Article III would present no real 
limitation.”   Fair Hous., 141 F.3d at 79 (quoting Spann v. 
Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Kennedy v. Ferguson, 679 
F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Spann for the proposition 
that litigation-related costs are not injuries for the purposes of 
assessing an organization’s standing to bring suit on its own 
behalf); AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F. Supp. 
2d 287, 194 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“The Fifth Circuit has held that 
an organization cannot ‘bootstrap standing’ by claiming a drain 
on its resources as a result of costs incurred for the particular 
lawsuit in which it asserts standing.”).  In City of Philadelphia v. 
Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 897 (E.D. Pa. 
2000), the district court made the following convincing 
statement with respect to artificial standing: 
It is also disturbing that the organizational 
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plaintiffs argue that they may sue for the costs of 
educational sessions and other programs which 
they run to counteract gun violence.  By this 
logic, any social action organization may confer 
standing upon itself by voluntarily spending 
money on the social problem of its choice.  
Analogously, the environmentalist group in Lujan 
[v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 1112 
S.Ct. 2130 (1992)] would have standing to protest 
the endangerment of wildlife in Sri Lanka simply 
by running programs to preserve foreign fauna.  
This would be a novel and vast expansion of 
associational liability for which plaintiffs have 
advanced no precedential support.  It also 
contradicts the prudential concern behind the 
standing doctrine that courts not become vehicles 
for the advancement of ideological and academic 
agendas. 
In addition to not overcoming the foregoing problems 
with respect to its standing, CBP does not satisfy the third 
requirement for an organization to have standing to sue on 
behalf of its members, namely that neither the claim the 
organization is asserting nor “the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”  Hunt, 432 
U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441.  Even if the District Court’s 
analysis regarding CBP’s lack of members and its attenuated 
claims of injury did not demonstrate that CBP did not have 
standing, after considering this third criterion it is clear that the 
District Court reached the correct result.  It is an accepted 
principle that “[b]ecause claims for monetary relief usually 
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require individual participation, courts have held associations 
cannot generally raise these claims on behalf of their members.” 
 Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health Servs., 
Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 2002).
60
   
Here, individual student plaintiffs are seeking monetary 
reimbursement for remedial courses that they either already 
have taken or wish to take, and that they contend were necessary 
because of LMSD’s failure to provide them with a FAPE or 
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 Plaintiffs did seek prospective injunctive relief in the TAC, 
including an injunction prohibiting LMSD from placing African 
American students in special education programs “whether or 
not they have a disability” and forcing the LMSD to identify and 
evaluate African American students who may have been 
improperly placed in lower-level courses, as well as monitoring 
and training programs for parents and LMSD staff.  J.A. 533-34. 
 As we discussed below, because the individual plaintiffs are 
parties to the suit, prudential concerns restrict the conferring of 
representational standing on the CBP because the individuals 
affected are capable of litigating their rights on their own behalf. 
 Moreover, in Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, the distinction 
between compensatory and injunctive relief was justified by the 
need for assurance that “the the remedy, if granted, will inure to 
the benefit of those members of the association actually 
injured.”  280 F.3d at 284 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 
S.Ct. at 2441).  Although the relief would benefit CBP’s 
members, the members actually injured are already parties to 
this suit.  It is thus unnecessary for the CBP to have standing to 
vindicate their rights.   
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LMSD’s incorrect analysis that they were learning disabled.  
Although a determination of whether this case should be 
certified as a class action is no longer an issue in this case, the 
District Court’s explanation of the highly individualized nature 
of these claims is instructive on this last point.  It should be 
readily apparent to anyone reviewing this case that, in view of 
the complex and varying facts asserted for the individual 
students and the myriad legal theories presented in the District 
Court, the Court was correct in finding that it would have been 
inappropriate to certify this case as a class action.  For many of 
the same reasons, the facts of this case make organizational 
representation of the individual plaintiffs insufficient without 
their personal participation in this litigation.  After all, the 
particular aspects of each student’s educational needs, indeed 
the very individualized character of the application of IEP and 
FAPE to an individual student’s needs, necessarily means that 
addressing the diverse factual assertions in this case would 
require individual participation from each student litigant 
involved. 
Significantly, the third prong of the Hunt test is 
prudential, not constitutional.  See United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 
555-56, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 1535-36 (1996).  As the Supreme Court 
explained, this inquiry is designed to ensure that sufficient 
reasons exist to justify departing from the “background 
presumption . . . that litigants may not assert the rights of absent 
third parties,” and thus focuses on “matters of administrative 
convenience and efficiency.”  Id. at 556, 116 S.Ct. at 1536.  
CBP’s claim to standing is grounded on the claims of its 
members—individual students—who are also plaintiffs in the 
  93 
lawsuit.  Unlike other cases conferring standing on 
organizations, the plaintiffs in this case are not absent.  See, e.g., 
id. (organization suing on behalf of its members); Hunt, 432 
U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441 (same); Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 280 (same).61  The remedies sought here—
compensatory and injunctive—will benefit individual plaintiffs 
that are already parties to the suit.  Permitting the CBP to litigate 
this case on behalf of its members, when those members are 
already parties to the lawsuit in their own right, does not fulfill 
the Supreme Court’s guidance to focus on “administrative 
convenience and efficiency” in determining prudential standing. 
 United Food, 517 U.S. at 557, 116 S.Ct. at 1536.   
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 The fact that the plaintiffs are parties to the suit distinguishes 
this case from “‘the long line of cases in which organizations 
have sued to enforce civil rights’” to which Judge McKee’s 
dissent has referred.  It is true that, in many circumstances, an 
organizational plaintiff may be the best (and only) mechanism 
by which discrimination against a large group of individuals 
may be remedied.  However, where—as here—individual 
plaintiffs have brought suit on their own behalf, courts are not 
justified in making an exception to the general rule that third 
parties may not assert their rights.  Although, in Powell v. 
Ridge, 189 F.3d 391 (3d Cir. 1999), claims for both individual 
and organizational plaintiffs were permitted to proceed, the suit 
challenged state policy affecting all students in Philadelphia 
schools, a class far larger than the eleven parents who actually 
joined the suit.  By contrast, the group at issue here affects a 
much smaller set of students who are all capable of joining the 
suit as individuals or as a class.   
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As the District Court explained: 
the amount of compensatory education necessary for 
each named plaintiff and class member would require a 
highly individualized inquiry into that student’s unique 
needs, whether those needs were met, the extent to which 
the School District failed to provide that student with a 
free, appropriate public education and the proper amount 
of compensatory education necessary to redress any 
deficiencies.  The individualized analysis of each 
student’s educational history and needs precludes a 
finding that a class would be efficiently managed by this 
court. 
August 19, 2009 Order at 17, No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 123. 
The District Court’s findings regarding the individualized 
nature of the factual basis for each plaintiff’s claim go directly 
to the third prong for organizational standing, which requires 
that, for an organization to assert standing on behalf of its 
members, their individual participation in the lawsuit must be 
unnecessary.  It is very clear that the highly individualized 
components of the plaintiffs’ claims, the complex history of 
each plaintiff’s IEP and evaluations, and the changes in 
understanding of his or her disability status, led the Court to 
conclude correctly that the students’ individual participation in 
this lawsuit was required.  Thus, the Court believed that CBP is 
not an appropriate representational litigant for individual 
students and/or their parents.
62
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 Although the District Court’s dismissal of CBP’s claims due 
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C.  The Blunts and the 90-day Statute of 
Limitations under the IDEA, as Revised by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act 
of 2004 
Appellants now argue, contrary to their original 
contentions in the District Court in their complaint even as 
amended, that five or six
63
 of the individual student plaintiffs do 
not have a learning disability and the LMSD incorrectly 
identified them and placed them in special education classes.  
Nonetheless, we discuss the IDEA statute of limitations, as 
revised in 2004, because it appears that the Blunts still seek a 
recovery under the IDEA based on the contention that Amber 
                                                                                                         
to lack of standing is believed correct by Judge Greenberg, even 
if CBP had standing it would not be successful in this case in 
light of our disposition of the other issues in this appeal.  We, 
however, will not avoid deciding the standing issue on the 
ground that it is moot, for the necessity for a party to have 
standing is jurisdictional and thus a court of appeals always 
must determine if the district court from which the appellant 
took the appeal had jurisdiction. 
63
 As we already have indicated, this new theory rests on an 
evaluation prepared by a psychologist that the plaintiffs engaged 
to evaluate the student plaintiffs.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, 
at 36-38.  During oral arguments, one of appellants’ attorneys 
put the number of students who appellants claimed were 
classified incorrectly at five but the other attorney put the 
number at six.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 12, 14, 19, 36.  
Our analysis does not depend on the figure being five or six. 
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was identified as disabled but without challenging the accuracy 
of the identification with respect to that contention.  
Accordingly, it is not clear that Amber in this litigation has 
joined in all respects with the other students now identifying 
themselves as having been incorrectly identified as disabled. 
In its February 15, 2008 Order, the District Court found 
that the Blunts’ ADA, RA, Title VI, and § 1983 claims were 
barred on a different basis than their IDEA claims.  J.A. vol. 1, 
at 42.21-42.29.
64
  In reaching its conclusion, the Court applied 
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal 
injury actions to the Blunts’ ADA, RA, Title VI, and § 1983 
claims because the applicable federal statutes did not include 
governing statutes of limitations with respect to these claims.  
See Sameric Corp v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 598-99 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  The Court concluded that the claims were time-
barred because Amber Blunt had graduated from high school on 
June 9, 2005, and the original complaint in this case was filed in 
the District Court on July 30, 2007, more than two years after 
Amber suffered her alleged injuries.  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.28.  The 
Blunts do not challenge this disposition.  But the Blunts do 
challenge the Court’s holding that the IDEA 90-day statute of 
limitations barred their IDEA claims.   
In reviewing this determination, we note the following 
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 In its February 15, 2008 Order, the District Court noted that 
the Blunts conceded that their IDEA, ADA and RA claims 
against PDE were untimely, but contended that their IDEA, 
ADA and RA claims against the LMSD and the School Board 
were timely.  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.29. 
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timeline: the LMSD denied the Blunts’ request for “transitional 
services” on April 8, 2005, the Blunts requested a due process 
hearing under the IDEA on April 11, 2005, a two-day hearing 
followed, and the Hearing Officer issued his decision on July 
25, 2005.  Id. at 42.23.  Both the Blunts and the LMSD filed 
exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s decision with an Appeals 
Panel which issued its ruling on August 31, 2005.  Id.  
Therefore, for purposes of calculating the time allowed by the 
statute of limitations for the Blunts to file their action under the 
IDEA, their cause of action accrued on August 31, 2005.   
The Blunts argue that the 90-day statute of limitations for 
an IDEA claimant adversely affected by an administrative 
decision to bring suit in state or federal court does not apply to 
their case, even though this statute of limitations became 
effective on July 1, 2005, and the decision in their 
administrative case became final on August 31, 2005.  They 
argue that we should reach this result because they filed their 
request for a due process hearing on April 8, 2005, before the 
change in the limitations period.  Therefore, the Blunts believe 
that an earlier version of the IDEA under which their IDEA 
claims would have been timely should apply in their case.  In 
their view, to apply the 90-day statute of limitations effective on 
July 1, 2005, to their case “would be an impermissible 
retroactive application of IDEA amendments.”  J.A. vol. 1, at 
42.20.  They assert that their case is unique because there has 
been no other case applying the statute of limitations in a 
situation in which the administrative due process hearing request 
was made before the 2004 IDEA amendments became effective, 
but the final administrative decision was rendered after the 
amendments had become effective.  Thus, they contend that the 
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90-day statute of limitations should not bar their IDEA claims.   
We, however, agree with the District Court, which “[was] 
not persuaded” by their contention because “[t]he date that the 
hearing was requested is irrelevant.”  J.A. vol. 1, at 42.23.  
Rather, we look at the statute of limitations in effect on the date 
of the final administrative decision, August 31, 2005.  Indeed, it 
might be asked why we even would consider applying any other 
limitations period as the Blunts could not have brought their 
IDEA action before August 31, 2005.  Consequently, when the 
Blunts’ federal cause of action arose, the 90-day statute of 
limitations was in effect, and when they brought their case in the 
District Court on July 30, 3007, it was untimely.  Inasmuch as 
the law setting forth the limitations period changed on 
December 3, 2004, and became effective on July 1, 2005, the 
change as applied to them was hardly abrupt and it left the 
Blunts with nine months, from December 3, 2004, until August 
31, 2005, to become familiar with the revisions, and an 
additional 90 days after August 31, 2005, in which to file their 
action. 
The LMSD cites Steven I. for the proposition that the 
two-year statute of limitations governing due process hearings is 
retroactive to the extent that it applies to proceedings pending 
when it became effective.  It further contends that the seven 
months between the enactment of this new statute of limitations 
and its effective date gave potential claimants sufficient notice 
so that its retroactive application did not violate due process.  
The Blunts contend, however, that Steven I. is not applicable 
because that case dealt with the two-year statute of limitations 
for bringing an administrative claim under the IDEA, rather than 
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the specific statute of limitations at issue, i.e., 90-day statute of 
limitations for bringing a state or federal suit after receipt of an 
adverse administrative determination.  But the Blunts cannot 
convincingly explain why an analysis regarding the 90-day 
statute of limitations, embodied in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) 
and applicable to the filing of a judicial challenge in a state or 
federal court to an administrative decision, should be different 
from an analysis of the validity of the changing of the time 
period in which to bring an administrative claim under the 
IDEA, embodied in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).  In considering 
this matter we point out that the amendment of the IDEA on 
December 3, 2004, which took effect on July 1, 2005, dealt with 
both limitations periods.   
We find that the reasoning we employed in Steven I. is 
applicable here.  In that case we relied on the analysis in 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. at 532, 102 S.Ct. at 793.  In 
Texaco v. Short, the Court spoke to the issue of fairness, which 
balances the need for a grace period when shortening a 
limitations period, with the need for injured parties to be vigilant 
in protecting their rights: 
The Court has upheld retroactive 
adjustments to a limitations period only 
when the legislature has provided a grace 
period during which the potential plaintiff 
could reasonably be expected to learn of 
the change in the law and then initiate his 
action.  In the context of a retrospective 
statute of limitations, a reasonable grace 
period provides an adequate guarantee of 
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fairness.  Having suffered the triggering 
event of an injury, a potential plaintiff is 
likely to possess a heightened alertness to 
the possibly changing requirements of the 
law bearing on his claim.  Because redress 
necessarily depends on recourse to the 
State’s judicial system, the State is free to 
condition its intervention on rules of 
procedure, and further, to impose on the 
potential plaintiff the obligation to monitor 
changes in those rules.  Plaintiffs, and their 
attorneys, are so aware.  
Id. at 549, 102 S.Ct at 802. 
We therefore concluded in Steven I. that the plaintiffs in 
that case had been afforded ample time to make themselves 
aware of the new two-year statute of limitations measured from 
the date of injury for seeking administrative review under the 
IDEA.  We similarly conclude that the Blunt plaintiffs had 
ample opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 90-day 
statute of limitations with respect to judicial actions.  In fact, we 
even question whether the application of the 90-day statute of 
limitations in this case should be regarded as retroactive 
inasmuch as the Blunts did not receive an administrative 
decision until after the new statute of limitations was in effect, 
and their federal court cause of action did not accrue under the 
IDEA until the final administrative decision in their case.  We 
reiterate that the Blunts cannot adequately explain why the 
reasoning in Steven I. should not be applied in a consideration 
of the effectiveness of the 90-day statute of limitations that was 
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enacted at the same time as the two-year statute of limitations 
for bringing an administrative action addressed in Steven I.  The 
fact is that the Blunts simply have not made a convincing 
argument for applying the two statutes of limitations in the same 
amendment to the IDEA in completely different ways. 
D.  Whether Appellants Established a Prima 
Facie Case of Racial Discrimination 
We deal now with appellants’ challenge to the summary 
judgment rendered against them on their § 1983 and Title VI 
claims, which allege that the LMSD intentionally discriminated 
against them because of their race.
65
  Appellants explain that 
“[t]his case ultimately rests upon a simple question:  What 
quantum of evidence must a plaintiff produce to support an 
inference of intentional racial discrimination in order to 
overcome a summary judgment motion?”  Appellants’ No. 11-
4200 br. at 21.  In addressing the discrimination claims, the 
LMSD responds that, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, 
they “presented no evidence to establish: (1) that the classes 
they took were ‘lower level’ and/or ‘below grade-level’”; (2) 
                                               
65
 The Blunts and the CBP are not involved with the summary 
judgment as the District Court dismissed their claims before it 
considered the motion for summary judgment.  We also note 
that the appeal with respect to the summary judgment on the § 
1983 claim does not include the aspect of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint under § 1983 to the extent the complaint was based 
on the IDEA, ADA, or RA because the Court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims, other than those of the Blunts, under those 
laws for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
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LMSD maintained any specific discriminatory custom, practice 
or policy; or (3) “that similarly situated Caucasian students were 
treated differently.  Indeed, the record is replete with evidence 
that class placement . . . is driven by the decisions of students 
and parents.”  LMSD’s br. at 36.  Thus, the LMSD argues that 
“[t]here is . . . no dispute that Plaintiffs have no direct evidence 
of discrimination.”  Id. at 37. 
Appellants argue that “if there is any evidence in the 
record from which a reasonable inference in the [appellants’] 
favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a 
summary judgment.”  Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 5-6 
(quoting Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 
1081 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Appellants then conclude that “[LMSD] (and the District Court) 
were required to accept [all] the testimony of record and any 
legitimate inference Appellants draw from it, regardless of 
whether they agreed with those inferences or not,” and that the 
LMSD therefore should not have been granted summary 
judgment.  Id. at 5-6 (appellants’ emphasis removed).  As stated 
above, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment a district 
court must view the underlying facts and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.  Genuine and material factual disputes—
meaning those that bear on an essential element of the plaintiff’s 
claim—where the trier of fact could find in favor of the non-
moving party must be considered in the light most favorable to 
the non-movant.   
LMSD was entitled to summary judgment because there 
is no evidence to suggest either that LMSD itself acted with a 
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discriminatory intent, or that it knew of—but failed to correct—
a third party’s intentional discrimination.  See S.H., 729 F.3d at 
264.  Although appellants present some evidence that African 
American students were overrepresented in a statistical sense in 
special education classes, given the record we see no way to 
avoid a finding that each individual student’s educational needs 
were assessed and satisfied through a thorough and 
individualized process.  There is not sufficient evidence to show 
that the educators and administrators responsible for placing 
students intended to discriminate against them because of their 
race.  Moreover, in order to show that LMSD acted with 
deliberate indifference, appellants must show that it had 
knowledge of rights violations, but there is no evidence in the 
record to suggest that it did or that any third party under its 
control engaged in intentional discrimination.  See Davis, 526 
U.S. at 646-47 (finding deliberate indifference may be met 
where school knows of intentional harassment but fails to act.)   
Appellants argue that the District Court improperly assessed 
witnesses’ credibility, and discounted its statistical evidence.  
We discuss these arguments below, but ultimately agree with the 
District Court that the record is insufficient to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding LMSD’s intent.   
1.  Rejection of Certain Evidence 
by the District Court and Alleged 
Impermissible Reliance on Other 
Evidence Without a Daubert 
Hearing. 
As stated above, we review a district court’s decisions on 
admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard 
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where a party made known to the district court the substance of 
the evidence it desires to introduce.  Thus, in considering a 
district court’s application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we 
will reverse only where “‘there is a definite and firm conviction 
that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’” 
 Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146.  Here, we conclude that the District 
Court did not make a clear error of judgment, or, indeed, any 
error at all in its consideration of the proffered evidence, and 
that, at trial, the excluded evidence could not have been made 




a. The MAP Presentation 
 Appellants contend that the District Court improperly 
discounted a powerpoint presentation discussing a “Minority 
Achievement Program” (MAP).  J.A. vol. 5, at 1836-39.  The 
presentation included a bulleted list of characteristics of African 
American students and how to teach them effectively.  We 
assume the contention that this presentation, if used by LMSD, 
                                               
66
 We have not overlooked such cases as Lexington Insurance 
Co. v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 423 F.3d 318, 329 n.6 
(3d Cir. 2005), and Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 
F.2d 458, 465 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989), in which we indicated that a 
court in assessing opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
might consider unauthenticated documents or hearsay provided 
that the evidence could be made admissible at trial.  Here, 
however, we see no bases on which the deficiencies in the 
evidence could have been cured at the trial. 
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would provide evidence of discriminatory intent, or deliberate 
indifference to a third party’s discriminatory intent.  Yet we do 
not see any record evidence from which we could conclude that 
the LMSD ever used or implemented this presentation.  The 
presentation does not contain any indication of who authored it 
or how it is connected to the LMSD.
67
  Instead, appellants rely 
on the testimony of Dr. Barbara Moore-Williams, an education 
consultant retained by LMSD to help it develop “cultural 
proficiency among staff.”  J.A. vol. 4, at 1411.  Appellants 
attempt to use her testimony for two purposes: to show that 
LMSD used and implemented the MAP presentation and to 
show intent.   
 In Dr. Moore-Williams’ deposition, appellants’ counsel 
questioned her about whether she had heard LMSD teachers or 
other personnel refer to specific bullet points from the MAP 
presentation.  Id. at 1414.  Dr. Moore-Williams responded that 
she had heard teachers or other personnel refer to some of the 
bullet points.  Id.  Crucially, however, Dr. Moore-Williams did 
not testify about the MAP presentation itself—she explains that 
she had heard LMSD personnel discuss in general the concepts 
raised in the presentation, but that does not establish who 
prepared the presentation, or whether LMSD ever used it or for 
what purpose.  Indeed, even when Moore-Williams indicated 
that she had heard of certain bullet points, she noted that they 
were not related to African American students.  See id. at 1414 
                                               
67
 The dissent points out that the MAP was produced by LMSD 
during discovery, but we cannot assume anything from this fact. 
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(explaining, with respect to “active” classes, that she had not 
“heard about it in reference to African-American students”).  At 
most, her testimony is relevant to the extent that she heard from 
LMSD personnel that they used different teaching strategies for 
particular students.  But although purposeful use of such 
strategies may show racial bias and would be repugnant, it is 
not, as the dissent suggests, sufficient to show that LMSD 
created, used, or implemented the MAP presentation.  Finally, 
the MAP presentation does not show that appellants suffered 
intentional discrimination; it does not discuss placement in 
lower-level classes and, as discussed, there is no evidence that 
these concepts were applied to LMSD’s individualized special 
education placement decisions.   
b. Daniel Reschly’s Report 
Appellants argue that “[t]he District Court erred when it 
failed to conduct a Daubert hearing but still relied on the 
District’s expert Daniel Reschly’s definitions and principles to 
undercut Appellants’ statistical evidence of discrimination by 
the District.”  Appellants further contend that “the portions of 
Reschly’s report relied upon by the District Court form part of 
the basis for the two paragraphs that are specifically referred to 
in appellants’ form of order,” and thus the District Court erred 
in not holding a Daubert hearing on a motion in limine directed 
at the Reschly report.  Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 34-
38.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).  Appellants contend that “Reschly’s 
opinions should have no place in this appeal, as they should 
have had no place in the District Court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment without a Daubert hearing.  This provides 
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yet another basis to reverse and remand the District Court’s 
ruling.”  Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 38.  However, 
appellants do not specify the “definitions” and “principles” that 
the District Court adopted from Reschly’s report.   
It may be that appellants’ specific objection with regard 
to Reschly’s report lies with one paragraph of the October 20, 
2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order which refers to 
Reschly’s report, consisting of phrases commonly used by those 
studying the implementation of disability education and services 
under the IDEA.  The paragraph reads: 
 Disproportionality is defined as ‘significantly greater or 
lower participation in special education by one or more 
groups compared to the participation rates for other 
groups.’  The preferred methods of analyzing 
disproportionality are risk and relative risk or risk ratio.  
Risk is calculated by dividing the number of students 
with disabilities in a particular group by the total number 
of students in that group. 
No. 2:07-cv-3100 Doc. No. 180 at 13; J.A. vol. 1, at 16. 
We find this use of Reschly’s wording to define 
disproportionality to be immaterial to the outcome of this 
litigation.  The District Court did not draw inferences in favor of 
either side from this definition, which, we observe, seems very 
straightforward.  Further, the concepts of risk and relative 
risk/risk ratio are commonly used statistical terms, and the Court 
described these definitions in the October 20, 2011 
Memorandum and Judgment Order to give the reader a basic 
understanding of the statistical data that the plaintiffs presented 
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which the District Court’s opinion goes on to discuss.  We find 
no other “adoption” of Reschly’s views or principles, 
notwithstanding  appellants’ objection to the use of his report.  
As stated above, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to exclude 
Reschly’s expert report as moot, as the Court was able to make a 
determination regarding whether plaintiffs had presented a 
prima facie case in its summary judgment analysis without the 
use of the report. 
2.  Whether the District Court Properly 
Viewed the Evidence in the Light Most 
Favorable to the Plaintiffs as Non-movants 
and Whether Plaintiffs Established a Prima 
Facie Case of Discrimination. 
Appellants argue that, when the facts are viewed in the 
light most favorable to them as non-movants in the District 
Court, they established a prima facie case under Title VI and § 
1983 applying the Equal Protection Clause.  Thus, appellants 
contend that the Court erred in granting summary judgment 
against them on their claims predicated on these bases, as it 
refused “to view evidence in the light most favorable to [them].” 
 Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 28.  We point out, 
however, that a court’s obligation to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to a non-movant does not require the court 
to take into account evidence that will not be admissible at the 
trial.  Thus, in considering appellants’ argument with respect to 
the adequacy of the evidence, we take into account our holdings 
with respect to the evidence in which we uphold the District 
Court’s disposition of the issues.     
  In its October 20, 2011 grant of summary judgment, the 
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District Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to “put forth 
any evidence that supports their contention that they were 
‘segregated’ intentionally into inferior education programs in 
violation of Title VI,” and that “plaintiffs have not raised a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding their § 1983 cause of 
action” based on the Equal Protection Clause.  J.A. vol. 1, at 31-
35.  The Court, in considering the summary judgment motion, 
noted that the plaintiffs were required to “raise at least some 
reasonable inference that they were placed into classes and 
offered services by the School District due to intentional 
discrimination based on their race and not simply due to errors 
in evaluation.”  The Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to 
offer evidence sufficient to support an inference that the LMSD 
had intentionally discriminated against African Americans.  
Moreover, plaintiffs had not put forth more than a scintilla of 
evidence that the LMSD acted with a racially discriminatory 
purpose in identifying them as disabled and placing them in 
special education courses regardless of whether this 
identification was correct.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not 
identify an official policy or custom that suggested that the 
LMSD was deliberately indifferent to their rights.  J.A. vol. 1, at 
32-36. 
We emphasize that, as we explained above, a non-
moving party—here, appellants—opposing a motion for 
summary judgment has the burden to produce evidence 
supporting its case with respect to material facts of the case on 
which it has the burden of proof.  Appellants contend that they 
met this burden because they did offer more than a scintilla of 
evidence in support of their case and that a reasonable fact 
finder could have found that the evidence of discrimination they 
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offered was sufficient to support a finding in their favor.  We, of 
course, recognize that in some race discrimination situations 
actors do not leave a “smoking gun” evidencing their intent, and 
in such cases plaintiffs can prove their cases only with 
circumstantial evidence.  In this case, however, the piecemeal 
anecdotes to which appellants point were insufficient to survive 
LMSD’s summary judgment motion. 
The appellants attempt to meet this standard by pointing 
to an email by a member of the LMSD School Board, which 
they believe supported their prima facie case of discrimination 
when read in a light most favorable to them and considered as a 
part of the case as a whole.  In discussing school redistricting to 
increase minority representation in certain schools, one member 
of the School Board apparently wrote an email expressing his 
concern that “moving any of the low income and African 
American students to Harriton [High School] when they can 
walk to [Lower Merion High School] simply creates an 
additional stressor that doesn’t need to be there.”  Appellants’ 
No. 11-4200 reply br. at 26. 
Appellants believe that “[f]rom that comment, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that [LMSD] fostered an 
institutional culture (expressed by at least one Board member) 
that tolerated racial insensitivity and viewed African Americans 
[sic] students as creating unnecessary ‘stress.’”  Appellants’ No. 
11-4200 reply br. at 27.  But we do not need to decide how a 
reasonable jury could construe this email because even though it 
was available when depositions were taken and a witness other 
than its author referred to it on a deposition, it was not properly 
submitted to the District Court as it was not introduced into 
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evidence and its author was not deposed.  Consequently, 
appellants cannot rely on the email to defeat the motion for 
summary judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
68
   Thus, the 
email did not contribute to the admissible evidence appellants 
needed to have survived summary judgment.  
  Appellants also argue that the District Court wrongly 
discounted the deposition testimony of Dr. Moore-Williams, an 
independent consultant that the LMSD had engaged prior to this 
litigation to address minority issues in the LMSD, as being 
based on her personal beliefs and on hearsay.  In considering 
this testimony, the Court found that her opinions were not based 
on anything that she had observed firsthand, but rather 
concerned attitudes about race in the country and the education 
system in general.  Appellants seem to conflate the issue of 
admissibility of evidence with the requirement of taking 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant when 
considering a summary judgment motion.  Thus, during oral 
argument, appellants’ counsel argued that the District Court 
                                               
68 As far as we can tell, the original email was submitted in an 
unrelated case against the LMSD, Doe v. Lower Merion School 
District, 689 F. Supp. 2d 742, 755 (E.D. Pa. 2010).  We also 
point out that when the scope of this litigation is considered it is 
not easy to understand how an email by one school board 
member expressing concern about putting stress on students by 
requiring that they be transferred away from a school to which 
they can walk supports the allegations of the complaint.  But we 
do not predicate our result on this observation. 
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should have found that there was evidence that LMSD 
committed an intentional wrong against African American 
students in its schools, not only because it did not consider the 
MAP presentation, but because it also wrongly discounted 
Moore-Williams’ testimony as hearsay.  Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 
2013, at 51-52.  While the MAP issue seems to concern 
admissibility, it is clear from the October 20, 2011 
Memorandum and Judgment Order that the Court did consider 
Moore-Williams’ deposition testimony, and appellants referred 
to this testimony in their oral arguments on October 4, 2011, in 
the District Court on the summary judgment motion.
69
   No. 
2:07-cv-3100 Doc. No. 180 at 25.   
The District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and 
Judgment Order found that references to Moore-Williams’ 
testimony by the plaintiffs during the October 4, 2011 oral 
argument was “selective and misleading,” and that she had 
“admit[ted] that her statements about the School District [we]re 
not based on anything she observed firsthand but rather on her 
own personal belief and the hearsay statements of others.  
Accordingly, her statements cannot create a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the School District’s intent to 
                                               
69
 Although appellants objected to the limited weight the District 
Court gave Moore-Williams’ testimony both in their briefs and 
at oral argument, and made reference to her deposition in the 
appendix, they do not claim to have made a formal motion in 
limine regarding Moore-Williams’ testimony seeking to have it 
considered, nor have they pointed to an order denying its 
admission or consideration by the District Court.  
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discriminate.”  Id.  In this regard, we do not see how the 
deficiencies in her testimony could have been cured so that the 
evidence could have become admissible at trial.  Clearly, we 




Indeed, putting aside inadmissible evidence, the 
allegations in all of the complaints and briefs are inconsistent in 
their logic.  For example, appellants seem to be complaining 
both that LMSD’s placement of individual students in special 
education courses has taken them away from “regular” courses, 
while at the same time alleging that they did not receive 
adequate special education and support.
71
  It is unclear what 
actions LMSD could have taken that plaintiffs would deem 
appropriate.  In order to participate in full schedules of both 
special education and regular education classes, students would 
need a longer school day than students taking only regular 
education classes.  Further, if individual students require extra 
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 We note that inasmuch as the Blunts do not appeal from the 
October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order granting 
summary judgment, we will not address their allegations. 
 
71
 One example, among many, is found in the following 
paragraph of the TAC: “Denying these Plaintiffs and the class 
the opportunity to participate in and benefit from federally-
assisted regular education services, program and activities, 
including special education and related services . . .”  TAC at 
para. 175(a); J.A. vol. 9, at 3889 (emphases added). 
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help in particular subjects, obviously it is counterintuitive to 
protest that, for example, they are not receiving foreign language 
instruction during the time that they are participating in remedial 
courses.   
We also point out that at various points in the SAC the 
plaintiffs express dissatisfaction with grades that are too low, 
and at other points complain of grades that are too high.  
Plaintiffs seem to believe that the divergence in grades 
demonstrates that they were placed in courses that either were 
too easy or too difficult, depending on which plaintiff they are 
discussing.
72
  But student placement is not an exact science, and 
different children have different needs.  We repeatedly have 
explained that the teachers and parents, school districts, and 
administrative review boards are closest to the issues at hand, 
and therefore they are the best persons or entities to address 
individual concerns and complaints.  Of course, this recognition 
underlies the need for the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA. 
  
3.  Statistical Evidence 
In Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir. 
2011), we cited several Supreme Court cases to support our 
conclusion that gross statistical disparities may serve to establish 
a plaintiff’s prima facie case in a Title VII case if the statistical 
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 By this reasoning the only acceptable grade that would not 
give rise to a legal claim might be a “C,” and the giving of any 
other grade might be viewed as evidence that a school district 
was at fault for not providing an appropriate education. 
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evidence is of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the 
policy or practice in question caused the discrimination.   In 
considering the statistical evidence in this case, we note first that 
for monetary damages to be awarded under Title VI, the 
discrimination must be intentional.   See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 
U.S. 187, 191, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2096 (1996) (“[D]amages are 
available under Title VI for intentional violations thereof.” 
(citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463 
U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983))).  However, even if this were 
not the case and we simply applied the analysis we articulated in 
the Meditz Title VII case, the statistics do not indicate gross 
disparities of the kind and degree sufficient to give rise to an 
inference that the non-uniform individualized analyses of 
students in the LMSD, utilized to determine appropriate 
classroom placement, reflected a pattern or practice of 
discrimination. 
The District Court in its October 20, 2011 Memorandum 
and Judgment Order discussed in detail the statistical data that 
the plaintiffs put forward.  No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 180 at 
13-18.  As the Court pointed out, “[d]isproportionality is not per 
se evidence of discrimination” and, as plaintiffs’ own experts 
have acknowledged, disproportionality can be either biased or 
unbiased.  Id. at 14.  Noting that “[t]here is no specific 
numerical criteria for disproportionality set forth in the IDEA or 
federal regulations,” the Court explained that the PDE has 
established guidelines whereby it considers a disproportionality 
of 3.0, i.e., three to one, to be an indication of over-
representation of that race, while the United States Department 
of Education’s guidelines indicate that a 1.5 disproportionality 
ratio is an overrepresentation of that race.  Id. at 14-15.   
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The District Court summarized the data presented by 
plaintiffs (collected by the PDE) for the LMSD for the years 
2005-2010 as follows: 
Year 



















































6,945 7.7% 84.4% 1,255 18.1% 12.7% 82.6% 
’06-
‘07 
6,981 7.9% 83.2% 1,187 17.0% 14.5% 80.2% 
’07-
‘08 
6,914 8.1% 83.1% 1,158 16.7% 14.0% 80.8% 
’08-
‘09 
6,788 8.0% 81.6% 1,101 16.2% 13.7% 80.5% 
’09-
‘10 
7,072 8.6% 81.1% 1,094 15.5% 14.3% 80.0% 
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Id. at 16-17.  Though these numbers undoubtedly show that it 
was more likely that an African American student than a 
Caucasian student would be placed in a special education 
course, the numbers are not so disproportionate that they suggest 
the presence of discrimination in student placement absent 
additional evidence that could justify drawing this inference.   
 In considering the statistics, it is critical to recognize that 
there was no evidence presented in the District Court that the 
LMSD applied different evaluation procedures for determining 
placement of African American students than for Caucasian 
students.  After all, if the same evaluation procedures are used 
for all students regardless of their race there simply is no 
discrimination.  Moreover, the opinion of the plaintiffs’ expert, 
a psychologist, that five or six of the students in question 
incorrectly had been identified as learning disabled was not 
rendered until these proceedings were pending in the District 
Court and was insufficient to support a prima facie case for the 
plaintiffs, particularly inasmuch as she predicated her opinion 
on her personal evaluation of the students. 
 In fact, we doubt that anyone could explain better than 
LMSD’s counsel did at oral argument why the divergence of 
views on student placement should not be a basis to support 
plaintiffs’ claims:   
[LMSD] has procedures in place that are followed 
for all students.  And the fact a psychologist could 
disagree with [LMSD’s] psychologist and say 
‘No, I don’t think this person met these criteria’ 
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doesn’t prove or produce any evidence to suggest 
that that was as a result of these students’ races.  
The psychologist did not [attempt] . . . to 
ascertain . . . that identification process . . . to see 
if there was perhaps some other indicia that could 
be pointed to as to why that occurred.  Instead, it 
was simply, ‘I don’t believe these students were 
[properly] identified.’  From that, the plaintiffs 
had made the leap that therefore it must be 
because of their race. 
Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 37-38. 
In reaching our result, in addition to considering the 
statistics we have cited and plaintiffs’ expert’s claim that 
students were misidentified, we have considered plaintiffs’ 
allegation that a small number of special education classes at 
LMSD were comprised of 100% African American students.  
But the problem with that evidence is that it was not offered in a 
context from which a meaningful correlation between race and 
class placement could be demonstrated because plaintiffs did not 
accompany it with testing data, grading, and other factors that 
might provide some meaning to the evidence that they offered.  
Under the IDEA structure, school districts that accept federal 
funds such as the LMSD must treat every student as an 
individual, and thus must evaluate, test, and monitor the student 
individually, as well as provide an IEP for the student on an 
individual basis.  If by following this mandate a school district 
should make a special education placement for a particular 
student, the school district should not decline to make the 
placement merely because the application of the mandate leads 
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to students of a particular group being statistically 
overrepresented in special education grouping.  We certainly are 
not going to require or even suggest that school districts use a 
quota system in assigning students to special education classes 
so that the percentages of students in such classes be 
proportionate to overall school ratios when measured on a racial 
basis.  A school district has the function of educating its 
students, and should be concerned with that critical matter rather 
than with producing particular statistics. 
 Appellants’ evidence of discrimination consists of 
statistical evidence that African American students were 
overrepresented in special education classes, testimony 
indicating that certain LMSD educators had discussed different 
learning styles and an email from a School Board member 
expressing concern about putting extra stress on black students.  
However, the record also reflects that each individual student’s 
educational needs were assessed and satisfied through a 
thorough and individualized IEP process, and contains no 
evidence that the educators and administrators responsible for 
placing students intended to discriminate against them because 
of their race.  Taking the record as a whole and drawing all 
inferences in appellants’ favor, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact that LMSD itself—or a third party under its 
control—engaged in intentional discrimination.   
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 First, we hold that the District Court correctly held that 
the action against the PDE was barred by principles of res 
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judicata (claim preclusion) as a result of the settlement of the 
class action in Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F. Supp. 2d 628.  
We reach that conclusion because the Gaskin class included all 
school-age students with disabilities in Pennsylvania who were 
denied a FAPE, and the claims pleaded against the PDE in this 
case were brought on behalf of students within the Gaskin class. 
 Thus, the claims asserted against the PDE in this case overlap 
with the claims that had been brought against it in Gaskin. 
Next, in reviewing the District Court’s conclusions 
regarding the IDEA’s statute of limitations for a party adversely 
affected by an administrative determination of an IDEA claim to 
bring a state or federal suit, we hold that the Court correctly 
concluded that the 90-day statute of limitations barred the 
Blunts’ IDEA claims.  In reaching this result, we hold that it did 
not matter that the Blunts’ administrative judicial process began 
on April 8, 2005, a date on which the IDEA’s statute of 
limitations for bringing a claim in state or federal court after 
receiving an adverse administrative determination was two 
years, because the Blunts’ final administrative disposition was 
on August 31, 2005, almost two months after the 90-day statute 
of limitations came into effect, and almost nine months after 
Congress enacted it.  Contrary to the Blunts’ contention, the 
amended statute of limitations was not unfairly retroactively 
applied, for they had nine months notice regarding the 
amendment of the statute of limitations before their IDEA action 
was barred; thus they had ample time to bring their case.  In 
fact, inasmuch as their cause of action did not arise until after 
the amendment of the statute of limitations, it is fair to say that 
the amendment simply was not applied retroactively in their 
case.  Further, as noted above, the Blunts had the responsibility 
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to be vigilant about changes in legislation, including statutes of 
limitation.  Our reasoning in Steven I. regarding the shortened 
IDEA statute of limitations for bringing an administrative claim 
plainly applies here with respect to the judicial claim. 
Judge Greenberg concludes that CBP did not have 
standing to sue on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, 
but Judges Ambro and McKee conclude that the District Court 
erred in dismissing CBP for lack of standing because CBP had 
organizational standing under Havens.  Although a majority of 
the Court thus does not accept the District Court’s ruling that 
CBP did not have standing, this conclusion does not change our 
outcome in light of a different majority’s independent 
conclusion that the Court properly entered summary judgment 
against the plaintiffs, as CBP has not explained why it could 
have prevailed where the individual plaintiffs did not.   
We also hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in how it dealt with disputed evidence.  The Court 
was correct in determining that the MAP presentation was not 
authenticated, and it did not abuse its discretion in discounting 
Moore-Williams’ testimony or in not giving it more weight than 
it did.  Further, the Court did not err in its use of Reschly’s 
report.   
Finally, plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination in violation of Title VI or § 1983; thus, the entry 
of summary judgment against them on their claims under those 
laws was appropriate.  Evidence that the District Court found to 
be inadmissible need not have been considered in a light most 
favorable to the non-movant plaintiffs because the evidence 
could not have become admissible at trial.  Further, the evidence 
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before the Court did not support a circumstantial prima facie 
case of racial discrimination in violation of Title VI or § 1983.  
In particular, the statistical evidence was insufficient to establish 
a prima facie case even when considered with other evidence.  
The IDEA’s goal is to ensure that educators and parents 
have necessary tools to improve educational results of disabled 
students.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(3) (stating as one purpose of 
the IDEA, “to ensure that educators and parents have the 
necessary tools to improve educational results for children with 
disabilities by supporting system improvement activities”).  As 
we have noted in the past, it is not necessarily the case that 
when students do not achieve equal results from their education 
there is a constitutional violation.  Coalition to Save Our 
Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Del., 90 F.3d 752, 766 
(3d Cir. 1996); see also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 273, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293 (1979) (It is a “settled 
rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not 
equal results.”).   
In summary, we will affirm the District Court’s orders of 
October 20, 2011, February 15, 2008, and August 19, 2009, on 
appeal at Nos. 11-4200 and 11-4201, and will dismiss LMSD’s 
cross-appeal at No. 11-4315.
73
   
                                               
73
 We are affirming the order of August 19, 2009, even though 
only Judge Greenberg agrees with the District Court that CBP 
does not have standing and the District Court dismissed CBP on 
that ground.  Appeals are taken from judgments, not opinions, 
see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984), and Judge 
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Ambro joins in the disposition of the case dismissing CBP 
because it has not explained how, if it had been permitted to 
continue in the case, it could have prevailed, a conclusion with 
which Judge Greenberg agrees.   
 
 We recognize that Chief Judge McKee believes that we 
are not affirming the August 19, 2009 judgment because the 
judgment recites that the motion to dismiss for lack of standing 
is granted and both he and Judge Ambro reject the District 
Court’s conclusion on the CBP standing issue.  But obviously 
the judgment simply dismisses the claim and the reference to the 
lack of standing is merely an explanation for the operative order 
which is to dismiss CBP’s claim.  The reference to a lack of 
standing is no different than a reference to the Court’s opinion 
finding that CBP did not have standing.  Therefore, inasmuch as 
Judge Ambro is voting to affirm the August 19, 2009 judgment, 
though on a basis other than its lack of standing, the judgment is 
being affirmed. 
 Judge Ambro’s vote brings into play the “well established 
[principle] that we are free to affirm the judgment of the district 
court on any basis which finds support in the record.”  Bernitsky 
v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).  We have 
applied this principle in the context of affirming a district 
court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.  See, e.g., Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999); Central Pa. 
Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 
1098, 1107 (3d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging power to “affirm 
decision of the district court on grounds other than those relied 
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upon by the district court” but declining to exercise it).  The 
Supreme Court also has noted that “settled” rule “that, if the 
decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the 
lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong 
reason.”  Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 
158 (1937).  
Amber Blunt, et. al. v. Lower Merion School District, et. al. 
Nos. 11-4200, 11-4201 & 11-4315 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring  
 I agree with and join in Judge Greenberg’s excellent 
and thorough opinion as to all but Part VII.B, which deals 
with whether Appellant Concerned Black Parents of Mainline 
Inc. (“CBP”) has standing to sue.  Although standing is a 
jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived, Pub. Interest 
Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magensium Elektron, Inc., 123 
F.3d 111, 117 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997), “the presence of one 
plaintiff with standing is sufficient to satisfy that 
requirement.”  Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. 
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 228 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986)), rev’d on other 
grounds, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).  The standing of the individual 
Plaintiffs here has never been challenged (nor should it).  
Thus the individual Plaintiffs confer standing and CBP’s 
standing as an organization is irrelevant.   
 Were it necessary to decide, I would agree with Judge 
McKee that, under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363 (1982), CBP has standing to sue on its own behalf.  
However, I also agree with Judge Greenberg that the claims 
of the individual Plaintiffs were properly dismissed at 
summary judgment.  CBP, who shared counsel with some of 
the individual Plaintiffs, has not explained how, were it 
permitted to continue as a plaintiff in the case, it could prevail 
where the individual Plaintiffs have failed.  Thus I agree with 
Judge Greenberg’s disposition of these appeals on their 
merits.  For these reasons, I concur.  
  
 
Blunt v. Lower Merion Nos. 11-4200, 11-4201, 11-4315 
McKee, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 Today we hold that a group of African-American 
parents and students have not produced sufficient evidence to 
have a jury decide if race is a factor in how African-American 
students are assigned to special education classes in their 
school district.  My colleagues reach this result even though 
the record contains numerous issues of disputed fact that 
would support plaintiffs’ claims if a jury resolved those 
disputes in the plaintiffs’ favor. 
 
 The allegations here are not pretty.  No one likes to 
think that a school district, especially one with an outstanding 
educational reputation, allows race to be a factor in assigning 
African-American students to special education classes.  
However, there is sufficient evidence on this record to 
establish that a trial is warranted to determine whether this 
school district did exactly that.  I therefore write separately to 
express my strong disagreement with my colleagues’ 
conclusion that these plaintiffs cannot survive summary 
judgment. 
 
 Despite that strong disagreement, I do agree that the 
Gaskin settlement bars the Title VI and § 1983 claims that 
have been brought against the Pennsylvania Department of 




 The District Court’s August 19, 2009 ruling that the 
settlement agreement bars claims against the PDE sets forth 
the relevant language of the settlement agreement.  That 
agreement identified the plaintiffs as: “representatives of a 
certified class consisting of all school-age students with 
disabilities in Pennsylvania who have been denied a free 
appropriate education in regular classrooms with 
individualized supportive services, individualized instruction, 
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 I also join Part VII.C of the Majority Opinion in which my 





and accommodations they need to succeed in the regular 
education classroom.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion School 
District, 262 F.R.D. 481, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  The 
agreement was in effect from September 19, 2005 to 
September 19, 2010.  Id.  Although, as counsel for CBP noted 
at oral argument, those claims are very different from the 
claims here, the language of the settlement agreement is very 
broad in its scope and provides in part as follows: 
 
[i]n consideration of the performance of PDE’s obligations under 
the Settlement Agreement, the plaintiffs, individually and 
collectively hereby remise, release, and forever discharge each of 
the defendants […] from all actions and causes of action, suits, . . . 
claims and demands whatsoever . . . , known or unknown, foreseen 
or unforeseen, particularly those which were or could have been 
set forth in Gaskin v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, No. 
94-CV-4048 (E.D. Pa.), or which any of the plaintiffs ever had or 
now has, . . . or may have, for . . . any reason of any cause, . . . 
whatsoever arising out of or related to the claims brought by the 
plaintiffs against the defendants in the Gaskin case from the 
beginning of the world to the effective date of the Settlement 
Agreement[.] 
 
Id. (ellipses and bold type and italics emphasis in original, 
underline emphasis added).  The claims in this suit, though 
quite different from the claims in Gaskin, are clearly “related 
to the claims brought by the plaintiffs . . . in the Gaskin case.” 
  
 However, for the reasons that follow, I cannot agree 
that Concerned Black Parents, Inc. (“CBP”) lacks standing 
(as discussed in Section VII.B of the Majority Opinion) or 
that the District Court properly granted summary judgment on 
the claims that these Plaintiffs brought against the Lower 
Merion School District (“LMSD”) under Title VI and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (as discussed in Section VII.D of the Majority 
Opinion).  
 
I.  CBP’S STANDING 
A.  General Principles 
 
 As Judge Greenberg explains, Article III requires a 
plaintiff to demonstrate a sufficient interest in the outcome of 
litigation to establish a “case or controversy” and thus have 







 As the Supreme Court explained in 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 511 (1975), “[t]here is no 
question that an association may have standing in its own 
right to seek judicial relief for injury to itself and to vindicate 
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may 
enjoy. . . . [e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an 
association may have standing solely as a representative of its 
members.” 422 U.S. at 511 (internal citations omitted). 
 
The District Court held that CBP was unable to 
demonstrate a sufficiently concrete injury to itself or the 
parents it represents to have standing to bring this suit.  Blunt, 
262 F.R.D. at 486.  In rejecting CBP’s claim of standing, the 
District Court focused on the fact that CBP is not a student 
and therefore could only demonstrate “an abstract, ideological 
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  Judge Greenberg properly notes that his discussion of 
CBP’s standing is not the holding of this Court, because 
Judge Ambro agrees that CBP has personal standing.  See 
Majority Opinion (“Majority Op.”) at 97-98 & n.72. 
However, for reasons of convenience and clarity, with the 
exception of Judge Greenberg’s discussion of personal 
standing, I frequently refer to his opinion in its entirety as the 
“Majority Opinion,” or the opinion of  “my colleagues.”  
     Judge Greenberg engages in a very detailed analysis to 
explain why he believes that CBP lacks standing.  He 
explains that such a detailed analysis is appropriate because 
“[w]e . . . will not avoid deciding the standing issue on the 
ground that it is moot, for the necessity for a party to have 
standing is jurisdictional and thus a court of appeals always 
must determine if the district court . . . had jurisdiction.”  
Majority Op. at 73 n.62. However, there is no dispute 
whatsoever about the standing of the individual plaintiffs, nor 
could there be.  Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the District 
Court and this Court is clear and undisputed. Accordingly, 
Judge Greenberg’s discussion of standing is dicta. See Galli 
v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are not bound by our Court’s prior dicta . . 
. .”). 
    Nevertheless, in order to respond to Judge Greenberg’s 
very detailed analysis, and to avoid any questions about the 
impact of our discussion on future suits by organizational 





interest in the litigation as opposed to the necessary ‘personal 
stake in the outcome’ of the controversy necessary to confer 





 In his separate opinion, Judge Ambro states: “ I would 
agree with Judge McKee that, under Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), CBP has standing to sue on 
its own behalf.”  Ambro at 1. However, both Judge Ambro 
and Judge Greenberg believe that CBP’s standing is irrelevant 
because they do not believe CBP can prevail on the merits.  
Majority Opinion (“Majority Op.”) at 98-99 n.72; Ambro at 
1.  Of course, CBP’s likelihood of success on the merits has 
no bearing on its standing.  The issue of CBP’s standing not 
only “matter[s], it is of the utmost importance . . .” as our 
decision here is precedential and can impact other 
organizations in the future.  “In essence, the question of 
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court 
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”  
Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
 
 Moreover, the standing issue is dispositive for 
purposes of the merits of CBP’s appeal of the August 19, 
2009 judgment because we are not affirming that judgment.  
As the Majority Opinion correctly notes, “[a]ppeals are taken 
from judgments, not opinions.”  Majority Op. at 98 n.72 
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).  CBP appealed the District 
Court’s August 19, 2009 judgment.  That judgment states: 
                                            
3 The District Court also held that CBP did not have 
representational standing because its bylaws stated that CBP 
had no members, and “in light of this express statement in a 
formal document governing . . . the corporation, [the District 
Court concluded] that [CBP] does not have standing to bring 
suit on behalf of its members because it has none.”  Id. at 487.   
I do not discuss the issue of whether CBP has representational 
standing because there is no need to. Judge Ambro and I 
agree that CBP has standing to sue based on its own injuries.  
I do note that the District Court failed to appreciate the extent 
or nature of CBP’s own injuries or the nature of CBP’s efforts 
to advance the interests of parents of African-American 





“the motion of defendants, the Lower Merion School District 
and the Lower Merion School Board, to dismiss the claims of 
Concerned Black Parents of Mainline, Inc. and the Mainline 
Branch of the NAACP for lack of standing is GRANTED.”  
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 42.69 (emphasis added).  It is 
therefore beyond dispute that CBP was dismissed from the 
case because of standing, and only because of standing.  
Because a majority of this Court now holds that CBP does 
have standing, see, e.g., Majority Op. at 97, the District 
Court’s August 19, 2009 judgment must be reversed as to the 
dismissal of CBP.   
 
 Thus, it is simply inaccurate to claim that our holding 
regarding standing “does not change [the] outcome in light of 
a different majority’s conclusion that [the District Court] 
properly entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs.”  
Majority Op. at 97.  The appeal from the District Court’s 
judgment granting summary judgment against the individual 
plaintiffs must be decided separately because it arises from a 
discrete judgment.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842.  
Furthermore, any suggestion that CBP must explain “why it 
could have prevailed where the individual plaintiffs did not,” 
see Majority Op. at 97, has no basis in the law.  Because CBP 
was dismissed from the litigation on a motion to dismiss, it 
was unable to engage in the same discovery as other parties; 
no summary judgment motion was filed against it and it 
therefore did not have a full opportunity to fairly oppose 
summary judgment.  
 
 When the District Court dismissed CBP for lack of 
standing, it did so without any motion to dismiss or motion 
for summary judgment being filed against CBP.  The 
Majority is correct that the District Court considered CBP’s 
standing twice—once before the Third Amended Complaint 
and once after it—and discovery was taken after the first 
dismissal, Majority Op. at 59 n.52.  However, that does not 
resolve the procedural issue here.    Plaintiffs filed for class 
certification.  In opposing that certification, defendants 
argued that CBP could not serve as a class representative, but 





J.A. at 918-19.  Rather, the District Court sua sponte 
dismissed CBP for lack of standing.  J.A. at 42.69.4 
 
 While the Majority is correct in noting that a judgment 
may be affirmed for any reason that is supported by the 
record, this record is more than adequate to survive summary 
judgment based on the standing of CBP as well as the 
individual plaintiffs.  Judge Ambro and I agree that CBP has 
demonstrated that it is entitled to personal standing under 
Havens Realty Corp.  Ambro at 1.  However, unlike Judges 
Ambro and Greenberg, I also believe there is sufficient 
evidence to survive dismissal on the merits of the relevant 
discrimination claims.  As I discuss in detail below, the 
District Court failed to properly credit some evidence, and 
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 Although the District Court notes that defendants “move to 
dismiss the claims of Concerned Black Parents . . . for lack of 
standing,” J.A. at 924-25, defendants’ motion makes no such 
claim.  Instead, as part of its argument that plaintiffs’ 
proposed class representatives cannot adequately represent 
the class, defendants’ motion states:  “Plaintiffs’ evidence 
does nothing to establish CBP’s standing and completely fails 
to address the fact that CBP is not a member of the proposed 
class and therefore cannot be a class representative.”  J.A. at 
919.   
 
      Plaintiffs were neither required, nor expected, to present 
evidence to establish CBP’s standing in order to move for 
class certification.   It is therefore not the least bit surprising 
that they did not then attempt to come forward with evidence 
to establish standing.  It appears that the District Court 
focused on the defendants’ comment about standing and 
transformed it into a motion attacking standing.  J.A. at 928.  
The District Court then focused on CBP’s lack of formal 
membership, and concluded that CBP “does not have 
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members,” ostensibly 
addressing plaintiffs’ claims that CBP may represent the 
class.  J.A. at 932.  The District Court then concluded: 
“[a]ccordingly, we will enter an order dismissing Concerned 
Black parents from this lawsuit for lack of standing.”  Id.  The 
District Court does not state that it is granting summary 
judgment against CBP for lack of standing.  Rather, it simply 





improperly discredited or ignored other evidence. When the 
evidence here is properly viewed in its entirety, the record 
establishes genuine issues of material fact pertaining to Plaintiffs’ 
claims under Title VI and § 1983, and the resulting harm.  See 
infra Section III at 30-60.  CBP has also presented sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding harm 
it suffered as a result of the LMSD’s conduct.  See infra Section 
I.B at 7-19. 
 
 For these reasons, the August 19, 2009 order, must be 
reversed as to CBP’s dismissal for lack of standing; a 
majority of this Court now holds that CBP does have 
standing. 
 
B. CBP’s Personal Standing 
 
 An organization has standing to assert its own injuries 
(“personal standing”) when it can show: (1) a concrete and 
particularized injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood 
of redressability.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Fair Housing Council of 
Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 
71, 76 (3d Cir. 1998) (“In order to defeat the summary 
judgment motion based on the issue of standing, [the 
opposing party] was required to submit ‘affidavits or other 
evidence showing through specific facts…that…it [was] 
‘directly’ affected [by the alleged discrimination]. . . .’”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 
 To show an injury in fact, CBP must show that its 
activities or operations were sufficiently disrupted by the 
disputed conduct.  In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the 
district court had erred in dismissing the claims of a nonprofit 
organization based on its alleged lack of standing.  The 
nonprofit organization there (“HOME”) was committed “to 
mak[ing] equal opportunity in housing a reality in the 
Richmond Metropolitan Area.”  Id. at 368 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   In furtherance of its mission, 
HOME counseled potential renters and undertook 
investigations to determine if landlords were discriminating 





rental units or neighborhoods based on race.  Id. at 368-69.  
HOME sent “testers” of different races into the community 
where they inquired about advertised rental units to determine 
if certain landlords were engaged in racially discriminatory 
steering.  Id. at 368.  As part of its investigation, HOME sent 
two testers to inquire about rental properties owned by 
Havens Realty Corporation (“Havens”).   Id.  The African-
American tester was incorrectly told that certain apartments 
were not available.  Id.  Simultaneously, the Caucasian tester 
was told that the very same apartments were available.  Id.   
 
 HOME sued Havens for housing discrimination, 
alleging that it had standing to sue in its own right and on 
behalf of its constituents.  Id.  HOME claimed it had itself 
been injured because Havens’ conduct “frustrated the 
organization’s counseling and referral services, with a 
consequent drain on resources.”  Id.   
 
The Supreme Court agreed.  The Court reasoned that 
where an organization’s ability to provide its primary services 
has been “perceptibly impaired,” the organization has 
personal standing to attempt recover for its injuries.  Id. at 
379.  HOME asserted that it had “been frustrated by 
defendants’ racial steering practices in its efforts to assist 
equal access to housing through counseling and other referral 
services.”  Id.  That was sufficient to allege an Article III 
injury.  The Court explained: “[s]uch concrete and 
demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the 
consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes 
far more than simply a setback in the organization’s abstract 
social interests.”  Id.  Specifically, HOME’s complaint 
included an allegation that it “[had] to devote significant 
resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic] 
racially discriminatory steering practices.”  Id.  (brackets in 
original).  The additional expense and the need to counteract 
Havens’ allegedly discriminatory conduct was a sufficiently 
particularized and concrete injury to confer standing upon 
HOME.  Id.  
 
We elaborated on Havens Realty in Montgomery 
Newspapers.  There, the defendants raised the same issues 
raised in Havens Realty, but on a motion for summary 





organization that worked “to educate and promote fair 
housing and to oppose segregation based on the protected 
classes found in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended.”  
Id.  In an effort to advance that objective, the organization 
sued multiple defendants, including a newspaper that had run 
advertisements that appeared to perpetuate housing 
discrimination on the basis of gender and familial status.
5
  Id.  
The plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment relied heavily on Havens Realty.  The 
plaintiff argued that it had sufficiently alleged its own injuries 
because the defendant newspaper’s “acceptance and 
publication of discriminatory housing advertisements 
frustrated the organization’s mission and [damaged] the 
organization . . . by . . . divert[ing] resources to fight the 
discrimination.” Id.   
 
We granted summary judgment to the defendants, but 
only because the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to 
support its alleged injuries. “[S]omething more than . . . 
naked allegations were required at the summary judgment 
stage.”  Id. at 76.  We explained that the nonprofit “was 
required to submit affidavits or other evidence showing 
through specific facts … that … it [was] directly affected by 
the alleged discrimination.”  Id. (italics, brackets, and ellipses 
in original, bold emphasis added, internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The organization had not produced any evidence 
that it had “altered its operations in any way as a result of the 
allegedly discriminatory advertisements or diverted any of its 
resources to a bona fide investigation.” Id. at 78.  “[B]are 
allegations of injury such as those based on the investigation 
described [there were] not enough to establish standing.” Id.  
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, we held that 
the organization had not established an Article III injury.  
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 “The complaint included copies of six advertisements which 
appeared in Montgomery newspapers between November, 1993 
and March, 1994.  Each of these advertisements contained one of 
the following allegedly objectionable phrases: ‘mature person’, 
‘ideal for quiet and reserved single and-or couple’; ‘professional 
male … only’ and ‘quiet mature setting.’”  Montgomery 





Thus, Montgomery Newspapers involved a failure of 
proof.  It does not support the conclusion that CBP has failed 
to introduce sufficient evidence of its own injury to survive 
summary judgment here.  
 
As discussed in detail below, CBP produced sufficient 
evidence of its own concrete and particularized injuries to 
create an Article III case or controversy.  While it is 
obviously true (as the majority and the District Court note) 
that CBP is not itself a student within the LMSD, that 
circumstance is only minimally relevant at best.  
 
In Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 391, 404 (3d Cir. 
1999), a case also brought under Title VI and § 1983, we 
stated that organizational plaintiffs that “devote substantial 
resources to overcoming what they allege are the disparate 
and inadequate educational programs caused by” the state’s 
failure to equally contribute funding and resources to 
minority school districts, had standing to sue on their own 
behalf.
6
  We explained that “the standing of the plaintiff 
organizations to bring this suit is consistent with the long line 
of cases in which organizations have sued to enforce civil 
rights . . . .” Id. at 404 (citing Walters v National Ass’n of 
Radiation Survivors,442 U.S. 347, 352 & n. 8 (1979); Havens 
Realty, 455 U.S. at 369 (1985); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 
U.S. 347, 352, 353 & n.8 (1979);  Fair Employment Council 
of Greater Washington, Inc., v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 
F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994); N.A.A.C.P v. The Medical 
Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981)).  Some of the 
relevant organizational defendants in Powell such as “Parents 
Union for Public Schools” and “Parents United for Better 
Schools” had an organizational purpose quite similar to 
CBP’s, and the actions they took to advance that purpose 
were also quite similar to actions CBP undertook here.  Id. at 
387, 391.  
 
Any focus on the fact that CBP is an organization of 
parents (rather than students) is particularly hard to 
understand in the context of the allegations of racial bias that 
underlie this lawsuit.  The interests of children in the quality 
                                            
6
 Disapproved of on other grounds in Fowler v UPMC 





of their education is identical to the interests their parents 
have in seeing them obtain such an education without the 
poisonous sting of racial bias.  The harm African-American 
students allegedly suffered here cannot readily be amputated 
from a concomitant harm to their parents or to an 
organization that devoted scarce resources to remedying it.  
After all, the nonprofit organization in Havens Realty had not 
been denied housing.  Yet, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
nonprofit had standing to challenge discriminatory housing 
practices because it had been forced to devote its own 
resources to its efforts to remedy racial discrimination in the 
housing market.  See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379. 
 
Here, CBPs purpose includes efforts to “promote 
equity and excellence” in education for diverse students.  It 
advances that purpose by addressing “issues related to 
education for populations identified as minority and/or 
African-American.”  Blunt and CBP Appellants’ Br. at 11.  
There is no suggestion that this statement of purpose is 
inaccurate.  Given that purpose, the record establishes that 
CBP has an interest in the outcome of the litigation, and that 
the alleged discriminatory conduct of  LMSD negatively 
affects the organization’s central activities, requiring it to 
incur extra expenses and provide resources to mitigate 
LMSD’s conduct.  Blunt, 262 F.R.D. at 486; see also  J.A. at 
3169.   
 
Judge Greenberg lists several of the injuries that CBP 
alleges, but ignores the evidence produced to support those 
injuries.  See Majority Op. at. 62-63.  The following 
numbered headings recite some of the injuries Judge 
Greenberg lists, and the discussion that follows each heading 
explains where supporting evidence can be found in this 
record:
7 
 [1] Use of its resources to ‘host educational 
consultants and experts’ with the purpose of 
providing information to the Plaintiffs, class 
members, community and LMSD; 
 
                                            
7
 Majority Op. at 62-63(citing TAC at 25-26; J.A. vol. 9, at 
3871-72) (footnote omitted) (I have added bracketed numbers 





 CBP hosted numerous educational events featuring 
educational consultants and experts.  These experts were paid 
to speak to parents about the effects of the LMSD’s conduct 
and how to counteract the consequences of that conduct.  
CBP’s president, Loraine Carter, testified that, “[s]ince 2006, 
[CBP has] coordinated public forums for parents in the 
community” by bringing in experts “to address the 
underachievement of African-Americans in the School 
District.”  J.A. at 3167.  Moreover, CBP’s newsletter 
references numerous speaking events held each month with 
prominent scholars and educational leaders.  Id. at 1495.  For 
example, in January 2004, CBP met with Dr. Donald Clark 
regarding educational law, history, and policy as it pertains to 
both African-American students and Pennsylvania.  Id.  In 
February 2004, it arranged for Dr. Freya Rivers, an 
educational consultant, to speak at a CBP meeting regarding 
strategies she uses to identify high achieving children and 
“closing the achievement gap.”  Id.  CBP also listed the 
following activities, among others, in its Fall of 2004 
schedule: “Special Education Action Roundtable; Youth 
Town Hall Meetings; Education Empowerment Sessions; 
Advocacy Training Sessions.”  Id.  
  
 [2] A ‘sharp’ rise in expenditures over the 
last five years due to its efforts to ‘protect its 
members from the adverse impact’ of ‘the 
inferior quality of  LMSD’s dual system of 
education’; 
 
 There is evidence that CBP incurred expenses 
responding to the allegedly discriminatory conditions at 
LMSD and the resulting need to advocate on behalf of parents 
seeking to change the educational circumstances of their 
children.  Id. at 3169.  From December 2005 to March 2006, 
CBP had an income of approximately $1,090 and expenses of 
$1,106.  Id.  Like HOME in Havens Realty, CBP had to divert 
its scarce resources to counseling and otherwise supporting 
African-American families who were allegedly being 
discriminated against by LMSD, in order to minimize the 
impact of LMSD’s purportedly discriminatory attitudes and 
actions toward African-American students.  Evidence that 
CBP’s expenses exceeded its income constitutes far more 





Newspapers; this evidence demonstrates that CBP suffered a 
discrete and cognizable injury as a result of LMSD’s conduct.  
  
 [3] Expenditure of resources as a result of its 
attending meetings related to IEPs, Section 
504 and ‘disciplinary meetings, court 
hearings and parent-teacher conferences 
with and/or on behalf of’ various plaintiffs, 
CBP members and class members; 
 
 Like HOME’s board members in Havens Realty, 
CBP’s board members had to attend LMSD’s educational and 
disciplinary meetings, as well as court hearings, on behalf of 
African-American students.  Barbara Metzger, who worked as 
a special education teacher at LMSD during the relevant time 
period, testified in her deposition that on at least one occasion 
she “was invited to and sat in on a portion of a Concerned 
Black Parents’ conversation with some of the school 
administrators” regarding concerns that “African-American 
students, as a whole, . . . were not performing at the same 
rate, not experiencing the same success as other students.”  Id. 
at 1456.  She also noted that, among other issues, CBP raised 
concerns that “these students didn’t feel welcome in the 
school.”  Id.  CBP engaged in dialogue with LMSD as part of 
their advocacy and counseling services for parents whose 
children were experiencing discrimination, in an effort to 
raise the concerns at issue in this case. 
  
 [4] Publication of a community newsletter 
and ‘News Notes . . . to disseminate the 
compilations of data on’ alleged racial 
disparities in application of disciplinary 
measures, segregation by race and ‘under 
achievement of African-American students 
in the [Lower Merion] District’; 
 
 CBP published and distributed numerous newsletters 
addressing claims of bias in order to inform parents of 
LMSD’s conduct.  For example, in Volume 1, Issue 3 of its 
“Main Line Voice” newsletter, CBP sought “a district-wide 
strategic plan to close the achievement gap,” citing statistics 
indicating that the same academic excellence that 





(60%) of its African-American students.”  Id. at 1494.  This 
newsletter also includes data demonstrating that African-
Americans are statistically more likely than their Caucasian 
peers to have IEPs and significantly less likely to be classified 
as gifted.  In fact, as I will discuss, for the years that were 
studied, the probability that an African-American student 
would be classified as “gifted” or assigned to an Advance 
Placement class was zero, as none were.  Id.
8
    
  
 [5] The ‘organization’ of educational, career, 
standardized test, financial aid, and college 
preparatory seminars. 
  
 Finally, there is ample evidence that CBP advocated 
for, and provided, college preparation resources that it 
believed African-American students needed because of 
LMSD’s purported failure to properly address their needs.  In 
her deposition, Ms. Metzger mentioned a meeting she 
attended with school administrators where she raised 
numerous claims of discrimination on behalf of African-
American students.  CBP “believed that at times, guidance 
counselors or others, personnel, maybe didn’t afford [African-
American students] the same consideration when it came to 
the college planning process.”   Id. at 1456.  Ms. Carter 
similarly testified that CBP has “met with a number of . . . 
community organizations and institutions that we’ve 
identified to bring them together” with LMSD, to provide 
support to African-American students.  Id. at 3406.  Thus, 
CBP has demonstrated that it has provided career and college 
counseling services to the school’s African-American 
students to make up for services that it claims LMSD unfairly 
withheld from these students.   
 
 Judge Greenberg’s analysis suggests that these actions 
do not establish Article III injuries because “CBP’s very 
purpose relates to actions directly involving LMSD, and its 
expenditures were devoted to protecting students’ interests in 
their interactions with LMSD.” Majority Op. at 64.  He 
believes this is different from HOME’s injuries in Havens 
                                            
8
 I will discuss such evidence in detail below in order to 
explain how the District Court erred in concluding that there 





Realty because “HOME’s purpose was to promote equality in 
the Richmond area overall and its interests thus went far 
beyond monitoring the specific actions at issue in the Havens 
case.”  Id.  To the extent that I understand that argument, it 
appears to be the classic distinction without a difference.  
CBP would not have had to undertake any of the actions or 
expenses detailed on this record absent the alleged racial bias 
of LMSD toward African-American students.  The fact that 
CBP’s actions are focused on remedying the results of bias 
within a school district rather than promoting equality 
throughout the township of Lower Merion (or Montgomery 
County) is absolutely irrelevant.  See Majority Op. at 64.  
Whether an organization monitors discrimination in a city or 
simply a school district does not affect whether it has 
standing to protect its own interests.
9
  See Majority Op. at 64-
65.
10
   
 Moreover, nothing in this record supports Judge 
Greenberg’s suggestion that CBP’s expenditures relate solely 
to this litigation or that it is thereby trying to manufacture 
standing through litigation. See Majority Op. at 64 
(“organizations may not satisfy the injury in fact requirement 
by making expenditures solely for the purpose of litigation.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
                                            
9
 As noted above, in Powell v. Ridge, this Court held that an 
organizational plaintiff similar to CBP contesting 
discrimination in a local school district had personal standing 
to assert its claims.  Powell, 189 F.3d at 391, 404.  Thus, it is 
incorrect to argue that an organizational plaintiff representing 
the interests of students in the school district is unable to 
make a personal standing claim under Havens.  Id. (citing to 
Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 369); Majority Op. at 64-
65. 
10
  Therefore, Judge Greenberg’s observation that “[i]t 
appears that the alleged additional expenditures were 
consistent with CBP’s typical activities and it is thus unclear 
the effect, if any, that this litigation had on their 
expenditures,” Majority Op. at 64, misses the point. CBP’s 
activities were all focused upon combating the effects of the 
racial bias alleged in LMSD toward African-American 
students. The fact that it had to make additional expenditures 
to combat any particular action or to mitigate the impact of 





 Judge Greenberg states: “CBP has failed to show why 
this particular litigation has frustrated its mission, or caused a 
‘concrete and demonstrable’ injury to its activities.”  Maj. Op. 
at 64.
11
  However, that is not the issue. The issue is not 
whether the litigation has drained CBP’s resources, but 
whether CBP has had to devote its scarce resources to 
combating the perceived bias of LMSD and the inferior 
educational opportunities that CBP believes African-
American students in that school district are afforded.  
 
 Moreover, this record establishes a diminution of 
CBP’s resources irrespective of any subsequent litigation.  It 
is abundantly clear that the organization’s goal was not 
simply to advance litigation against LMSD, but to counteract 
and monitor LMSD’s day-to-day conduct.  See, e.g., J.A. at 
3169 (Carter testifying that in 2005-2006, CBP’s expenses 
exceeded its income).  The impact on CBP’s scarce resources 
resulted from the organization’s response to the bias it 
believed African-American children in LMSD were subjected 
to, not from the litigation that was brought to address it.  
Judge Greenberg’s approach would result in a classic Catch-
22: nonprofit organizations that had devoted resources and 
incurred expenses to combat a particular activity would 
somehow lose their standing to sue if they decided that it was 
necessary to resort to litigation.  Judge Greenberg’s 
observation that “CBP has failed to show why this particular 
litigation has frustrated its mission, or caused a ‘concrete and 
demonstrable’ injury to its activities,” Majority Op. at 64, 
therefore misses the point of the standing inquiry.  The issue 
is not whether this litigation has drained CBP’s resources, but 
whether CBP’s efforts to combat perceived bias within the 
LMSD has drained CBP’s scarce resources.   I do not doubt 
that the litigation has negatively impacted this nonprofit, but 
that is neither the beginning nor the end of our inquiry, nor 
should we focus on that one factor.  
 
 Moreover, even assuming that some of CBP’s 
activities and expenses were incurred as a result of litigation, 
summary judgment review requires drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmovant and not against it.  Josey 
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 In addition, far from frustrating CBP’s mission, this 





v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 642 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“in the context of an appeal from summary judgment 
[we] must evaluate evidence in the light most favorable to 
[the nonmovant] and draw all inferences in his favor.”). 
 
CBP operates on the proverbial “shoe string” budget, 
and clearly had to divert its already-scarce resources to 
mitigating the impact of the conduct alleged here.  See 
Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379 (“[i]f, as broadly alleged, 
petitioners’ steering practices have perceptibly impaired 
HOME’s ability to provide counseling referral services for 
low - and moderate - income homeseekers, there can be no 
question that the organization has suffered injury in fact.”).  
The evidence supporting CBP’s assertions that it was injured 
by LMSD’s discriminatory conduct distinguishes this case 
from Montgomery Newspapers, and suffices to meet the 
standard for personal standing at the summary judgment 





II. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE WRONG 
TEST TO APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS UNDER TITLE 
VI AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
 The District Court applied the wrong test in granting 
LMSD’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims 
under Title VI and § 1983.  As the Majority correctly notes, 
the appropriate standard for determining liability under Title 
VI is deliberate indifference.  I note the following to amplify 
the Majority’s discussion of the appropriate standard for 
liability under Title VI and § 1983. 
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 Judge Greenberg cites La Asociacion de Trabajadores de 
Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (an out of circuit case that is obviously not 
binding) for the proposition that an organization “must . . . 
show that it would have suffered some other injury if it had 
not diverted resources to counteracting the problem” in order 
to demonstrate standing.  Majority Op. at 64.  However, we 
have never imposed any such impediment to Article III 
standing.  This additional hurdle is simply contrary to the 
minimal injury required under Article III. See, e.g., Havens 





 As the District Court notes, to establish a prima facie 
case under Title VI, plaintiffs must show that they: (1) were 
members of a protected class, (2) were qualified for the 
educational benefit or program at issue,  (3) and that they 
suffered an adverse action, (4) which occurred under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.  
Blunt, 826 F.Supp.2d 749, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (internal 
citations omitted).    
 
 In order to establish a prima facie claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs needed to show that their right to be 
free from racial discrimination, as guaranteed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, was 
violated, and that the violation was committed by a person 
acting under the color of state law.  See Chainey v. Street, 523 
F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008).  
 
 The District Court concluded that both the § 1983 
claim and the Title VI claims failed because Plaintiffs were 
unable to show a discriminatory purpose.  The court 
determined that Plaintiffs failed to “put forth ‘more than a 
scintilla’ of evidence that the School District acted with a 
racially discriminatory purpose when identifying them as 
disabled and offering them special education services, even if 
this identification was somehow incorrect.”  Blunt, 826 F. 
Supp. at 764 (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 
891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).   
  
 According to the District Court, “there was no direct or 
circumstantial evidence of intentional racial discrimination by 
the School District,” and this was fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims.  
Id at 762.  However, the test for “intentional discrimination” 
that the District Court applied to reach that conclusion is 
inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court, our sister 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, and our own precedential opinions.  
It is also inconsistent with the vast majority of courts that 
have interpreted the meaning of  “discrimination” under 
statutes that are inextricably linked to, derived from, and 
applicable to provisions of Title VI.  This is no minor concern 
because we cannot determine if there is sufficient evidence of 
Plaintiffs’ claims to withstand summary judgment unless the 






 In Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 288 F.3d 
548 (3d Cir. 2002), we emphasized that proof of disparate 
impact was not, by itself, sufficient to establish the requisite 
intent to discriminate under Title VI. Id. at 562 (“[a] mere 
awareness of the consequences of an otherwise neutral policy 
will not suffice” to establish intentional discrimination) 
(internal citations omitted).  Rather, we held that, “[in order 
to] prove intentional discrimination by a facially neutral 
policy, a plaintiff must show that the relevant decisionmaker 
(e.g., a state legislature) adopted the policy at issue ‘because 
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.”  Id.  (quoting Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Our holding rested in large part 
upon Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).   
  
 However, as we explained recently in S.H. vs. Lower 
Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248, 264 n.24 (3d Cir. 
2013), “Pryor [reached its result] because it equated 
deliberate indifference with disparate impact.”  Id. at 264 n.24 
(citing Pryor, 288 F.3d at 568).  S.H. relied upon the Supreme 
Court’s post-Sandoval jurisprudence as exemplified by 
Jackson v Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 
(2005).  There, the Supreme Court “[recognized] that 
deliberate indifference is a form of intentional 
discrimination.”  S.H., 729 F.3d at 264 n.24.13 (Emphasis 
added).  
  
 Given our unequivocal pronouncement in S.H. that 
deliberate indifference “is a form of intentional 
discrimination, and not a pseudonym for disparate impact,” it 
is clear that the Plaintiffs here do not have to prove 
discriminatory animus, as the District Court held and as my 
colleagues’ analysis implies.  Id. (emphasis in original).  Of 
course, I appreciate the fact that the District Court did not 
have the benefit of our decision in S.H. when it granted 
summary in favor of the defendants.  However, my colleagues 
and I do. 
                                            
13
 Jackson cited Gebser, and both involved claims filed under 
Title IX.  However, as I have already mentioned, and as I 






 Although it is true that the claims in S.H. arose under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 
Rehabilitation Act (RA), not Title VI or § 1983, this is 
immaterial as the statutes are interrelated. 
 
A.  The Proper Test for Discriminatory Intent 
 
1.  Civil Rights Statutes and the “Deliberate Indifference” 
Standard 
 
 In order to avoid any confusion over the applicability 
of the deliberate indifference standard, its application under 
Title VI here, or the relevance of cases decided under certain 
other statutes, it is helpful to expound on the majority’s 
explanation of the relationship of Title VI to other civil rights 
statutes related to it, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and Title IX of 
the Educational Amendments of 1978 (“Title IX”).  See 
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002). Courts often 
look to the standard that applies under one of these statutes, to 
decide cases brought under one of the others.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court, this Court, and nearly all of our sister Courts 
of Appeals that have addressed the standard for establishing 
intentional discrimination under these interrelated civil rights 
statutes (the RA, ADA, and Title IX) have held that deliberate 
indifference can be sufficient to establish the required 
discriminatory intent.  Evidence of discriminatory animus is 
not required.  
 
a. The Interrelationship of Title VI, The RA, and the 
ADA. 
 
 As my colleagues note, the RA prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of disability in federally funded 
programs, including employment programs receiving federal 
financial assistance.  29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1998).  The 
ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in 
employment, public accommodations, public entities and 
transportation, and telecommunications.  42 U.S.C. § 12101 
et seq. (2009).  As noted above, the RA and ADA are 
coextensive with Title VI.  Barnes, 536 U.S. at 185 (2002); 
S.H. ex. rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion School Dist., 729 F.3d 





explained: “the remedies for violations of . . . the ADA and . . 
. the [RA]  are coextensive with the remedies available in a 
private cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in 
federally funded programs and activities.” 536 U.S. at 185 
(internal citation omitted).  In S.H., we explained that:  
Section 203 of the ADA states that the remedies 
available under § 202 of the ADA are the same 
remedies available under § 505 of the RA. 
Similarly, § 505 of the RA clearly states that the 
remedies available under § 504 of the RA shall 
be the same remedies available under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 
 S.H., 729 F.3d at 260-61. 
  
 Under both the RA and the ADA, “deliberate 
indifference is a form of intentional discrimination . . . .”  
S.H., 729 F.3d at 264 n.24 (emphasis in original) (internal 
citation omitted).  Because the RA itself states that Title VI’s 
rights and remedies should apply, the same deliberate 
indifference standard that applies under the RA should apply 
to claims brought under Title VI. 
  
 “Supreme Court precedent construing Title VI governs 
enforcement of the RA and the ADA as well,” because both 
laws were modeled on Title VI.  S.H., 729 F.3d at 261 
(internal citations omitted).  
  
 When we decided S.H., this was an issue of first 
impression for us.  Id. at 260 (“We have not yet spoken on 
this issue.”).  We therefore took pains to explain our inquiry 
into “[w]hich standard to apply – discriminatory animus or 
deliberate indifference. . .”,  and we provided a thorough 
explanation of our decision to adopt the majority rule.  We 
explained that our discussion was (at least in part) in response 
to the Eleventh Circuit’s observation that “despite the 
adoption of the deliberate indifference standard by many of 
our sister courts, ‘there has been little explication for the 
conclusion that intentional discrimination under the RA may 
be established by deliberate indifference.’” Id. at 263 (quoting 
Liese v. Indian River County Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 





b.  Title VI and Title IX. 
  
 Fewer than ten years after Title VI was passed, 
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 (“Title IX”) to protect against gender-based 
discrimination in federally funded educational programs.  20 
U.S.C. § 1681 (2014) (“No person in the United States shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”).  Congress explicitly modeled Title IX on Title 
VI. “Except for the substitution of the word ‘sex’ in Title IX 
to replace the words ‘race, color, or national origin’ in Title 
VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the 
benefited class.”  Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
694-95 (1979).  
  
 Given the interrelated nature of the statutes, “[t]he 
drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be 
interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the 
preceding eight years.”  Id. at 696; see also Barnes v. 
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“The Court has 
interpreted Title IX consistently with Title VI . . .”); 
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 254-58 
(2009) (“Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and passed Title IX with the explicit 
understanding that it would be interpreted as Title VI was.”) 
(internal citations omitted). The standard for intentional 
discrimination under Title IX is clearly deliberate 
indifference.  Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 
526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District, 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).   
  
 In Davis, a parent brought suit against the Monroe 
County Board of Education because her fifth-grade daughter 
had been repeatedly sexually harassed by another student in 
her class.  Davis, 526 U.S. at 632-33.  The harassed student 
(LaShonda) and her family reported the harassing student’s 
conduct to various school officials, including her teachers and 
the principal.  Id. at 634.  The harassing student was 
eventually charged with, and pled guilty to, sexual battery for 
harassing LaShonda and others.  Id.  In the suit that followed, 





guilty, the school took no disciplinary action in response to 
LaShonda’s repeated complaints, and it failed to make any 
effort to protect LaShonda by separating her from the 
harassing student.  Id. at 635.  The defendants argued that 
plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that the defendants 
themselves had actually harassed LaShonda, not simply that 
they had ignored her harassment at the hands of another 
student.  Id. at 636.  The Supreme Court relied on Gebser, 
and held that the school board could itself be liable for sexual 
harassment under Title IX if it was deliberately indifferent to 
the peer-on-peer sexual harassment.  Id. at 641-43 (“Gebser 
thus established that a recipient intentionally violates Title IX, 
and is subject to a private damages action, where the recipient 
is deliberately indifferent to known acts of teacher-student 
discrimination.”) (internal citations omitted)(emphasis 
added).    
 
The rational for allowing deliberate indifference to 
establish intentional discrimination under Title VI is further 
illustrated by limitations and obligations arising from the 
Sending Clause authority that each of the analogous statutes 
is based upon.   
 
c.  The Relevance of the Spending Clause 
 
 Title VI, Title IX, the RA and the ADA are all based 
on the same exercise of congressional power under the 
Spending Clause. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.  Guardians 
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 598-99 (1983) (opinion of White, J.)(Title 
VI); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 (Title IX); S.H., 729 F.3d at 264 
(RA and ADA).  
 
 In Gebser, the Supreme Court explained how the 
source of congressional authority in enacting Title IX and 
Title VI informed interpretation of the statutes: 
 
Title IX's contractual nature has implications for our 
construction of the scope of available remedies. When 
Congress attaches conditions to the award of federal 
funds under its spending power, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 
8, cl. 1, as it has in Title IX and Title VI, we examine 
closely the propriety of private actions holding the 





noncompliance with the condition. Our central concern 
in that regard is with ensuring that “the receiving entity 
of federal funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a 
monetary award.”  
 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287-88 (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted).   
  
In S.H. we explained:  
 
[t]he RA and ADA were enacted under 
Congress’s Spending Clause power; legislation 
that is enacted under this power ‘is much in the 
nature of a contract’ between the federal 
government and recipients of federal funds” and 
“[t]he Supreme Court has thus reasoned that a 
recipient of federal funding, such as the School 
District here, may be held liable for money 
damages only when it is on notice by statute 
that it has violated the law.”).  
 
729 F.3d at 264 (internal citations omitted).   
 
Under the Spending Clause analysis of  S.H., animus is 
not a condition precedent to a contractual breach.  Rather, 
intent to breach can be assumed from knowledge of a set of 
circumstances, and a refusal to remedy them.  This is true 
whether the law in question prohibits gender-based 
discrimination under Title IX, disability-based discrimination 
under the ADA or RA, or racial discrimination as is alleged 
here under Title VI.  
 
2.  The District Court’s Approach is Inconsistent with the 
Decision of Every Other Circuit Court That Has Decided 
This Issue 
 
Every Circuit Court of Appeals that has addressed this 
issue has held that the heightened discriminatory animus 
standard does not apply to Title VI claims.
14
  See Bryant v. 
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 In S.H., we identified two Courts of Appeals that appeared 
to adopt a minority position. The First Circuit in Nieves-
Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126-27 (1
st





Independent School District No. 1-38 of Garvin County, 
Oklahoma, 334 F.3d 928, 933-34 (10th Cir. 2003); Zeno v. 
Pine Plains Central School District, 702 F.3d 655, 665 n.10 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“Although the harassment in Davis, and the 
‘deliberate indifference’ standard outlined by the Supreme 
Court, arose under Title IX, we have endorsed the Davis 
framework in cases of third-party harassment outside the 
scope of Title IX.”) (internal citations omitted); Monteiro v. 
Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1034-35 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted); Liese v. Indian River 
County Hospital District, 701 F.3d 334, 347-49 (11th Cir. 
2012) (applying deliberate indifference to a disability 
discrimination case because the RA is based on Title VI, 
where deliberate indifference would be sufficient to show 
discriminatory intent).  
 
In Bryant, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
relied on Davis in adjudicating a Title VI hostile environment 
claim.  Bryant, 334 F.3d at 934.  Plaintiffs there were students 
who alleged that they were subject to a racially hostile school 
environment.  Id. at 931.  The relevant school officials were 
“aware of the racial slurs, graffiti inscribed in school 
furniture, and notes placed in students’ lockers and 
notebooks” and yet, “[t]he principal affirmatively chose to 
take no action.”  Id. at 932-33.   While noting that the 
offending conduct must be intentional to pass muster under 
Title VI, the Tenth Circuit explained: “[c]hoice implicates 
intent” lest “school administrators . . . sit idly, or 
intentionally, by while horrible acts of discrimination 
occurred on their grounds by and to students in their charge.”  
Id. at 933.  The court added: “when administrators who have 
a duty to provide a nondiscriminatory educational 
                                                                                                  
and the Fifth Circuit in Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 
F.3d 567, 575 (5
th
 Cir. 2002).  However, neither decision 
actually adopts a “minority rule.” Nieves-Marquez never 
rejected the “deliberate indifference” standard as a form of 
intentional discrimination. Similarly, in Delano-Pyle, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not affirmatively 
require discriminatory animus to establish intentional 
discrimination under the RA and ADA.  Instead, the court 






environment for their charges are made aware of egregious 
forms of intentional discrimination and make the intentional 
choice to sit by and do nothing, they can be held liable” under 
Title VI.  Id.  
 
The court instructed the district court on remand:  
to apply the test from Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education” to a Title VI hostile 
school environment claim because “Congress 
based Title IX on Title VI; therefore, the 
Court’s analysis of what constitutes intentional 
sexual discrimination under Title IX directly 
informs our analysis of what constitutes 
intentional racial discrimination under Title VI 
(and vice versa). 
 
  Id. at 934. We should remand and do the same here.    
  
 The Plaintiffs here may not be able to ultimately 
convince a fact finder that they should prevail under Title VI 
or § 1983, but they have clearly produced sufficient evidence 
to survive summary judgment, and they are clearly entitled to 
have the correct legal standard of deliberate indifference 
applied to their proof.  
 
III.  THIS RECORD AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 My colleagues readily concede the difficulty of 
proving a discriminatory motive and the concomitant 
necessity of allowing plaintiffs to rely solely on 
circumstantial evidence.  See Majority Op. at 45 (“individuals 
who violate the law based on discriminatory motives 
sometimes do not leave a trail of direct evidence, but instead 
‘cover their tracks’ by providing alternate explanations for 
their actions.”).  We have discussed this in some detail in the 
context of claims of job discrimination.  In Aman v. Cort 
Furniture, 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996), we stated: 
“defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit 
discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating 
it.”  This is especially true since those who harbor conscious 
(as opposed to subliminal) bias may attempt to “cover their 





 Thus, bias will sometimes manifest itself only in subtle 
ways that the actor him/herself may not even be cognizant of. 
In Cort Furniture, we explained that “Discrimination 
continues to pollute the social and economic mainstream of 
American life, and is often simply masked in more subtle 
forms.” 95 F.3d at 1082.  In Coombs v 616 F.3d, 264, in 
discussing the possible unconscious bias of a prosecutor in 
striking Black jurors we explained, “[l]ike anyone else, trial 
attorneys possess those human frailties that make each of us 
far too susceptible to social conditioning and the subliminal 
bias that may result.”  Surely, teachers in our public schools, 
even though they may not be acting out of racial animus or 
conscious bias, are no less human, and no more immune to 
the “frailties that make each of us far too susceptible to social 
conditioning and the subliminal bias that may result,” than 
attorneys are.  
 
 This does not eliminate the Plaintiffs’ need to produce 
enough evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment. 
However, the nature of the fact to be proven must inform a 
court’s analysis of the evidence that is produced.  If Plaintiffs 
have produced enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to Defendants’ deliberate indifference, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court on their Title VI 
and § 1983 claims whether the deliberate indifference is 
borne of deliberate animus or the more insidious poison of 
social conditioning. 
15
  Here, plaintiffs’ proof is more than 
sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, 
especially if we consider the ephemeral nature of the racially 
caused deliberate indifference they must prove.  
 
A.  The Summary Judgment Standard Has Been Ignored 
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 For an interesting discussion of the neurological science 
underlying the subtleties of bias that we discussed in Cort 
Furniture and Coombs, see John A. Bargh, “Our Unconscious 
Mind: How Unconscious Thought and Perception Affect Our 








 I reiterate that a court may not “weigh the disputed 
evidence and decide which is more probative,” when deciding 
a motion for summary judgment.  Lawrence v. National 
Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 67 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(internal citations omitted) (holding that the district court 
erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence 
to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim 
where the district court had simply discounted plaintiff’s 
admissible evidence as less probative than defendant’s.).   
Similarly, courts may not “make credibility determinations or 
engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-
moving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed[,] and all 
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v. 
Indus. Crafting Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986)).   
  
 The District Court did acknowledge the Plaintiffs’ 
“[e]vidence of procedural irregularities” in the way some of 
the children were erroneously placed into special education 
classes.  Blunt, 826 F.Supp.2d at 760.  Yet, the court 
dismissively refused to admit it based upon the court’s belief 
that “there must be some evidence that irregularities were 
related to plaintiffs’ race.” Id.  Thus, the Plaintiffs were 
denied the benefit of all reasonable inferences in defending 
against summary judgment and they were also expected to 
prove a negative by dispelling all causes for the “procedural 
irregularities” other than race.  
  
 After demanding that Plaintiffs prove the irregularities 
here were tied to race - irregularities that my colleagues 
ignore, the District Court not only failed to afford the 
Plaintiffs the inference demanded by summary judgment, the 
court ignored evidence that was relevant to the very racial 
nexus the court demanded proof of. 
  
 As I will explain below, the Plaintiffs’ expert 
examined the extent to which African-American students are 
overrepresented in LMSD’s special education classes while 
being completely absent from any “high expectation” college 
prep or advanced placement classes, and concluded both as a 
matter of statistical science as well as common sense that 





the LMSD practices related to Ethnicity.” J.A. at 1676 
(emphasis added).  There is other evidence, that I will discuss, 
that is easily sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material 
fact if the record is properly viewed in its totality.  
  
 Any appropriately flexible inquiry, if guided by the 
correct legal test of deliberate indifference, would have 
realized the potential for a fact finder to conclude that 
Plaintiffs have met their burden based on all of the 
circumstantial evidence here.  I reiterate: at this point, the 
burden is merely to produce sufficient evidence that there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact.  Plaintiffs do not have to 
prove their case to survive summary judgment, and they are 
entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences.  
  
 Circumstantial evidence (which all involved concede 
is not only permissible but  necessary in such cases) is 
nothing more than a fact derived from an inference drawn 
from proof of underlying circumstances.  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 18c (9th ed. 2009).  That is exactly what we have 
here.  Although I do not suggest that this record would 
necessarily result in a reasonable fact finder inferring a racial 
motive based on deliberate indifference, such a finding would 
clearly be supported by this record, even absent the 
evidentiary equivalent of a “smoking gun.” 
  
 I am thus at a complete loss to understand how the 
District Court could have looked at this record and concluded 
that Plaintiffs had “not put forth more than a scintilla of 
evidence that the LMSD had acted with a racially 
discriminatory purpose [i.e. deliberate indifference] in 
identifying them as disabled and placing them in special 
education courses . . . .” See  Majority Op. at 86. 
  
  Although we are assured that plaintiffs in cases such 
as this need not produce the proverbial “smoking gun,” it 
certainly appears that after today, they will be required to 
produce something akin to evidence of either a muzzle flash 
or a surveillance video in order to survive summary 
judgment.  
  
 In affirming this grant of summary judgment, my 





District Court that the LMSD applied different evaluation 
procedures for determining placement of African-American 
students than for Caucasian students.”  Majority Op. at 93.  
There does not have to be.
16
   
  
 There is an expert’s conclusion that there is 
statistically significant evidence of African American being 
disproportionately assigned to special education classes while 
none are enrolled in advanced placement or “high expectation 
classes.”  We know that the African-American students who 
are plaintiffs here were placed in special education classes 
even though their tests did not indicate such a placement was 
warranted and/or that deficiencies were relied on for such 
placements that did not justify a special education 
placement.
17
  This is evidence that was dismissed, even 
though we should be mindful of the difficulties of proof in 
such cases and that bias is no longer “worn on sleeves” or 
“carried on signs.” 
  
 Moreover, as I have already explained, no evidence of 
different testing or separate evaluation procedures is required.  
Although such evidence would certainly have advanced the 
Plaintiffs’ claim of racial bias, its absence is far from fatal to 
those claims given the other evidence on this record.  
                                            
16
 A relevant article from the highly respected periodical 
mentioned above (n.15) contains a helpful illustration of why 
my colleagues’ approach to claims of bias is both misguided 
and naivè: “A college admissions officer might zero in on a 
less than stellar grade in an otherwise solid medical school 
application from a prospective minority student without 
realizing those same negative features are not weighted so 
heavily for the other applicants.”  Bargh supra note 16 at 34.  
As I discuss below, it appears here that African-American 
students may well have been placed in special education 
classes based on evaluations that did not warrant such a 
placement. It is therefore irrelevant that the same evaluations 
were used to place White students in special education 
classes. 
17
 And this does not even include evidence that should have 
been admitted but was erroneously labeled “hearsay,”  or 






Whether or not the procedural irregularities in the erroneous 
and improper placement of these African-American students 
in special education classes was the result of bias (i.e. 
deliberate indifference), ineptitude, or coincidence should not 
be decided on summary judgment given the Plaintiffs’ 
evidence.  
  
 My colleagues acknowledge that “plaintiffs’ expert, a 
psychologist [concluded] that five or six of the students in 
question incorrectly had been identified as learning disabled. . 
.”  Majority Op. at 93.  Yet they attach no evidentiary 
significance to the fact that nearly every individual African-
American student in this suit was improperly placed in special 
education classes, because that expert opinion “was not 
rendered until these proceedings were pending in the District 
Court . . . .”  Majority Op. at 93.  I do not understand how that 
bears on whether the Plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence 
to survive summary judgment in the District Court, and the 
absence of legal citation or explanation of why this is the least 
bit relevant does not encourage comfort in such a strange 
principle.  Indeed, I have no idea why one would go to the 
trouble and expense of obtaining an expert opinion about 
alleged improprieties before the evidence was required as 
proof in a judicial proceeding.  The expert opinion was before 




 Although the abuse of discretion standard that governs 
our review of the District Court’s evidentiary rulings is quite 
deferential, it is not insurmountable and focusing on the 
deference properly afforded an evidentiary ruling ought not to 
substitute for an objective analysis of whether the ruling was 
an abuse of discretion.  
  
 Thus, even if it was proper to ignore the MAP 
PowerPoint and all of Dr. Moore-Williams’ testimony (and it 
was not), which I discuss in detail below, the remaining 
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 The District Court never even mentioned the fact that the 
record contained evidence that the level of disproportionality 
was statistically significant, and that it showed “there is 
something systematic about the LMSD practices related to 





record should still have precluded summary judgment. “The 
totality of the evidence . . . must guide our analysis rather 
than the strength of each individual argument.”  Bray v. 
Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 991 (3d Cir. 1997).  Yet my 
colleagues attempt to “explain[] each of the discrepancies in 
[the] record in isolation and conclude[] that none of them 
creates a material issue of fact.” Id. (internal citation omitted).  
“[S]uch an analysis is improper in a discrimination case.”  Id; 
see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 
1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A play cannot be understood on the 
basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, 
and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not 
on the individual incidents, but on the overall scenario.”). 
 
B. Plaintiffs’ Statistical Evidence was Not Properly 
Credited.  
 
 Plaintiffs’ proof consists in part of strong statistical 
evidence.  It is summarized in the following chart that is 
based on data collected by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education:  
Year 









































’05-‘06 6,945 7.7% 84.4% 1,255 18.1% 12.7% 82.6% 
’06-‘07 6,981 7.9% 83.2% 1,187 17.0% 14.5% 80.2% 
’07-‘08 6,914 8.1% 83.1% 1,158 16.7% 14.0% 80.8% 
’08-‘09 6,788 8.0% 81.6% 1,101 16.2% 13.7% 80.5% 
’09-‘10 7,072 8.6% 81.1% 1,094 15.5% 14.3% 80.0% 
 
Majority Op. at 92-93.  
 
 My colleagues ignore the force of these numbers by 
stating that “[d]isporportionality is not per se evidence of 
discrimination, […] [because disproportionality] can be either 





marks and citations omitted).  Although that is true, recitation 
of that general principle does not justify adopting a wholly 
dismissive attitude toward the evidence of disproportionally 
in the LMSD, or considering it in isolation from other 
evidence. 
 
 For the five-year span captured by these numbers, the 
percentage of Caucasian students in special education classes 
in LMSD was roughly equivalent to, though always less than, 
the total percentage of Caucasian students in the LMSD 
student body.  For most of that time frame, the percentage of 
African-American students enrolled in special education 
classes in LMSD was twice the percentage of the number of 
African-Americans in the student body.  These percentages 
do not exist in a vacuum.   
 
1.  Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Conroy Placed the Statistical 
Evidence in Context 
 
 Plaintiffs produced the testimony of an expert witness, 
Dr. James W. Conroy, Ph.D, who studied enrollment and 
student placement in the various courses at LMSD.
19
  He 
found that, while African-American students were greatly 
overrepresented in “low expectation” classes, they were 
dramatically underrepresented in more demanding college 
preparatory and advanced placement courses.  J.A. at 1671-
74.  “The pattern is that these courses with the highest 
proportions of Black students tend strongly to be courses that 
I would label as ‘low expectations’ courses.”  Id., at 1673-74 
(italics added).  
 
 Conroy also examined the racial composition of the 
twelve advanced or “high expectation” classes.  He found that 
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  Although it is not necessary to note Conroy’s 
qualifications at this stage, it is important to consider that it 
includes “39 years of research in disability, education, and 
health issues among children and adults,” and since 
graduating Cum Laude, from Yale and earning his Ph.D. in 
Medical Sociology from Temple University, “With 
Distinction,” he has qualified as an expert in disability 
research, disability policy, special education and statistical 





in 2008, not only were African-American students 
underrepresented in those classes; the percentage of African-
American students in “high expectation” classes was “zero.” 
Id. at 1674-75 (emphasis in original).  In other words, not a 
single African-American student was assigned to any of the 
twelve high expectation classes in LMSD in 2008.
20
  Id.  Lest 
one think 2008 was a fluke or a statistical aberration, Conroy 
found exactly the same pattern “for each of the years 2005, 
2006, 2007, and 2008.”  Id. at 1675.  For each of those years 
not a single African-American student was assigned to a 
college prep or “high expectation” class in this school district. 
 
 Conroy testified that the extent of this disparity was 
“‘significant’ in the statistical sense.”  Id. at 1676.  In fact, 
Conroy concluded that the disproportionally in LMSD was so 
evident that one need not be an expert in statistics to grasp its 
significance.  Rather, he believed that “[t]he Lower Merion 
population data may be judged practically significant by 
simple observation of large differences in the kinds of courses 
students [sic] Black and Others students wind up in.”  Id. at 
1677 (emphasis in original).  His conclusion, rejected by the 
District Court as a matter of law, was that: “there is 
something systematic about the LMSD practices related to 
Ethnicity.” Id. at 1676 (emphasis in original). 
 
 The Majority states that “[t]he District Court . . . 
discussed in detail the statistical data that the plaintiffs put 
forward.”  Majority Op. at 92.  Yet, both my colleagues and 
the District Court ignore that absolutely no African-American 
students were placed in “high expectation” classes during the 
period examined by Conroy, and the Majority fails to note 
that the District Court ignored the expert conclusion that 
LMSD employed these “practices related to Ethnicity.”  
However, even if the statistics could properly be viewed in 
isolation, the issue remains not whether those disparities 
establish deliberate indifference, but whether they create an 
issue of fact about African-American students’ placement in 
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 Those classes included: Latin 3H, AP Calculus BC, IB 
Senior Project, IB Theory of Knowledge, Economics H, IB 
History of Americas HL 2, IB English A1 HL (Part 2), Art 2 
H, AP Spanish Language, AP Physics C Electromagnetism, 





“low expectation classes” during this time frame, which was a 
period when LMSD did not place a single African-American 
student into any “high expectation” college prep or Advanced 
Placement test.  
 
 The Majority attempts to further minimize the 
evidentiary value of this testimony by noting that: 
 
 [t]he Supreme Court also has rejected the use 
of particular standard deviations or ‘any 
alternative mathematical standard’ in 
establishing a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination, and has stressed that the 
significance or substantiality of numerical 
disparities must be judged on a case-by-case 
basis . . . [and they] must be sufficiently 
substantial that they raise an inference of 
causation. 
 
Majority Op. at 47 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996 (1988). 
  
 There are other problems with the Majority’s attempt 
to ignore the force of the statistical evidence.  First, in 
Watson, the Court was deciding whether a statistically based 
disparate impact analysis was applicable to a claim of 
disparate treatment in a “subjective or discretionary 
promotion system.”  487 U.S. at 999.  The Court said nothing 
that would assist us in determining the propriety of a sample 
size or the probative force of the “deviation” here.  Indeed, 
the Court’s only mention of “deviation” was the following 
reference in a footnote: 
  
 Courts have also referred to the ‘standard deviation’ 
analysis sometimes used in jury selection cases. We have 
emphasized the useful role that statistical methods can have in 
Title VII cases, but we have not suggested that any particular 
number of ‘standard deviations’ can determine whether a 
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in the complex area 
of employment discrimination.  
 





 The Majority seems concerned with the sample size 
here as well as the significance of the deviation.  They cite to 
Watson, stating: “the Supreme Court has explained that 
neither the ‘courts nor defendants [are] obliged to assume that 
plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable,’ and has cited, for 
example, the weaknesses inherent in small or incomplete data 
sets and/or inadequate statistical techniques.”  Majority Op. at 
46 (internal citation omitted).  That is clearly true as a general 
proposition, but I do not understand how that general 
proposition advances our inquiry.  There is nothing on this 
record to suggest that the Plaintiffs’ experts’ statistical 
analysis is flawed, that the data set is “incomplete and/or 
inadequate,” or that their experts’ statistical techniques are 
flawed.  The District Court made no such finding and it 
appears that LMSD did not make any such argument to the 
district court.  
  
 The issue in Watson was whether a disparate impact 
analysis could be used to establish disparate treatment in an 
employment discrimination suit involving a discretionary 
promotion system at a bank having 80 employees – far fewer 
than the numbers involved here.  There, the African-
American plaintiff had attempted to use statistical evidence of 
the paucity of African-Americans who had been promoted at 
the bank, in order to establish her disparate treatment claim 
that the bank had failed to promote her because of her race.  
The Supreme Court held that statistical evidence of disparate 
impact could be used to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment but rejected the position of some courts 
that looked to EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employment 
Selection Procedures.  Those courts had “adopted an 
enforcement rule under which adverse impact” would “not 
ordinarily be inferred unless the members of a particular . . . 
group [were] selected at a rate that [was] less than four-fifths 
of the rate at which the group with the highest rate [was] 
selected.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3.  The Court restated 
the “useful role that statistical methods can have in Title VII 
cases,” but cautioned that it had “not suggested that any 
particular number of ‘standard deviations’ can determine 
whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case . . ..” Id. 






 The situation here is remarkably different.  In order to 
establish deliberate indifference under the theory advanced 
here, Plaintiffs had to first establish that African-American 
students were being placed in “low expectation” classes at a 
significantly disproportionate rate to Caucasian students.  
Even my colleagues seem to concede that the record 
establishes that, and LMSD does not really deny that.  Any 
dispute about statistical sampling, standard deviations, and “z 
scores,” is beside the point. 
 
2.  There are Issues Regarding Defendants’ Expert’s 
Methodology 
 
 Plaintiffs’ expert explained his methodology in great 
detail and we have only my colleagues’ countervailing 
implied mastery of statistics to dismiss the statistical validity 
of Plaintiffs’ expert’s conclusions.  My colleagues’ concern 
about such statistical terms of art as: “data sets” and 
“statistical techniques” and sample size, is even more 
puzzling when one considers that the Defendants’ expert, Dr. 
Daniel Reschly, reached a conclusion that was contrary to 
Plaintiffs’ expert based on a much smaller sample size.  
Reschly only looked at two years of student placements as 
opposed to the five years that Conroy used to reach a 
conclusion about the role of race in LMSD’s placements.  
Moreover, Reschly admitted that his inquiry was hurried and 
that he did not request additional information required to 
perform the kind of analysis he would otherwise have 
conducted because there was insufficient time.  J.A. at 2979.  
Id. at 2590. 
 
 Although I do not address the Majority’s rejection of 
Plaintiffs’ appeal of the District Court’s decision to consider 
Reschly’s evidence without subjecting it to a Daubert 
hearing, I neither agree with that decision, nor do I 
understand why the District Court denied the requested 
Daubert hearing.  I do not discuss it in detail because that 
ruling has no bearing on whether Plaintiffs offered enough 
evidence to survive summary judgment.  If Reschly’s report 
could withstand a Daubert inquiry, we have a classic battle of 
the experts that a jury should resolve.  If it is not admitted 
under Daubert, the record still contains a factual issue that 





 I do note that my colleagues misstate the Plaintiffs’ 
basis for challenging the District Court’s denial of their 
request for a Daubert hearing.  My colleagues suggest that 
Plaintiffs’ objection to Reschly’s report “lies with one 
paragraph.” Majority Op. at 84. That is the District Court’s 
acceptance of Reschly’s definition of “disproportionality.”  
My colleagues explain their rejection of this claim as follows: 
“[w]e find this use of Reschly’s wording to define 
disproportionality to be immaterial to the outcome of this 
litigation.”  Id. 
 
 However, there are many more issues with Reschly’s 
report than the definition of “disproportonality,” and these are 
set forth in the Memorandum of Law filed in support of  
Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Partially Exclude and/or Limit 
the Report and Testimony of Daniel J. Reschly, Ph.D.  J.A. at 
2916.  Arguably, there are numerous problems with Reschly’s 
report, including the fact that he admitted that he did not have 
enough time to conduct the kind of comparison he otherwise 
would have, the files he compared were selected by agents of 
LMSD, and he only compared two years of class assignments. 
 
 The issue for us is not, of course, which expert is 
correct. Rather we should only be concerned with whether 
this disagreement raises a genuine dispute of material fact.  
The majority does not believe it does because my colleagues 
simply reject the statistical evidence supporting the Plaintiffs’ 
claim of bias.  That is improper.  See Federal Laboratories v. 
Barringer Research, Ltd., 696 F.2d 275, 274 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(“A court may not . . . resolve ‘disputed and relevant factual 
issues on conflicting affidavits of qualified experts.’ Nor is it 
at liberty to disbelieve the good faith statements of experts 
contained in depositions or affidavits and presented by the 
non-moving party”) (internal citations omitted). 
 
 Although my colleagues cite to Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977), they manage to overlook 
the thrust of the Court’s analysis there.  In Teamsters, the 
defendant employer argued that “statistics can never in and of 
themselves prove the existence of a pattern or practice of 
discrimination, or even establish a prima facie case shifting to 
the employer the burden of rebutting the inference raised by 





defendant’s attempt to minimize the importance of statistical 
analysis by explaining: “our cases make it unmistakably clear 
that ‘[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to 
serve an important role’ in cases in which the existence of 
discrimination is a disputed issue.” 431 U.S. at 338, (brackets 
in original). This is such a case. 
 
 Moreover, the invocation of the maxim that statistics 
cannot “by themselves” establish discriminatory intent, 
should not obscure the fact that there is “more,” on this 
record.  There is much more.  Thus, even if the opinion of the 
Plaintiffs’ expert could not, by itself, raise an issue of fact, it 
is neither proper nor fair to discuss Plaintiffs’ proof as if they 
were only relying on that evidence to establish an issue of fact 
about discriminatory intent under the deliberate indifference 
standard.  
 
C.  Evidence of a “MAP” Program was Improperly 
Excluded and Raises a Dispute of Fact. 
 
 Before discussing the MAP evidence, it is helpful to 
reiterate the nature of the disputed factual issues in this case.  
As my colleagues readily concede, proof of intent can rarely 
be achieved by direct evidence.  See Majority Op. at 45.  
Accordingly, as noted earlier, “[c]ourts today must be 
increasingly vigilant in their efforts to ensure that prohibited 
discrimination is not approved under the auspices of 
legitimate conduct, and a plaintiff’s ability, to prove 
discrimination [i.e. deliberate indifference rising to the level 
of discriminatory intent] indirectly, circumstantially, must not 
be crippled . . . because of crabbed notions of relevance or 
excessive mistrust of juries.”  Cort Furniture, 85 F.3d at 1082 
(internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis in original).   
 
 Moreover, the practical problems of proof in cases 
such as this counsel in favor of the same kind of practical 
assessment of proof that the courts have adopted pursuant to 
the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 
analysis.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, at 411 
U.S. 792, 802 & n.13 (1973). The District Court 
acknowledged the flexible nature of the proof required to 
establish a prima facie case. The court explained: “the prima 





context in which it is applied.” 826 F.3d at 758 (quoting 
Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 
2003)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  Yet, 
the court’s inquiry was inconsistent with the flexible 
approach the court acknowledged it must adopt. 
 
 With respect to the MAP presentation and the 
attendant authentication testimony from Dr. Barbara Moore-
Williams, the District Court and the Majority commit 
different errors.  The District Court abused its discretion by 
failing to admit the MAP presentation because it held that the 
document was improperly authenticated under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 901(a).  On the other hand, the Majority 
ostensibly does not contest the admissibility of the document 
and instead simply holds that it is insufficient to demonstrate 
that the LMSD intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs.  
Such a position is problematic because it places an improper 
burden on the Plaintiffs, and again transgresses into fact-
finding.  The MAP testimony is admissible and 
admissibility—not probative weight, is the focus of a 
summary judgment inquiry. 
  
 As an initial matter, it is important to understand what 
the MAP presentation is.  During discovery, LMSD disclosed 
a PowerPoint presentation entitled “Minority Achievement 
Program” (MAP) on LMSD letterhead dated October 2010 
that the District Court deemed inadmissible because it was 
not properly authenticated.  That was an abuse of discretion 
that had a very significant impact on this litigation, and threw 
one more obstacle in the path of having a jury determine the 
validity of Plaintiffs’ allegations against this school district. 
  
 The MAP “document lists alleged characteristics of 
African-American students, including a preference for ‘tactile 
learning’ and ‘[s]ubdued lighting’ that they ‘[r]ely heavily on 
visual input rather than auditory input,’ and that they ‘[r]eact 
intensely to being praised or criticized.’” Blunt, 826 
F.Supp.2d at 761 (brackets in original).  The District Court 
refused to consider the contents of the brochure because “the 
record does not reveal who created this document or under 
what circumstances and what position the creator or creators 
occupied within the School District.  There is no evidence 





majority agrees with the District Court that the fundamental 
problem with admitting the MAP testimony is the lack of 
evidence that it was used, noting that it “assume[s] the 
contention that this presentation, if used by LMSD, would 
provide evidence of discriminatory intent, or deliberate 
indifference to a third party’s discriminatory intent.”  
Majority Op. at 82. 
  
 Dr. Barbara Moore-Williams, Ed. D. is an educational 
consultant retained by LMSD to assist LMSD in addressing 
issues of racial disparity in educational placements.  She was 
retained by LMSD’s Assistant Principal after he saw her give 
a presentation at a consortium of area schools.  J.A. at 1410.  
Her presentation addressed the issue of “cultural proficiency” 
and educational success “as a national issue.”  Id. at 1411.  
According to Moore-Williams, the Assistant Principal was 
apparently interested in retaining her because he thought her 
work and information would be helpful to LMSD.  Id. at 
1410.  Her work focused on “cultural proficiency among staff 
that teach children who are not their culture, their race, their 
ethnicity, and the need to pay attention to African-American 
males who are struggling in America to get an education . . . 
.” Id.  
  
 The District Court refused to consider the entirety of 
Dr. Moore-Williams’s testimony that LMSD “discriminated 
against African-Americans” because she also testified that 
“there is racism in all school districts and that Lower Merion 
School District’s problems are no different from any other 
suburban school district.”  Blunt, 828 F.Supp.2d at 761.21  
The District Court thought that Dr. Moore-Williams’ 
testimony was little more than her “personal belief and 
hearsay statements of others.”  Id.  The District Court 
concluded that for these reasons, “her statements cannot 
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the School 
District’s intent to discriminate.”  Id.  My colleagues agree.  
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 When asked directly whether, based on her experience and 
conversations with LMSD personnel regarding prejudice in 
the teaching staff, there was any prejudice in the teaching 
staff, she stated that “[b]ased on [her] experience, there’s 
prejudice in everybody.  So, yes, there’s prejudice in the 





Majority Op. at 89-90.  Regardless, parts of her testimony 
were nevertheless admissible for the purpose of shedding 
light on the MAP PowerPoint. 
  
 As I have just noted, that PowerPoint purported to list 
several things that were characteristic of the way African-
American students learn.  It stated in part: 
 
 “Many African-American students prefer: 
  
 more kinesthetic/tactile learning. 
 subdued lighting rather than bright light. 
 rely heavily on visual input rather than 
auditory input. 
 respond to cooperative learning. 
 simultaneous talk instead of alternating 
talk. 
 to study while music or conversation 
occurs in the room.. 
 outer-directed rather than egocentric 
focus. 
 more active environments v. sedentary 
learning environments of American 
Schools. 
 rely more on information from their 
surroundings. 
 
J.A. at 1838.  During her deposition, Moore-Williams was 
asked if she had “ever heard a teacher or a staff member from 
Lower Merion School District discuss the use of visual input 
rather than auditory input in their classrooms.”  Id. at 1414.  
She affirmed that she had.  Id.  She was then asked about each 
of the items listed in the MAP PowerPoint. Id.  Counsel 
referred to them by their place on the list. Id.  Although she 
had not heard teachers refer to each of the bullet points, she 
had heard teachers refer to some of them.  Id.  The following 
exchange occurred as counsel took Moore-Williams through 
the PowerPoint:  
 Q. [W]ith regard to the fourth bullet point concerning 
highly cooperative learning? 
 A.. Yes. 
 Q. That has been implemented? 





 Q. And has the fifth bullet point concerning 
simultaneous talk instead alternating  talk been 
implemented in Lower Merion School District? 
 A. Yes. 
 Q. And what about the use of music of conversation in 
the room while studying? 
 A. I haven’t heard. 
 Q. And that was the sixth bullet point.  Now, what 
about the seventh bullet point  concerning the outer-
directed rather than egocentric focus? 
 A. No.  
 Q. And what about the eighth bullet point concerning,  
I believe you said, more  active environments versus 
sedentary learning environments.? 
 A. Yes. 
 Q. And how have teachers described . . . active 
environments versus sedentary  learning environments with 
African-American students in the district? 
 A. Kind of along with cooperative learning, because 
cooperative learning is active.    So it’s in conjunction with, 
we need to do more things where the kids are up and about 
and interacting with each other.
22
  
Id. at 1414.   
 
 Although Moore-Williams could not corroborate that 
the MAP PowerPoint presentation had been used in its 
entirety, the District Court abused its discretion by so 
focusing on the generalities of her beliefs about the extent to 
which all public schools are infected with some degree of 
racism that it overlooked the fact that her testimony was 
relevant to establishing the very fact the District Court found 
lacking - that teachers had adopted the MAP PowerPoint (at 
least in part). 
 
 My colleagues conclude that because “Dr. Moore-
Williams did not testify about the MAP presentation itself,” it 
necessarily follows that her testimony “does not establish 
who prepared the presentation, or whether LMSD ever used it 
or for what purpose.”  Majority Op. at 83.  The conclusion 
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 “Cooperative learning” is the 14th bullet point on the MAP 
PowerPoint: “Function better under cooperative conditions.” 





fails to consider the detail with which Moore-Williams 
referred to the presentation. 
 
 More importantly, it does not refute the admissibility 
of the testimony or the presentation.  While the District Court 
disputed the authenticity of the presentation, the Majority 
does not identify any such failure to meet the requirements of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a).  Perhaps this is because 
authentication under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) is an 
incredibly “slight” burden, which may be satisfied by simply 
producing “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.”  Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).  
 
 My colleagues concede that Moore-Williams  
“indicated that she heard of certain bullet points,” but they 
argue that “she noted that they were not related to African-
American students.  At most, her testimony is relevant to the 
extent that she heard from LMSD personnel that they used 
different teaching strategies for particular students.”  Majority 
Op. at 83.  My colleagues then dismiss the probative value of 
Moore-Williams’ testimony because she did not testify that 
she heard teachers specifically connect the  MAP strategies to 
African-American students.  However, the portion of the 
MAP document quoted above begins with the statement: 
“Many African-American students prefer . . .”.  The fact that 
Moore-Williams did not hear teachers mention African-
American students when discussing the unique learning styles 
suggested in the MAP presentation is clearly fodder for 
defense counsel’s closing argument at trial.  It is not a reason 
to ignore the existence of a disputed fact.  While Moore-
Williams’ testimony need only place relevant “dots” into 
evidence, Plaintiffs should be able to rely on the resulting 
inferences to connect them.  They should not, however, have 
to explicitly connect all of the dots, color in the resulting 
image, and frame the picture to survive summary judgment.  
There is enough on the record to support an inference that the 
distinct teaching approaches were aimed at African-American 
students given the language of the MAP presentation and the 
specificity of Moore-Williams’ testimony about what she 
heard certain teachers discussing.  
 
 Moore-Williams’ testimony, taken along with the 





LMSD both was a proprietor of and, through their teachers 
and other personnel, used the MAP.  The document is on 
LMSD’s letterhead in its header and LMSD supplied it in 
discovery.  There is no suggestion that it was fabricated, and 
neither the Majority nor the District Court contest the veracity 
of the document.  Yet, because Plaintiffs could not identify 
the author of this document it was deemed inadmissible.   
 
 As a final matter, the Majority contends that the 
District Court properly rejected Moore-Williams’ testimony 
as inadmissible hearsay.  Majority Op. at 89-90.  However, 
Moore-Williams was testifying about statements teachers 
made to her about the conclusions in the MAP.  It certainly 
appears that the statements were made by teachers acting 
within the scope of their duties as teachers at LMSD, and 
neither my colleagues nor the District Court suggest anything 
to the contrary.  Accordingly, those statements were not 
hearsay.  They were party opponent admissions.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (noting that a statement is not hearsay 
when “[t]he statement is offered against an opposing party 
and . . . was made by the party’s agent or employee on a 
matter within the scope of that relationship and while it 
existed.”).  
 
D.  Testimony of Psychologists and Parents Supports 
Plaintiffs’ Contention that Race is a Factor in Assigning 
Students to Special Education Classes 
 
 Plaintiffs produced the expert Rebuttal Report of 
Tawanna J. Jones, Ed. S. Certified School Psychologist.  See 
id. at 2306.  Her Curriculum Vitae was attached to her report, 
and her expertise in the appropriate areas is not disputed.
23
  
She was retained by Plaintiffs to rebut the expert report of 
Reschly, LMSD’s expert.  Jones was specifically asked to 
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 Jones was then serving as a Certified School Psychologist 
for the School District of Philadelphia. Her primary 
responsibilities included evaluating students and determining 
eligibility for Special Education Services.  She was also a 
collaborative team member working to ensure proper student 
placement, provision of adequate services, “development of 
appropriate behavioral and academic goals, and transition 





give her expert opinion about “whether: (1) each of the 
student Plaintiffs were properly identified by [LMSD] as 
having a learning disability; (2) based on LMSD’s placement 
of each student Plaintiffs [sic] into low level and/or special 
education classes, were the student Plaintiffs denied the 
equality of education they should have otherwise received . . . 
.” Id. at 2307-08.  Jones found that the students whose files 
she reviewed were erroneously evaluated by the school 
district.  See J.A. at 2318-20.  Specifically, as discussed 
below, three of the plaintiffs, Q.G, C.H., and S.H., were 
incorrectly placed in special education courses although they 
did not meet the criteria for placement in those courses.  Id.  
Jones’s testimony is corroborated and supported by the 
testimony of Dr. Barbara Shapiro, Ph.D. the Assistant 
Director of Pupil Services, who supervised school 
psychologists at LMSD.   
 
 Jones opined that Plaintiff Q.G., an African-American 
student at LMSD, “was incorrectly identified by LMSD as a 
student who met the criteria for a Learning Disability in the 
area of Language Arts.” Id. at 2318.  She added: “[a]s an 
initial matter of import, Language Arts is not a disability 
category.”  Id. at 2318 (emphasis in original).  Thus, even 
assuming the accuracy of LMSD’s conclusion that Q.G. was 
deficient in Language Arts, according to the undisputed 
testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, that should not have resulted 
in Q.G. being placed in special education classes.  Q.G.’s 
academic skills then declined over time “after being placed in 
Special Education.”  Id. at 2319 (emphasis in original).  
 
 The dubious nature of Q.G.’s placement based on a 
single deficiency is corroborated by the testimony of Shapiro.  
Shapiro began working in the LMSD in the fall of 2003 as 
Assistant Director of Pupil Services. J.A. at 1387.  She 
supervised ten school psychologists in that capacity until 
March 1, 2009, during that time she “collaborated with the 
special ed supervisors regarding special ed services district 
wide.”  Id.   
 
 Shapiro testified that no student should ever be placed 
into special education classes based on one score.  Id. at 
1393.  “As a psychologist, you would look at the entire 





on one piece of information.”  Id.  Yet, that was not the 
process used to place Q.G. in special education classes that 
she did not need, and which impeded her educational 
development.  
 
 Shapiro also testified that LMSD did not comply with 
the American Psychological Association’s protocol for record 
retention.  J.A. at 1397.  This meant that testing protocols that 
determined students’ placement in classes were sometimes 
destroyed before parents could examine (and thereby 
challenge) them.  Although parents were informed that they 
had a right to request these protocols, Shapiro did not believe 
that parents were ever informed of this shortened retention 
policy.  The result was that parents would often ask to see 
their child’s testing protocols, only to learn they had already 




 Jones also opined that the initial evaluation for another 
African-American student, Plaintiff C.H., “provided a clear 
indication, that there were deficits and needs in the areas of 
Reading Comprehension and Basic reading skills (reading 
decoding).”  However, “[t]here was no evidence, . . . that she 
met the criteria for SLD [specific learning disability] in the 
area of Written Expression or Mathematics.”  Id. at 2319.  
Jones believed that the absence of data made it impossible to 
give C.H. the support she needed to address the one area 
where she appeared deficient, and still allow her to progress 
normally in the areas where the need for such support was not 
indicated.  Id. at 2319-20.  
 
 Jones’ evaluation of yet another student, Plaintiff S.H., 
may be the most troubling.  “All of S.H.’s skills and abilities 
measured in the ‘Average’ range at the point of the initial 
assessment . . . .  Despite the lack of evidence required to 
determine eligibility, the evaluator labeled S.H. as meeting 
the criteria for a SLD and subsequently doomed S.H. to an 
academic experience [in special ed – low expectation courses] 
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 I mention this evidence merely to illustrate the extent to 
which Plaintiffs raised genuine disputes of material facts 
regarding those claims and they should have been resolved by 
a fact finder.  I am not suggesting that this necessarily proves 





that impeded her development rather than remediated or 
accelerated her academic progress.”  Id. at 2320.  According 
to Dr. Jones, “[i]t is evident from the data provided that S.H. 
was never a candidate for Special Education under the 
auspices of a SLD.” Id.  In her view, “[i]t is apparent that 
subsequent evaluators either were not aware of the criteria for 
a SLD or intentionally chose to ignore the criteria as 
demonstrated by the fact that S.H.’s not initially meeting the 
criteria for SLD was never subsequently addressed by 
LMSD.” Id. 
 
 S.H.’s mother testified that she did not believe her 
daughter was denied educational services per se, but was 
troubled because S.H. was placed in lower level courses that 
were not demanding.  S.H.’s mother did not initially object to 
the placement because she received letters from LMSD 
informing her that S.H. was receiving reading support, which 
S.H.’s mother interpreted as giving her daughter extra help.  
She said that “[N]obody in the school told [her] that it was a 
remedial course, no.  I just thought it was an enrichment.  It 
was presented as an enrichment course to help kids with 
reading.  So, to me, more is better.”25  Id. at 1165.  Like most 
of the parents here, S.H.’s mother did not initially object 
because she trusted the school officials and assumed they 
were acting in S.H.’s best interests.  S.H.’s mother testified 
that she finally objected to S.H.’s placement after an 
independent psychologist evaluated S.H. in tenth grade and 
concluded that S.H. did not have a learning disability.  
According to the mother, the school then gave her 
“pushback.”  Id. at 1167; see generally, id. at 1153-67.   This 
pushback demonstrates that the school was aware of the 
issues involved in S.H.’s placement, and responded in a 
manner that a jury could conclude was deliberately 
indifferent.  
 
 The differing kinds of omissions and irregularities 
evidenced by Dr. Jones’ assessment of the placements of 
Q.G., C.H., S.H., as well as Shapiro’s testimony, reflect some 
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 Although the District Court held that S.H.’s mother’s 
testimony was inadmissible with respect to other issues (third 
hand accounts of teachers’ statements to students), this 





of the difficulties in the way this case has been litigated as 
well as some of the conceptual difficulties and confusion 
inherent in the litigation posture here.  Indeed, counsel for 
CBP addressed this concern at oral argument: 
 
The general confusion in this case is that 
initially there were special-education claims in 
the case; those claims were dismissed because 
of failure to exhaust. There were also Title VI 
claims.  What happened was, through the course 
of discovery and though the process of 
evaluations, the children discovered that . . . 
most of them had never had the disabilities that 




Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Blunt v. Lower Merion 
School District, --F.3d-- (Nos. 11-4200, 11-4201, 11-4315).  
At the risk of repetition: “the totality of the evidence . . . must 
guide our analysis rather than the strength of each individual 
argument.”  Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 991 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
  In response to this glaring evidence in support of 
Plaintiffs’ claims that they were placed into special education 
classes because of their race rather than their relative 
academic need, the Majority simply makes a blanket assertion 
that “if the same evaluation procedures are used for all 
students or [sic] their race there is simply no discrimination.”  
Majority Op. at 93.   This statement is deeply problematic for 
two reasons. First, it assumes that the procedures themselves 
cannot be discriminatory. Second, and most importantly here, it 
assumes the “procedures” comprise the whole of the evaluation, 
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 The District Court commented on what it must have seen as 
a “moving target” by noting: “[i]n their brief in opposition to 
the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs now assert that 
they are not disabled and were wrongly placed in special 
education programs on the basis of race. This assertion that 
they are not disabled is in stark contrast to the Third 
Amended Complaint . . .” Blunt, 826 F.Supp.2d at 753. 
However, for purposes of deciding the summary judgment 
motion, the District Court assumed that the student plaintiffs 





thus ignoring the discretion and subjectivity afforded the examiner 
who is applying the procedures and interpreting the results of the 
evaluations. 
 
 As noted above, clearly the procedures were not 
applied appropriately with respect to Plaintiffs.  LMSD’s own 
Assistant Director of Pupil Services testified that procedures 
were not followed, including those for dictating which 
students should be placed in special education classes.  See 
supra at 71-72.  For instance, as noted above, LMSD 
evaluated Q.G. as having a learning disability in the subject 
of language arts, which is not even a disability category.  J.A. 
at 2318.  This directly belies the Majority’s broad assertion 
that as long as the procedures are neutral, the consequences 
cannot, as a matter of law, be considered discriminatory.  
Similar procedures and evaluative tools can always be applied 
in patently discriminatory ways, and evidence of their 
misapplication with respect to the Plaintiffs is certainly 
evidence of discrimination and deliberate indifference.  See 
infra n. 16 at 34. 
 
 It is, of course, possible to argue that the errors in 
placement on this record are simply the result of the district’s 
less than desirable and inartful method of selecting students 
for special education classes.  Mistakes can surely happen, 
especially in such a complicated, subtle and intricate process 
as identifying students who cannot handle regular academic 
work in a classroom.  However, LMSD had every opportunity 
to come forward with evidence that numbers of White 
students are also mistakenly placed in special education 
classes and that could have negated the causal nexus of the 
erroneous placement of these African-American plaintiffs.  It 
offered no such evidence.  
 
 Even if it could be argued that the decision to forego 
production of any such evidence results from political 
considerations rather than absence of such proof (and nothing 
on this record supports such rank speculation), the fact 
remains that this record only contains evidence of African-
American students erroneously being labeled as “learning 
disabled” and being denied the full benefits of a public 
education.  There is no evidence of this happening with White 





prevent the LMSD from getting an evidentiary bye. 
Moreover, to the extent that innocent mistakes happen in 
placement, it should be noted that, where the more 
challenging curricula is concerned, all such mistakes seem to 
happen in only one direction.  There were no African-
American students in “high expectation,” college prep or 
advanced placement classes in the school district during the 
years the experts studied.  Speculation about diagnostic error 
is simply that—“speculation;” it should play no role in our 
legal inquiry. 
 
F.  There is Testimony that Teachers and School 
Administrators Had Notice of These Allegations 
 
 Plaintiffs have also put forward sufficient evidence of 
deliberate indifference.  They established that LMSD was 
aware of the racial problems arising from the classroom 
assignments and provision of resources, and it ignored 
Plaintiffs’ requests to remedy the racial disparities.  As noted 
in the section on CBP’s standing above, Ms. Metzger, a 
former special education teacher at LMSD, testified that as a 
teacher she “was invited to and sat in on a portion of a 
Concerned Black Parents conversation with some of the 
school administrators.”  J.A. at 1456.  At this meeting, parents 
and students raised concerns that “African-American 
students, as a whole, as we have discussed, were not 
performing at the same rate, not experiencing the same 
success as other students; that [African American families in 
the District] believed that [African American] students didn’t 
feel welcome in the school; that [African American families 
in the District] believed that at times, guidance counselors or 
others, personnel, maybe didn’t afford the same consideration 
when it came to the college planning process.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  As Metzger’s testimony makes clear, the “school 
administrators” who attended this meeting along with her had 
notice that African American families had complained that 
they were not receiving the same education as their peers, 
and, yet, nothing changed. 
 
 In addition, as I discussed above, when the mother of 
one of these plaintiffs objected to her daughter being 
identified as having a learning disability, the school gave her 





appropriateness of her daughter’s placement in special 
education.  J.A. at 1167. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  
We all recognize the difficulty of identifying students who are 
best served by the kind of remediation that special education 
classes are intended to provide. and that no process of 
evaluation is perfect.  However, this case is not about second-
guessing the placement of students in remedial classes.  It is 
not about frustrated hopes of parents or students.  And, 
despite the specter of the The Quota Boogeyman raised by the 
Majority,
27
 it is not about how many African-American 
students should be placed in a particular academic track.   
  
 This case is about whether courts will allow plaintiffs 
who have produced the kind of proof that I have discussed 
above to survive summary judgment and have their day in 
court to prove something as subjective and evasive as the 
deliberate indifference that is tantamount to racial bias. 
  
 When plaintiffs can produce the kind of evidence that 
has been produced here, the law requires that their ultimate 
claims of bias be determined by a fact finder, not by a court.  
As Judge Baylson stated in Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist.:“The Supreme Court has clarified that [d]etermining 
whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”  689 F. 
Supp. 2d at 755. (emphasis in original, internal quotation 
marks omitted).  That is sorely lacking here. 
  
 I also note the laudable caution of Judge Baylson in 
Doe 1, in explaining: “[this] Court is particularly reluctant to 
grant summary judgment and to deny Plaintiffs the right to 
trial in this case, which involves issues of public policy and 
great concern to the community.” Id.  
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 See Majority Op. at 94 (“We certainly are not going to 
require or even suggest that school districts use a quota 






 I therefore must respectfully disagree with my 
colleagues’ belief that the District Court did not err in 
concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact exists on 
this record. 
